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CASE COMMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-UNITED STATES V WAYTE. THE BIG
CHILL ON VOCAL DRAFT NONREGISTRANTS
A defendant contending that he has been singled out for prose-
cution from among a large number of alleged lawbreakers is not new.
As early as 1886, in Yick Yo v. Hopkns,1 Chinese defendants claimed
that building code regulations in San Francisco were being enforced
against them alone. This selective prosecution defense rests upon the
fourteenth amendment guarantee that no state shall "deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."'2 In
United States v. Wayte,3 David Alan Wayte was indicted for failing to
register for the draft.4 The district court dismissed the indictment,
finding that the government had selectively prosecuted Wayte.5 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, find-
ing that Wayte had not shown selective prosecution.6 The court ap-
plied the equal protection test, requiring the defendant to show
governmental discriminatory motive.7
Although a selective prosecution case is grounded in equal pro-
tection, a case like Wayte involves another important constitutional
consideration: the first amendment right to free speech. The intro-
duction of first amendment rights into the selective prosecution de-
fense raises new concerns. Many courts, in other first amendment
contexts, have applied a test which focuses on the effect of the con-
duct, rather than analyzing motive. Thus, although the court in
United States v. Wayte applied the traditional equal protection test, the
first amendment values involved may be strong enough to justify ap-
plying an "effect" test when protected speech is involved in a tradi-
tional selective prosecution fact pattern.
This comment examines the holding in Wayte and its effect on
both first amendment rights and the selective prosecution defense.
Part I explains the facts and holding of United States v. Wayte. Part II
looks at the history of the selective prosecution defense, from its equal
1 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
2 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
3 710 F.2d 1385 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 2655 (1984).
4 Id. at 1386.
5 Id.
6 Id. at 1387.
7 Id
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protection roots to more recent cases, including Wayte. Finally, Part
III examines the Wayte holding, the selective prosecution defense,
and the right to free speech. This comment concludes that first
amendment analysis is appropriate when protected speech is in-
volved in a selective prosecution claim.
I. United States v. Wayte
In 1980, President Carter issued a Presidential Proclamation
which required all males within a certain age group to register with
the Selective Service System.8 David Alan Wayte, the petitioner in
this case, fell into the class of required registrants but did not regis-
ter.9 Instead, he wrote letters to the Selective Service and the Presi-
dent informing them that he had not registered and did not plan to
register.'0 Wayte wrote another letter six months later, restating his
refusal and adding that he would be traveling the country encourag-
ing resistance to registration."
The Selective Service followed a policy of "passive enforcement"
with regard to draft nonregistrants. 12 Under that system, the Selec-
tive Service prosecuted only those nonregistrants who were brought
to its attention by either third party reports or by self-admission.' 3
United States Attorneys notified Wayte by letter that prosecution
was possible if he did not register within a specified time period. 14
Wayte ignored this warning and on July 22, 1982, he was indicted
for failure to register, in violation of 50 U.S.C. app. § 462.15
The district court granted Wayte's motion to dismiss, conclud-
ing that the government's passive enforcement policy resulted in the
selective prosecution of the defendant.' 6 Two factors led to this deci-
sion. First, Judge Hatter stated that of the approximately 500,000
males who failed to register for the draft, only eleven were prose-
cuted.' 7 Of these eleven, all were vocal opponents of the govern-
8 "Male citizens of the United States. . . who were born on or after January 1, 1960
. . . shall present themselves for registration .... " Proclamation No. 4771, 45 Fed. Reg.
45,247 (1980).
9 Wayle, 710 F.2d at 1386
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id. at 1387.
15 Id.
16 United States v. Wayte, 549 F. Supp. 1376, 1391 (C.D. Cal. 1982), rev d, 710 F.2d 1385
(9th Cir. 1983), cerl. granted, 104 S. Ct. 2655 (1984).
17 549 F. Supp at 1379.
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ment's registration policy. 18 In addition, the court believed that the
government, with access to Social Security records, could have easily
located vocal violators.19 Judge Hatter concluded, therefore, that
while the government could have investigated and prosecuted silent
violators of the draft regulation, they chose to prosecute only vocal
nonregistrants. 20 Second, the government's normal prosecution pro-
cedure was not followed in the investigation of vocal nonregistrants. 2 1
The Presidential Military Manpower Taskforce, the United States
Justice Department, and the White House, through Presidential
Counselor Edwin Meese III, were involved in the decisions. 22 Thus,
the court felt that this "involvement of high Government officials in
enforcement and prosecution decisions regarding nonregistrants
strongly suggest[ed] impermissible selective prosecution. ' 23
Based on these two factors, the district court held that Wayte
established a prima facie case of selective prosecution. 24 The court
shifted the burden of proof to the government to establish that its
passive enforcement policy was not designed to discourage the exer-
cise of first amendment rights. 25 The government, in refusing to
comply with Wayte's discovery requests and subsequent court orders,
failed to rebut the inference of impropriety.2 6 Therefore, the district
court dismissed the indictment. 2 7
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district
court's decision for two reasons. 28 First, Judge Wright, writing for
the majority, noted that Wayte's evidence did not demonstrate an
impermissible motive.2 9 Rather, it showed only that the government
was aware that the passive enforcement system would result in the
prosecution of moral and vocal objectors.30 According to the court,
"Wayte made no showing that the government focused its investiga-
tion on him because of his protest activities."'3' Second, the court
18 Id. at 1381.
19 Id
20 Id
21 Id at 1382.
22 Id
23 Id. at 1383.
24 Id. at 1382.
25 Id
26 Id.
27 Id. at 1385.
28 United States v. Wayte, 710 F.2d 1385 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 2655
(1984).
29 Id. at 1387.
30 Id.
31 Id.
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determined that the government's justifications for its passive en-
forcement policy were logical and did not evidence an impermissible
motive.3 2 The court accepted the government's claim that the identi-
ties of nonvocal violators could not be established.33 Therefore,
Judge Wright reasoned that the government could logically prose-
cute vocal violators; since their identities were the only ones known
to the government.34 The court also found merit in the government's
contention that its interest in prosecuting wilful violators justified the
use of passive enforcement.3 5 The Wayte court stated that the govern-
ment "may, in making prosecutorial decisions, consider whether the
potential defendants have, by their public statements or otherwise,
made clear their actual or intended participation in the illegal activ-
ity."36 Therefore, since Wayte made no showing that he was prose-
cuted because he exercised his first amendment rights, and the
government's justifications for its passive enforcement system de-
feated the inference of improper motive, the court held that the dis-
trict court's finding of selective prosecution was clearly erroneous.3 7
Judge Schroeder, writing in dissent, stated that "an enforcement
procedure focusing solely upon vocal offenders is inherently sus-
pect. 38 She believed the key question was whether the government
sufficiently explained the passive enforcement policy by showing that
it was motivated by concerns other than suppression of Wayte's criti-
cisms.3 9 She maintained that the government's justifications did not
defeat the inference of an improper motive.40
Judge Schroeder argued that nonvocal nonregistrants could
have been traced easily.41 "The district court noted that a law stu-
dent armed only with a telephone was able to obtain lists, from sev-
eral randomly chosen states, of persons legally required to register;
those lists could have been compared with the government's list of
actual registrants to locate violators. '42 In addition, the dissent con-
tended that the offender's statements were not necessary to establish
32 Id. at 1388.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id
37 Id.
38 702 F.2d 1385, 1390 (9th Cir. 1983) (Schroeder, J., dissenting).
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Id
42 Id.
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the wilfulness of the violators. 43 Before deciding to prosecute, the
government wrote to each suspected violator offering him a chance
to comply with the law.44 Only those who ignored this warning were
prosecuted. 45 Schroeder thus reasoned that "the government had a
method, independent of suspected violators' communications, for ex-
cluding from prosecution persons who might have an innocent expla-
nation for failing to register."'46 For these reasons, Judge Schroeder
concluded that the passive enforcement policy punished Wayte be-
cause he spoke out rather than because he violated the law.47 Wayte
was impermissibly prosecuted because he exercised his first amend-
ment rights.48
II. The Selective Prosecution Defense
A. The Ilstoy of Selective Prosecution.: Roots in Equal Protection
The selective prosecution defense has its roots in suspect class
equal protection analysis. In Yick Wo v. Hopkins,49 the Supreme
Court struck down a facially valid ordinance because of its discrimi-
natory enforcement. The municipal ordinance in question required
all those who operated laundries in wooden buildings to obtain a
license. The Court voided the law because it was administered by
public authorities "with an evil eye and an unequal hand" 50 to dis-
criminate against Chinese laundry owners. The Court held that
equal protection of the laws is denied when state officials enforce a
valid statute in discriminatory fashion.5'
Following the foundation laid in Yick Wo, the Supreme Court inQyler v. Boles52 considered the selective prosecution defense in a crimi-
nal context for the first time. The defendant was prosecuted under
West Virginia's habitual criminal statute upon his third felony con-
viction. In 0yler, the defendant challenged the constitutionality of
the state's enforcement of the statute, alleging that of the six men
subject to prosecution as habitual offenders in his county, he was the
only man sentenced under the statute. This, he argued, was a viola-
43 Id.
44 Id
45 Id
46 Id
47 Id.
48 Id at 1389.
49 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
50 Id. at 373-74.
51 Id. at 374.
52 368 U.S. 448 (1962).
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tion of the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution.
The Court rejected the defendant's challenge, stating that some selec-
tivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional violation
so long as the selection was not deliberately based on an unjustifiable
standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification. 53Using Oyler, the court in United States v. Berrios54 developed a
two-prong test for deciding whether a defendant has been selectively
prosecuted in violation of the equal protection clause:
To support a defense of selective or disciminatory [sic] prosecu-
tion, a defendant bears the heavy burden of establishing, at least
pn'nafacie, (1) that, while others similarly situated have not gen-
erally been proceeded against because of conduct of the type
forming the basis of the charge against him, he has been singled
out for prosecution, and (2) that the government's discriminatory
selection of him for prosecution has been invidious or in bad
faith, i.e., based upon such impermissible considerations as race,
religion, or the desire to prevent his exercise of constitutional rghts.
These two essential elements are sometimes referred to as "inten-
tional and purposeful discrimination. '55
This test has been adopted in a majority of the federal circuits. 5 6
Thus, the selective prosecution defense is couched in the equal pro-
tection language suggested by the Supreme Court in 0yler v. Boles.5 7
In applying the test, the initial presumption is that the govern-
ment has undertaken the prosecution in good faith. 58 When a de-
fendant raises a reasonable doubt of intentional discrimination, he
establishes a prima facie case of selective prosecution. 59 At this stage,
two benefits accrue to the defendant. The burden of proof shifts to
53 Id. at 456; see also Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978).
54 501 F.2d 1207 (2d Cir. 1974).
55 Id. at 1211 (emphasis added).
56 See, e.g., United States v. Mangieri, 694 F.2d 1270 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Barton v. Malley,
626 F.2d 151 (10th Cir. 1980); United States v. Murdock, 548 F.2d 599 (5th Cir. 1977);
United States v. Ojala, 544 F.2d 940 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Leggett & Platt, Inc.,
542 F.2d 655 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 945 (1977); United States v. Bourque, 541
F.2d 290 (Ist Cir. 1976); United States v. Peskin, 527 F.2d 71 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 818 (1976); United States v. Scott, 521 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 955
(1976).
57 368 U.S. 448 (1962).
58 United States v. Falk, 479 F.2d 616, 620 (7th Cir. 1973) ("The presumption is always
that a prosecution for violation of a criminal law is undertaken in good faith and in nondis-
criminatory fashion for the purpose of fulfilling a duty to bring violators to justice.").
59 See United States v. Catlett, 584 F.2d 864, 866 (8th Cir. 1978) ("A hearing is necessi-
tated only when the motion. . . raises a reasonable doubt as to the prosecutor's purpose.');
United States v. Falk, 479 F.2d 616, 620-21 (7th Cir. 1973) ("However, when a defendant
alleges intentional purposeful discrimination and presents facts sufficient to raise a reasonable
doubt about the prosecutor's purpose, we think a different question is raised.').
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the government to prove nondiscriminatory enforcement of the
law.60 In addition, the court may order an evidentiary hearing on
the issue of selective prosecution. 61 The defendant may then petition
the government to comply with his discovery requests. 62 Since the
government may not be willing to release the requested documents,
establishing a prima facie case may result in dismissal of the
indictment.6 3
B. Beginning of a Change. Introduction of the First Amendment into
Selective Prosecution Cases
Courts have eased the strict requirement of showing discrimina-
tory motive in some cases where the exercise of free speech is alleged
to have been the impermissible consideration in the decision to prose-
cute. While no court has expressly used a more lenient test, it seems
that courts have interpreted the law and facts more favorably for
defendants when speech is involved. This is consistent with the
courts' overall tendency to place the right of free speech "on the
highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values."' 64
In United States v. Oaks,65 the defendant was convicted of wilfully
failing to file a tax return. 66 He contended that he was prosecuted
solely because of his public protests against government tax poli-
60 United States v. Falk, 479 F.2d 616, 621 (7th Cir. 1973) ("The particular circum-
stances of this case .. compelled the government to accept the burden of proving nondis-
criminatory enforcement of the law. . ").
61 See, e.g., United States v. Schmucker, 721 F.2d 1046 (6th Cir. 1983) (evidentiary hear-
ing on the question of selective prosecution granted); United States v. Wayte, 549 F. Supp.
1376 (C.D. Cal. 1982) (evidentiary hearing on the question of selective prosecution), re'd on
other grounds, 710 F.2d 1385 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 2655 (1984).
62 See, e.g., United States v. Oaks, 508 F.2d 1403, 1405 (9th Cir. 1974) ("If the defendant
makes an initial factual showing of impermissible discrimination, then the trial court may, in
the exercise of its discretion, require disclosure of relevant privileged information.'; United
States v. Berrios, 501 F.2d 1207, 1211 (2d Cir. 1974) (showing colorable basis entitles defend-
ant to subpoena documentary evidence required to establish a selective prosecution defense).
In camera inspection may be available. See United States v. Oaks, 508 F.2d 1403, 1405
(9th Cir. 1974); United States v. Berrios, 501 F.2d 1207, 1212-13 (2d Cir. 1974).
63 United States v. Wayte, 549 F. Supp. 1376 (C.D. Cal 1982) (dismissal for failing to
cooperate in discovery), rev'd, 710 F.2d 1385 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 2655
(1984).
64 NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982) (citing Carey v. Brown, 447
U.S. 455, 467 (1980)). In a dispute over civil rights, leaders of the NAACP launched a boy-
cott against white merchants. The boycott consisted of picketing, though some acts of vio-
lence did occur. The merchants sued for damages and an injunction. The state courts
allowed the plaintiffs' damages claim. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the nonvio-
lent activities were protected under the first amendment.
65 508 F.2d 1403 (9th Cir. 1974).
66 Id. at 1404.
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cies.67 On appeal, the court of appeals held that Oaks was entitled to
an evidentiary hearing on the selective prosecution question.68
"Hearings on similar pretrial objections are usually in order when
enough facts are alleged to take the question past the frivolous stage
... ) 69 The standard used by the court would allow a defendant
to obtain evidence from the government, possibly even privileged
information, 70 upon enough facts to show that his claim is not
frivolous.
In another free speech case, United States v. Steele,71 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit allowed the defendant
to shift the burden of proof on the selective prosecution issue to the
government.72 Steele was convicted for refusing to complete census
forms.73 He alleged that the government chose to prosecute him be-
cause of his involvement in a census resistance movement. 74 Steele
produced evidence that the four men who were prosecuted were in-
volved in the resistance movement. 75 In addition, he found six others
who violated the statute, but did not publicly protest and were not
prosecuted. 76 The court held that Steele "had presented evidence
which created a strong inference of discriminatory prosecution. ' ' 77
Based upon this, the court required the government to explain its
selection process. 78 Since the government did not present an expla-
nation, the court reversed the conviction. 79
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit addressed both
the burden of proof issue and the discovery of documents issue in
67 Id.
68 Id. at 1405.
69 Id. at 1404.
70 On the subject of privileged information, the court stated:
If the defendant makes an initial factual showing of impermissible discrimination,
then the trial court may, in the exercise of its discretion, require disclosure of rele-
vant privileged information. See United States v. Berrigan, 482 F.2d at 181. But
even then the court can minimize the risk to the government by holding the pro-
ceedings in camera and issuing appropriate protective orders.
508 F.2d at 1405. Thus, the defendant may be able to obtain privileged information upon a
sufficient prima facie showing. The government is still protected from being forced to disclose
sensitive information to defendants by the possibility of the in camera review.
71 461 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1972).
72 Id. at 1152.
73 Id. at 1150.
74 Id.
75 Id
76 Id. at 1151.
77 Id. at 1152.
78 Id.
79 Id.
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United States v. Falk,80 a case very similar to Wayte. Falk was con-
victed for violations of the Selective Service Act.8 ' He had alleged in
the district court that he was prosecuted because of his involvement
with a draft counseling organization. 8 2 The court refused to allow an
evidentiary hearing on the issue, and also refused to allow Falk to
introduce that evidence at trial.83 The court of appeals reversed the
conviction, holding that Falk was entitled to an evidentiary hear-
ing.8 4 The court expained its standard:
The presumption is always that a prosecution for violation of a
criminal law is undertaken in good faith and in nondiscrimina-
tory fashion for the purpose of fulfilling a duty to bring violators
to justice. However, when a defendant alleges intentional pur-
poseful discrimination and presents facts sufficient to raise a rea-
sonable doubt about the prosecutor's purpose, we think a
different question is raised. 85
The court then discussed the factors which required the government
to assume the burden of proof. Of the persuasive factors, the court
noted Falk's participation in public protest activity, his allegation
that extraordinary prosecutorial channels had been used, and his al-
legation that over 25,000 others had similarly violated the statute yet
had not been prosecuted. 8 6
These cases certainly do not provide controlling authority that a
different test should be used when speech is involved in a selective
prosecution case. The decisions do illustrate, however, that courts
may be more sensitive to the defense when the defendant alleges that
he is being prosecuted based upon his speech.
C. The Wayte Effect.- Resisting the Change
The Wayte court held that, in any selective prosecution case, the
defendant must show the government's discriminatory motive.
8 7
This is the traditional equal protection test.8 8 The test itself is the
same as the one applied in Oaks,89 Steele,90 and Falk,9 1 but the court's
80 479 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1973).
81 Id. at 618.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id. at 620-21.
86 Id. at 621-22.
87 Wayte, 710 F.2d at 1387.
88 See notes 52-57 supra and accompanying text.
89 508 F.2d 1403 (9th Cir. 1974); see notes 65-70 supra and accompanying text.
90 461 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1972); see notes 71-79 supra and accompanying text.
91 479 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1973); see notes 80-86 supra and accompanying text.
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attitude seems to have changed. 92 In those previous cases, the courts
showed a sensitivity to the defendants by allowing them to shift the
burden of proof on a lesser showing and to obtain evidentiary hear-
ings.93 While not explicitly stating it, the courts moved toward a
more tolerant test when first amendment issues were present. In-
deed, the analysis they used is similar to the standard first amend-
ment analysis, since it does not require a showing of motive.94 The
Wayte court could easily have jumped onto the bandwagon, but did
not. Instead, it retained the traditional equal protection test.
III. A Proposed Analysis: The First Amendment and the
Selective Prosecution Defense
The introduction of first amendment values into a selective pros-
ecution case warrants application of a first amendment standard of
review. This standard would focus upon the efect of a prosecutorial
process, as opposed to the actual intent of the prosecutors. 95 Such a
standard would strike a proper balance between the interests of law
enforcement and protection of free speech.
A. The First Amendment Analysis Should be Applied
In some cases, it is obvious that protected speech is involved.
United States v. Wayte is not such a case. Wayte wrote letters to the
Selective Service and the President, criticizing the draft and confess-
ing that he had violated the statute which compelled him to regis-
ter.96  The government contends that these letters are simply
confessions, and are not entitled to protection.97 While a first amend-
92 Judge Wright wrote the opinions in both Steele and Wayle. He distinguished the two
cases on the government's twofold explanation for the passive enforcement policy in Wayte:
first, that the government could not identify other violators and, second, that the vocal viola-
tors had established their wilfulness in refusing to register. Judge Schroeder refuted these
reasons in her dissent. She noted that quiet nonregistrants can be traced by comparing lists of
those required to register (presumably from driver's license or Social Security records) and
comparing those with lists of actual registrants. She also argued that wilfulness was not in
controversy. In light of the government's repeated attempts to persuade Wayte to register, his
wilfulness is established without resort to his statements. If Judge Schroeder's arguments are
to be accepted, the two cases can be reconciled, possibly, on a simple reluctance on the part of
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit to fully break from prior law.
93 See notes 65-86 supra and accompanying text.
94 See notes 101-13 infra and accompanying text.
95 See note 101 infra and accompanying text.
96 Wayte, 710 F.2d at 1386.
97 Brief for the United States at 31, Wayte v. United States, cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 2655
(1984).
1984]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
ment analysis is appropriate whenever the right to free speech is in-
volved, it cannot apply to Wayte if the letters are not found to be
protected speech. 98
Wayte's letter is a communication with two functions: it is both
a confession of a crime and an expression of opinion on government
policy. In Cohen v. Caifomia,99 Justice Harlan recognized that speech
may have more that one meaning:
Additionally, we cannot overlook the fact, because it is well illus-
trated by the episode involved here, that much linguistic expres-
sion serves a dual communicative function: it conveys not only
ideas capable of relatively precise, detached explication, but
otherwise inexpressible emotions as well. In fact, words are often
chosen as much for their emotive as their cognitive force. We
cannot sanction the view that the Constitution, while solicitous of
the cognitive content of individual speech, has little or no regard
for that emotive function which, practically speaking, may often be the
more important element of the overall message sought to be
communicated 00
Cohen stands for the proposition that expressions may convey
ideas in more than one way, and that an idea does not have to be
conveyed explicitly to be entitled to constitutional protection.
Wayte's letter was, in a cognitive sense, a confession and a criticism
of government policy. In the emotive sense that Justice Harlan de-
scribes, however, it was an exercise of a citizen's right to free speech.
98 Another possible issue, apparently not argued by the government, is Wayte's actual
protest activity. In his second letter to the Selective Service, Wayte said that he would be
"traveling the nation . . . encouraging resistance and spreading the word about peace and
disarmament." 710 F.2d at 1386. While this language is vague, it may indicate some draft
counseling activities. The Selective Service Act provides a penalty for anyone who "know-
ingly counsels, aids, or abets another to refuse or evade registration." 50 U.S.C. app. 462(a)
(1982); Offenses and Penalties: Registration Under the Military Service Act, Proclamation
No. 4771, 45 Fed. Reg. 45,247 (1980). If Wayte's activities fall within that statute, he would
be subject to prosecution independently from his failure to register. In this context, the first
amendment will not preclude prosecution, even though Wayte's counseling activities involved
speech. See United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165 (1st Cir. 1969).
99 403 U.S. 15 (1971). The appellant was convicted under California Penal Code § 415,
which prohibited "maliciously and wilfully disturb[ing] the peace or quiet of any neighbor-
hood or person. . . by. . . offensive conduct." CAL. PENAL CODE § 415 (West 1970). Co-
hen was arrested in the Los Angeles County Courthouse for wearing a jacket that bore the
words "Fuck the Draft." He said that he wore the jacket to inform the public of his feelings
about the Vietnam War and the draft. The California court's justification for the conviction
was that offensive conduct as defined in the statute was anything that might provoke others to
disturb the peace. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that "absent a more particularized
and compelling reason for its actions, the State may not, consistently with the First and Four-
teenth Amendments, make the simple public display here involved of this single four-letter
expletive a criminal offense." 403 U.S. at 26.
100 403 U.S. at 26 (emphasis added).
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In deciding whether the first amendment is implicated, this emotive,
expressive element must be considered. Based upon the,expressive
element in Wayte's letters, the impact of the first amendment cannot
be ignored.
B. First Amendment Anaysis
If, as has been argued, Wayte's letters fall within the protection
of the first amendment, the selective prosecution defense should not
follow its two-pronged equal protection path.'0 ' Two changes will
transform the traditional approach into a new first amendment selec-
tive prosecution defense. First, a showing of improper prosecutorial
motive is unnecessary to establish a prima facie case. Rather, show-
ing that the efct of the government's policy is to prosecute individu-
als because they spoke out should be sufficient to establish a prima
facie case of first amendment selective prosecution. Second, once a
prima facie case is made out, a balancing approach should be ap-
plied instead of the current "shifting the burden" method, where the
governmental interests behind the prosecutorial policy are weighed
against the impingement on first amendment freedoms. If the bene-
fits do not outweigh the burden on first amendment rights or if the
policy's impact on first amendment freedoms is greater than neces-
sary to further those interests, the policy should be declared unconsti-
tutional and the defendant's conviction reversed.
1. Relaxing the Prima Facie Showing
In practice, the Wayte decision requires the defendant to make
101 The government's argument in this area is twofold. First, it refutes Wayte's selective
prosecution claim using the traditional two-pronged equal protection test. It asserts that pas-
sive enforcement did not discriminate against Wayte because he was vocal. The government
posits that all the people prosecuted under the system shared one characteristic: they were
known to the Selective Service. Because the government prosecuted all known nonregistrants,
Wayte did not show that he was prosecuted while others similarly situated were not. In addi-
tion, the government asserts that it investigated all known nonregistrants without regard to
their exercise of first amendment rights. No one who engaged in protests and who was not
reported to the government was prosecuted. Thus, the government maintains that Wayte
simply was not discriminated against because he was vocal. Wayte selected himself for prose-
cution by reporting his violation and persistently refusing to register. Second, to the extent
that Wayte's first amendment rights were implicated, vocal nonregistrants were not imper-
missibly selected for prosecution because the passive enforcement system served legitimate
governmental purposes. Brief for the United States at 14-18, Wayte v. United States, cert
granted, 104 S. Ct. 2655 (1984).
If the court applies the equal protection test and accepts the government's argument or
applies the first amendment analysis in this section and finds that the government did have
valid justifications for its prosecutorial policy, Wayte's claim of selective prosecution will be
defeated.
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an almost direct showing of discriminatory motive to establish a
prima facie case of selective prosecution.10 2 Since a defendant largely
relies on circumstantial evidence to prove his prima facie case, 10 3 a
direct showing of improper motive is a very difficult burden to
bear. 104
The Supreme Court has stated that motive is irrelevant in evalu-
ating the acts of the government that infringe upon first amendment
rights. 10 5 In NAACP v. Alabama,10 6 the Court said that "[i]n the do-
main of these indispensable liberties, whether of speech, press, or as-
sociation, the decisions of this Court recognize that abridgement of
such rights, even though unintended, may inevitably follow from varied
forms of governmental action."' 0 7 Thus, a valid governmental pur-
pose will not immunize the act from first amendment scrutiny. 08
This strict first amendment scrutiny should allow the defendant
to establish a prima facie case of first amendment selective prosecu-
tion not by showing improper motive, but by showing that the efct
of the government's prosecutorial policy is to investigate and prose-
cute the defendant because he spoke out against the registration pol-
icy. By presenting evidence that the passive enforcement system had
the effect of targeting vocal nonregistrants, as opposed to quiet
102 See note 104 infra.
103 See, e.g., United States v. Schmucker, 721 F.2d 1046 (6th Cir. 1983) (evidentiary hear-
ing on selective prosecution granted when only thirteen nonregistrants who expressed their
opposition to the registration were indicted, out of approximately 500,000 violators); United
States v. Falk, 479 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1973) (untimely indictment against defendant after he
protested American activities in Vietnam enough to establish prima facie case); United States
v. Steele, 461 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1972) (strong inference of discriminatory prosecution be-
cause background reports were compiled only on persons who had publicly attacked the
census).
104 See United States v. Wayte, 710 F.2d 1385 (9th Cir. 1983) (defendant made no show-
ing that the government focused its investigation on him because of his protest activities), cert.
granted, 104 S. Ct. 2655 (1984).
105 See, e.g., Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 103 S. Ct.
1365, 1376 (1983) ("Illicit legislative intent is not the sine qua non of a violation of the First
Amendment . . .even regulations aimed at proper governmental concerns can restrict un-
duly the exercise of rights protected by the First Amendment."); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S.
415, 438-39 (1963) ("Thus it is no answer to the constitutional claims asserted . . . that the
purpose of these regulations was merely to insure high professional standards and not to cur-
tail free expression. For a state may not, under the guise of prohibiting professional miscon-
duct, ignore constitutional rights."); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 451 (1938)
("Whatever the motive which induced its adoption [municipal ordinance prohibiting distri-
bution of circulars without permit], its character is such that it strikes at the very foundation
of the freedom of the press .. ).
106 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
107 Id. at 461 (emphasis added).
108 See generally Note, Rethinking Selective Enforcement in the First Amendment Context, 84
COLUM. L. REv. 144, 149-51 (1984).
[Vol. 60:102
CASE COMMENTS
nonregistrants, for prosecution, the defendant should establish his
prima facie case. Using this "effect" approach rather than the tradi-
tional motive standard, Wayte presented enough evidence to estab-
lish a prima facie case of first amendment selective prosecution.
First, Wayte demonstrated that of the approximately 500,000 viola-
tors of the registration law, only eleven vocal nonregistrants were
prosecuted. 0 9 Moreover, Wayte showed that high government offi-
cials were involved in the prosecution- decision.110 Finally, Wayte ar-
gued that the government, with access to Social Security records,
could have easily located nonvocal nonregistrants."'1 This evidence
suggests, at least on its face, that Wayte was singled out for prosecu-
tion because he protested the government's registration policy. This
"first amendment tripwire"112 demonstrates that the effect of passive
enforcement is to target a disproportionate number of vocal violators
for prosecution.1 3 Thus, if Wayte's letters are constitutionally pro-
tected speech, Wayte's evidence should establish a prima facie case of
first amendment selective prosecution.
2. The Balancing Approach
Once a prima facie case of first amendment selective prosecution
is established, the traditional "shifting the burden" approach should
be discarded in favor of a balancing approach designed to weigh the
justifications for the prosecutorial policy against the burdens on the
exercise of first amendment rights. In United States v. O'Brien,'' 4 the
Supreme Court introduced a balancing test to evaluate infringe-
ments upon first amendment freedoms:
[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within
the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an im-
portant or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental
interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if
the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is
no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.1 15
109 United States v. Wayte, 549 F. Supp. 1376, 1379 (C.D. Cal. 1982), rev'd, 710 F.2d 1385
(9th Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 2655 (1984).
110 Id. at 1382.
111 Id. at 1381.
112 Brief for the Petitioner at 22, Wayte v. United States, cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 2655
(1984).
113 United States v. Wayte, 549 F. Supp. 1376, 1379 (C.D. Cal. 1982). In Wayt, only
eleven of the approximately 500,000 males who failed to register were prosecuted. Id.
114 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
115 Id. at 377.
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While O'Bien can be distinguished from Wafyfe," t6 this balancing
test has been applied by the Supreme Court in factual contexts simi-
lar to Wate. In Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Commis-
sioner of Revenue, 117 a special tax on paper and ink was struck down by
the Court because its effect was to target a small group of newspapers
for disadvantageous treatment.'" 8 The Court viewed the tax as a first
amendment issue and agreed that "the appropriate method of analy-
sis is to balance the burden implicit in singling out the press against
the interest asserted by the state." 9 Thus, the Court applied the
O'Brien balancing test in a situation where the effect of the govern-
ment's action was to impinge on first amendment values. In Wate,
the effect of passive enforcement is to implicate a person because he
expresses a particular message.' 20 Therefore, the test advanced in
O'Bien should apply to evaluate the constitutionality of the policy.
In applying the balancing approach to Walyte, the first step is to
determine if the government can advance substantial interests to jus-
tify its passive enforcement policy.' 2 1 The government has offered
116 In O'Brien, the defendant questioned the constitutionality of a draft card burning stat-
ute on first amendment grounds. The question in Wate is not if the regulation is to be
enforced, but how. The issue is "whether the Selective Service may create a prosecution pol-
icy which relies on protected expression as the sole basis for investigation and prosecution of
suspected nonregistrants." Brief for the Petitioner at 22, Wayte v. United States, cert. granted,
104 S. Ct. 2655 (1984).
117 103 S. Ct. 1365 (1983).
118 Id. at 1375.
119 Id. at 1372 n.7.
120 Brief for the Petitioner at 23, Wayte v. United States, cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 2655
(1984).
121 The government could argue, although they have not, that Wayte would have been
prosecuted even without the letter. The Supreme Court illustrated this idea in Mt. Healthy
City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977). Doyle, a teacher, alleged that
the Board failed to rehire him because he had exercised first amendment rights. There were
several other incidents, however, which might also have justified dismissal. The district court
found that the first amendment was involved and that it did play a substantial part in the
decision to terminate. On this ground, it ordered Doyle rehired with backpay. The Supreme
Court reversed. It agreed with the district court's first two conclusions, but held that the
court should have gone on to determine whether the Board had "shown by a preponderance
of the evidence that it would have reached the same decision as to respondent's reemploy-
ment even in the absence of the protected conduct." 429 U.S. at 287. The Court wanted to
prevent a defendant from placing himself in a better position by speaking out. For example,
if a teacher knew he might be fired, or a lawbreaker knew he might be prosecuted, they might
speak out and allege that the firing or prosecution was based on their speech activities. This
type of "insulation" from prosecution will not work under the M. Healthy analysis.
This analysis does not support the government's position in Wayte. The government pol-
icy was to prosecute only those it knew about, and it knew about Wayte because of the letter.
The only way the government could prove that the same result would occur without the letter
would be to show some other way that it would have discovered Wayte. The facts of the case
do not suggest that another method of discovery existed.
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four justifications for passive enforcement. 22 First, by relying on re-
ports of nonregistration as its prosecutorial source, the system al-
lowed the government to identify and prosecute violators with a
minimal expenditure of its limited investigatory resources.1 23 Sec-
ond, since the law requires the government to prove that the defend-
ant, with knowledge of his obligation, did not register, 24 and because
failure to register is "by itself an equivocal act that could easily be
asserted to be due to such things as ignorance, mistake, or inadver-
tence,"' 25 the defendant's statements are useful in showing he know-
ingly and deliberately refused to register for the draft. 126 Third,
passive enforcement effectively promotes general deterrence by pro-
ceeding against publicly known offenders. This will encourage others
in violation of the law to register. 12 7 Finally, the government asserts
that it has an interest in prosecuting those who flaunt their violation
by calling it to the government's attention and persist in refusing to
register despite numerous opportunities to comply. 28
If the government establishes important objectives to justify its
actions, the O'Brien test requires that the means chosen to achieve
those objectives cannot be substantially broader than necessary. 29
The government argues that its enforcement policy was substantially
related to the interests noted above and that any incidental effect on
first amendment rights was "no greater than essential to the further-
ance of such interests."' 30 By focusing on those who were reported as
nonregistrants, the government asserts that it could target its investi-
gatory resources on people who it had reason to believe had violated
the law.' 3 ' Moreover, passive enforcement helped the government
pursue the strongest cases and the most flagrant violators while rein-
forcing the deterrent effect of the prosecutions. 32 Finally, the gov-
122 Brief for United States at 44, Wayte v. United States, cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 2655
(1984).
123 Id. at 34.
124 50 U.S.C. app. § 462(a) (1982). See, e.g., United States v. Boucher, 509 F.2d 991, 993
(8th Cir. 1975); United States v. Klotz, 500 F.2d 580, 581-82 (8th Cir. 1974); Kaohelaulii v.
United States, 389 F.2d 495, 497 (9th Cir. 1968).
125 Brief for United States at 34, Wayte v. United States, cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 2655
(1984).
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Id. at 44.
129 United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
130 Brief for the United States at 34, Wayte v. United States, cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 2655
(1984).
131 Id.
132 Id at 45.
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ernment asserts that passive enforcement was the only practical
means available at the time to enforce registration laws.13 Thus, the
government posits that passive enforcement is justified under O'Brien
because the policy's impact on first amendment rights did not extend
beyond legitimate prosecutorial purposes.1 34
With these arguments, the government claims that the benefits
of passive enforcement outweigh any incidental burdens the policy
places on the exercise of first amendment rights.13 5 The defendant,
on the other hand, advances three reasons why passive enforcement
does not further any substantial governmental interests. First, Wayte
argues that passive enforcement does not further registration because
it is not a general prosecution policy.13 6 By prosecuting only those
offenders who voice their objections to the registration requirement,
the policy encourages silence, not compliance with the law.13 7 Second,
the defendant claims that the Selective Service could have afforded
an active enforcement policy.1 38 Even if administrative costs were
severe, this could not justify curtailing first amendment rights.1 39 Fi-
nally, Wayte argues that his statements were not necessary to estab-
lish the wilfulness of the violation in light of the government's "beg
policy"' 4 which gave violators an opportunity to register without the
threat of prosecution.' 4 '
In addition, Wayte argues that even if the government's reasons
for passive enforcement were legitimate, the government could have
enacted a prosecutorial policy better tailored to achieve those
133 Id. at 45-46.
134 Id. at 45.
135 Id.
136 Brief for the Petitioner at 34, Wayte v. United States, cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 2655
(1984).
137 Id.
138 Id. at 36. Under an active enforcement policy, the government actively seeks out vio-
lators of the draft registration requirement by comparing Social Security or drivers license
records (which would reveal the names of nearly all males required to register) to the list of all
males who did in fact register to determine who did not comply with the law. In contrast,
under a passive enforcement system, the government does nothing to determine the identities
of people who have not registered. It awaits information that reveals the names of violators.
In this way, the government is passively receiving information instead of actively seeking it
out.
139 Id; see Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 162 (1939) (burden upon city in cleaning
streets does not justify ordinance prohibiting distribution of handbills).
140 Before prosecuting, the government wrote vocal violators offering them a chance to
comply with the law and told them of their possible prosecution if they did not register. In
this way, the government "begged" offenders to comply with the registration requirement.
Brief for the Petitioner at 32-33, Wayte v. United States, cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 2655 (1984).
141 Id at 35.
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ends.' 42 Wayte asserts that the government could have initiated an
alternate means to enforce the registration requirement that did not
exclusively rely on the identification of vocal nonregistrants.' 43 Spe-
cifically, Wayte claims that the government, by using records from
state drivers licensing agencies, could have identified both vocal and
nonvocal violators. 44 Thus, the defendant posits that passive en-
forcement was overbroad because a less restrictive alternative was
available that would not have burdened the defendant's first amend-
ment rights so heavily.1 45
3. Adjudication of a Case of First Amendment Selective
Prosecution
In summary, if Wayte's letters fall within the first amendment,
the traditional two-prong test for selective prosecution should be dis-
carded in favor of an analysis that recognizes that first amendment
rights are involved. Under this approach, the government's motive
for prosecuting is irrelevant; the defendant can establish a prima fa-
cie case by demonstrating that the effect of the prosecutorial policy is
to select a disproportionate number of vocal violators for prosecution.
The analysis would then become a balancing approach where the
interests underlying the policy would be weighed against the burdens
on first amendment rights. The outcome of a first amendment selec-
tive prosecution claim would then depend on whether the court ac-
cepts the government's interests, how it weighs those interests against
first amendment burdens, and whether the policy's effect on first
amendment freedoms is no greater than necessary to further those
interests. 146
142 Id. at 37.
143 Brief for the Petitioner at 39, Wayte v. United States, cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 2655
(1984).
144 Id. at 39; see note 138 supra.
145 Id. at 39.
146 It is possible to conclude that this approach requires a fairly low threshold of proof to
establish a case of first amendment selective prosecution. This could make it relatively easy
for a defendant to string along a case with nothing more than scant evidence to justify his
claim of selective prosecution. This is a valid concern, but it is unwarranted for two reasons.
First, scant evidence will not make out a prima facie case of first amendment selective prose-
cution. Wayte presented three pieces of evidence to establish his prima facie case. The most
important was evidence of the sheer effect of passive enforcement: eleven out of approxi-
mately 500,000 nonregistrants were prosecuted. All eleven were vocal protestors of the gov-
ernment's registration requirement. In addition, Wayte presented evidence that the
government had the capabilities and resources to implement a more active prosecutorial pol-
icy. Unless a defendant has evidence of this magnitude, courts simply will not recognize a
defendant's claim of selective prosecution. Even if the court recognized a defendant's claim,
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IV. Conclusion
The Wayte court views selective prosecution as an equal protec-
tion issue and views the first amendment as nothing more than a
peripheral consideration. The court requires the defendant to intro-
duce almost direct evidence of impermissible prosecutorial motive to
prove his prima facie case. Because this is such a formidable stan-
dard to meet, future defendants like Wayte are not likely to be able
to establish their prima facie cases 4 7 and the defense of selective
prosecution will be useless in first amendment contexts. The govern-
ment will be able to prosecute a disproportionate number of vocal
violators, while a defendant is left to prove motive with nothing more
than circumstantial evidence. The big chill will be complete.
The first amendment is implicated in cases like Wayte. This will
transform the traditional equal protection approach into a new first
amendment selective prosecution defense. The defense will operate
on two levels. The defendant will establish a prima facie case of first
amendment selective prosecution by showing that the effect of the
government's passive enforcement policy is to prosecute a dispropor-
tionate number of vocal violators. 48 If the defendant meets this bur-
den, the government must then advance justifications for its passive
enforcement system. The government's interests will be weighed
against the burden upon speech with an eye towards alternate means
of enforcement. If the court invalidates passive enforcement under
this proposed analysis, an active enforcement system based on ran-
dom prosecution of known violators would ensure that both vocal
and nonvocal nonregistrants would be prosecuted. 49 Under this new
however, the government can still prevail by asserting valid justifications for its policy. If it
has good reason for its prosecutorial policy, the defendant's claim will be defeated.
147 See, e.g., United States v. Eklund, 551 F. Supp. 964 (S.D. Iowa 1982) (selective prosecu-
tion defense rejected because of defendant's failure to establish motive), afd, 733 F.2d 1287
(8th Cir. 1984).
148 See, e.g., United States v. Schmucker, 721 F.2d 1046 (6th Cir. 1983) (passive enforce-
ment may be a guise for suppressing criticisms of government policy).
149 The government has since replaced passive enforcement with an active enforcement
system to identify nonregistrants. The system utilizes Social Security records and state drivers
license lists along with information from other federal and state sources. As of June 1984,
more than 160,000 names have been transmitted to the Department of Justice and 599 indi-
viduals have been selected for further investigation. Thus far, all people subject to the regis-
tration requirement have elected to comply with the law pursuant to the government's "beg
policy," and thus no prosecutions have been initiated. Brief for United States at 10, Wayte v.
United States, cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 2655 (1984).
One could legitimately raise the issue of mootness and argue that there is no longer a live
controversy in this case. One could argue that the Court need not decide the constitutionality
of passive enforcement since it is clear it will not be used again in this context. The Court
[Vol. 60:102
CASE COMMENTS
system, the defendant will not be able to immunize himself from
prosecution by speaking out against the government. By prosecuting
both vocal and nonvocal violators, the defendant's claim of selective
prosecution will be meritless.
John D. Goetz
Michael R. Seghetti
would then have to come to grips with Wayte's conviction under the obsolete policy. The
Court could find that under the new policy, it would be just a matter of time before the
Department of Justice would discover and investigate Wayte. Thus, the Court could affirm
Wayte's conviction on an inevitable discovery theory. See Nix v. Williams, 104 S. Ct. 2501
(1984).
A better view, however, is that the Supreme Court should decide the constitutionality of
passive enforcement. As argued, this involves seeing selective prosecution in a new first
amendment context. The issue is not moot for two reasons. One, first amendment involve-
ment in selective prosecution claims is not limited to draft registration cases. The situation
could come up in other contexts. For example, the Professional Air Traffic Controller cases,
in which the government prosecuted the leaders of local unions, provide a similar situation
where defendants could claim that the effect of the government's prosecutorial policies was to
select a disproportionate number of vocal strikers for prosecution. See United States v. Tay-
lor, 693 F.2d 919 (9th Cir. 1982). Because the fact situation in W te is capable of repetition
in other contexts, the court should grapple with the constitutional issues behind passive en-
forcement. Two, it is recognized that "voluntary cessation of allegedly illegal conduct does
not deprive the tribunal of power to hear and determine the case, ije., does not make the case
moot." County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631 (1979) (citing United States v. W.
T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632 (1953)).
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-JOHN F KENNEDY MEMORIAL HOSpI-
TAL, INC. v BLUD WORTH. REMOVING COURTS FROM THE DECISION
TO TERMINATE LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEMS
Mary Doe, mother of two, has had a stroke. She has been coma-
tose for two weeks. A respirator breathes for her. She is fed through
a naso-gastric tube and requires constant care. According to the phy-
sician, Mary is in a chronic vegetative state. The doctor believes that
Mary's condition will never improve.
Mary Doe has often told her family that if she became ill and
there was no hope of recovery, she would not want to be kept alive on
a machine. What can the family do? Can the physician withdraw
treatment solely on the family's request, or must the family obtain
prior court approval? If prior court approval is required, what value
will the court place on Mary's oral statements? Before becoming ill,
could Mary have taken steps to ensure that her wishes would be
followed?
The United States Supreme Court has yet to address the issue of
whether a terminally ill incompetent patient has the right, exercis-
able by a guardian, to refuse life sustaining treatment. States which
have addressed the issue recognize the patient's right to refuse treat-
ment, but differ on how this right may be exercised. In John F Ken-
nedy Memorial Hospital, Inc. v. Bludworh,l the Supreme Court of
Florida reduced the procedural requirements a family must meet
before exercising the incompetent's right to refuse treatment.
Part I of this comment sets forth the facts and holding of Blud-
worth. Part II examines the constitutional basis of the incompetent's
right to refuse treatment. Part III analyzes the case law and statu-
tory means of exercising this right. Finally, Part IV concludes that
the Bludworth court has taken a positive step by reducing the restric-
tions on exercising an incompetent patient's right to refuse life sus-
taining treatment. The court, however, has not placed enough
emphasis on the patient's prior expressions embodied in a living will.
I. John F Kennedy Memon'al Hospital, Inc. v. Bludworth
In 1975, Francis Landy executed a written document, known as
a "living will," expressing his desire not to be maintained by artificial
1 452 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 1984).
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life support systems.2 Six years later, Mr. Landy was hospitalized
and subsequently placed on a respirator. He could not breathe with-
out the assistance of the respirator due to his impaired neurological
and respiratory functions. His physician diagnosed the condition as
terminal.3
Landy's wife delivered the living will to hospital physicians.
Shortly thereafter, the probate court declared Landy incompetent
and appointed his wife as guardian. As guardian, Landy's wife asked
the physicians to discontinue all extraordinary means of life support
for her husband.4
The hospital filed suit for a declaratory judgment, asking the
court to assess its rights and liabilities in complying with Mrs.
Landy's request.5 The trial court held: (1) a guardian must be ap-
pointed to act on behalf of the incompetent, and (2) the guardian
must obtain prior court approval for termination of life support sys-
tems.6 The Florida District Court of Appeal affirmed the need for
prior court approval but, because the issue was one of "great public
importance," certified the question to the state supreme court.7
The Supreme Court of Florida held that an incompetent termi-
nally ill patient has the right to refuse continued maintenance on
artificial life support systems.8 The court declined to require that
prior court approval be obtained, 9 however, and held that close fam-
ily members or court appointed guardians may exercise the incompe-
tent's right to refuse extraordinary medical treatment without
resorting to the judicial system.' 0 According to the court, civil or
2 Landy and two witnesses signed the document. Landy reaffirmed his wishes two
months prior to his hospitalization. Id. at 922.
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Although Landy died prior to a hearing on the issue, the court refused to dismiss for
mootness since other incompetent terminally ill patients were being maintained on life sup-
port systems at the same hospital. Id. at 923. The controversy was "capable of repetition, yet
evaded review." See John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Bludworth, 432 So. 2d 611,
614 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125 (1973); Southern Pac.
Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911)); see also note 49 infra.
6 452 So. 2d at 923.
7 The Florida District Court of Appeal recognized the right of a terminally ill patient to
refuse extraordinary medical treatment based on the constitutional right to privacy. In the
case of an incompetent, however, the court held that this right must be exercised through the
courts. John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Bludworth, 432 So. 2d 611 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1983), decision quashed, 452 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 1984).
8 John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921, 923 (Fla. 1984).
9 Id. at 925.
10 The court emphasized that the attending physician and two specialists (in a field re-
lated to the patient's illness) should certify that the patient is in a vegetative state with no
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criminal liability would result only upon a showing that the parties
had acted in bad faith with an intent to harm the patient. 1
II. Recognition of the Right to Privacy
The Bludworth court, like others, held that the patient's right to
refuse or discontinue life sustaining treatment was inherent in the
patient's right to privacy.' 2 One of the earliest Supreme Court deci-
sions to refer to this right to privacy was Union Paqcic Railway v. Bot-
sford 13 The Court, in Botsford, held that a plaintiff in a personal
injury case could not be required to submit to a medical examination
because to do so would violate his common law right to privacy.' 4 Re-
cent Supreme Court decisions do not rely on a common law right but
hold, instead, that the right to privacy is constitutionally man-
dated,' 5 even though the Constitution does not explicitly guarantee
this right.
The Supreme Court first recognized an implied constitutional
right to marital privacy in Gn'swold v. Connecticut,'6 a decision which
declared a state statute prohibiting the use of contraceptives uncon-
stitutional. 17 Writing for the majority, Justice Douglas identified the
source of this privacy right as the "penumbras, formed by emana-
tions from [specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights] that help give
them life and substance.""' According to the "penumbras" theory,
the Bill of Rights contains implied rights' 9 which are necessary to
reasonable chance of recovery before family members or the patient's guardian request the
termination of any medical treatment. Id. at 926.
11 Id
12 Id at 924.
13 141 U.S. 250 (1891).
14 Id at 251.
15 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right to privacy includes a woman's decision to
seek abortion); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (statute which punishes mere posses-
sion of obscene material violates first amendment right to receive information free from gov-
ernment intrusion into personal privacy); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (fourth
amendment protects an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy); Griswold v. Connect-
icut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right to marital privacy protected by the penumbras of the Bill of
Rights).
16 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
17 In Griswold, the executive director and medical director of a Planned Parenthood office
had been convicted, as accessories, for giving advice and information on contraceptives to
married couples. Id at 485.
18 Id. at 484.
19 The implied right to privacy derives from the express guarantees of the first, third,
fourth, and fifth amendments. 381 U.S. 479, 482-84 (1965); see also Clark, Constitutional Sources
ofthe Penumbral Right to thivacy, 19 VILL. L. REV. 833 (1974); Note, On Privacy: Constitutional
Protectionfor Personal Liberty, 48 N.Y.U. L. REV. 670 (1973).
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give meaning to the express rights.20
In Eisenstadt v. Baird,2' the Court expanded the protections of the
right to privacy by recognizing the individual's right of equal access
to contraceptives regardless of marital status.22 In Roe v. Wade,23 the
Court held that the right to privacy also protects a woman's decision
to end her pregnancy through abortion.24 The Supreme Court cases
demonstrate an expansion of the right to privacy from a narrow fo-
cus on the marital relationship to a broader protection of decision-
making, at least in the context of abortions. This evolution signifies a
growing recognition of the right to privacy as a personal right of self-
control and self-determination. 25
Throughout this evolution, however, the Supreme Court has
20 Justice Goldberg, in a concurring opinion, identifies the ninth amendment as the
source of the right to privacy. 381 U.S. 479, 495-99 (Goldberg, J., concurring). The ninth
amendment states: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be con-
strued to deny or disparage others retained by the people." U.S. CONST. amend. IX. The
"other" rights alluded to include fundamental personal rights, such as the right to privacy.
Therefore, the right to privacy should receive equivalent protection by the courts. See also
Clark, The Ninth Amendment and Constitutional Privay, 5 U. TOL. L. REV. 83 (1973).
21 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
22 In Eisenstadt, the respondent challenged the constitutionality of a Massachusetts stat-
ute which limited the distribution of contraceptives to married persons, and then only by a
physician or pharmacist. The respondent "was convicted for violating this statute when he
gave a package of contraceptive foam to a woman following a lecture at Boston University.
The Supreme Court held that the statute violated the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment because, as applied, it caused dissimilar treatment of persons similarly
situated. In addition, the Court clarified its holding in Griswold-
It is true that in Griswold the right of privacy in question inhered in the marital
relationship. Yet the marital couple is not an independent entity,. . . but an asso-
ciation of two individuals. . . . If the right of privacy means anything, it is the
right of the individual. . . to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into
matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget
a child.
Id. at 453 (emphasis in original).
23 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
24 Ms. Roe, a pregnant single woman, brought a class action challenging the constitu-
tionality of a Texas statute which prohibited abortion except when necessary to save the
mother's life. She sought declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing that the statute was void
for vagueness and infringed on her personal privacy right. The district court granted declara-
tory relief and held that the abortion statute did infringe on Roe's right to privacy, in contra-
vention of the ninth amendment. Roe v. Wade, 314 F. Supp. 1217, 1223 (N.D. Tex. 1970).
On direct appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed this portion of the lower court ruling but took
the position that the right to privacy derives from the fourteenth amendment. 410 U.S. at
153.
25 See, e.g., Cantor, A Patient's Decision to Decline Life-Saving Medical Treatment: Bodily Integ-
rity Versus the Preservation ofLift, 26 RUTGERs L. REV. 228, 239 (1973); Comment, Roe v. Wade
and In Re Quinlan. Individual Decision and the Scope of Piivagys Constitutional Guarantee, 12 U.S.F.L.
REV. 111, 120 (1970); Note, On Privaqy: Constitutional Protectionfor Personal Liberty, 48 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 670, 697-701 (1973).
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consistently indicated that the right to privacy is not absolute. 26
Rather, courts must weigh the individual's interest in the right to
privacy against the legitimate state interests infringing on that right.
If the individual's privacy interests outweigh the state's interests, the
court will prevent state interference.2 7
Although the Supreme Court has not addressed the issue of
whether a terminally ill patient may refuse life sustaining medical
treatment, several state courts have interpreted the right to privacy
to include the authority to make such decisions.28 The Supreme
Court of New Jersey, in In re Quzilan,29 upheld an incompetent's right
to refuse the continued use of life support systems based on the indi-
vidual's right to privacy.30 The New Jersey court relied on the
26 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (privacy right is not absolute and may be
subject to important state interests); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 503-04 (1965)
(White, J., concurring) (state statutes which are "reasonably necessary" to protect legitimate
state interests do not violate the due process clause); see also Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 522
(Harlan, J., dissenting) (right to privacy is not absolute).
27 For example, in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), the Supreme Court
reversed the petitioners' conviction, holding that the statute under which they were convicted
was unconstitutional as a violation of the right to marital privacy. The state's interest in
controlling the use of contraceptives did not justify infringement of this right. In Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), the Court granted declaratory relief where the state's interest in
maintaining medical standards and protecting public health did not outweigh the individ-
ual's right to privacy in deciding to seek an abortion.
28 See Severns v. Wilmington Medical Center, 425 A.2d 156 (Del. Ch. 1980) (incompe-
tent's right to refuse medical treatment may be expressed through a guardian when the pa-
tient is in a chronic vegetative state); Satz v. Perlmutter, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980)
(constitutional right to privacy supports the decision of a competent adult, suffering from a
terminal illness, to refuse extraordinary treatment); Superintendent of Belchertown State
School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977) (right to refuse medical treatment
for terminal illness extended to incompetent patients); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647
(right to privacy includes the right of an incompetent to refuse, via her guardian, continued
life sustaining treatment), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976); Leach v. Akron Gen. Medical
Center, 68 Ohio Misc. 1, 426 N.E.2d 809 (1980) (right to privacy includes the right of a
terminally ill patient in a vegetative state to decide the course of his own treatment); In re
Welfare of Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 660 P.2d 738 (1983) (constitutional right to privacy
includes the right of a terminally ill adult patient to refuse life prolonging treatment, subject
to countervailing state interests). But see Storar v. Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 362, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266,
420 N.E.2d 64 (common law right to self-determination includes the right to refuse medical
treatment in some circumstances), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981).
29 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976).
30 Karen Ann Quinlan was, at the time of this case, a twenty-two year old female in a
chronic vegetative state due to anoxia (lack of oxygen in the blood) of unknown origin. Al-
though not clinically brain dead, she existed at a primitive level and required total assistance
with the basic functions of life such as breathing, eating, and excretion. Karen's father sought
appointment as her guardian with express authority to order the withdrawal of all extraordi-
nary medical treatment. He asserted that the use of a respirator violated Karen's free exercise
of religion, constituted cruel and unusual punishment, and violated her right of personal
privacy. The Supreme Court of New Jersey rejected the first two claims but agreed that
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Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade,31 reasoning that if the right
to privacy protects the right to obtain certain types of health care,
then it must also protect the right to refuse care.32  The Bludworth
court also upheld the incompetent's right to terminate life support
systems, 33 but differed from New Jersey and other state courts on
how that right may be exercised.3 4
III. Implementation of the Right
A. Common Law Development
State courts which have addressed the issue 35 fall into two
Karen's right of personal privacy encompassed her freedom to order the withdrawal of ex-
traordinary treatment. On this basis, the court granted Mr. Quinlan's petition. Id. at 39-42,
355 A.2d at 663-64.
31 See note 24 supra and accompanying text.
32 70 N.J. at 40, 355 A.2d at 663 (emphasis added). The court, however, clearly stated
that the right to privacy is not absolute but must be weighed against legitimate state interests.
In this case, the state's interest in preserving life and protecting physicians' autonomy did not
justify interference with Quinlan's right to refuse treatment. According to the court, "[t]he
state's interest contra weakens and the individual's right to privacy grows as the degree of
bodily invasion increases and the prognosis dims. Ultimately there comes a point at which
the individual's rights overcome the state interest." Id. at 41 (emphasis in original); see also
Cantor, Quinlan, Pivay, and the Handling of Incompetent Dying Patients, 30 RUTGERS L. REV. 243,
244 (1977); Comment, supra note 25, at 133-34.
Other state courts, in applying this balancing test, have identified four areas of state
interest which the court must consider. The state interests are: (1) preservation of life, (2)
prevention of suicide, (3) protection of third party interests, and (4) maintenance of medical
ethical integrity. See Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), a 'd, 379
So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980); Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass.
728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977); Leach v. Akron Gen. Medical Center, 68 Ohio Misc. 1, 426
N.E.2d 809 (1980).
33 452 So. 2d 921, 926 (Fla. 1984).
34 See notes 45-51 infra and accompanying text.
35 The patients in these cases have been diagnosed terminally ill. With or without life
support systems, most of them will die within a relatively short time. These patients are also
incompetent, unable to make their wishes known. A few cases have dealt with severely re-
tarded adults, see, e.g., Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass.
728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977), Storar v. Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266,420 N.E.2d 64
(1981), or infants, see, e.g., In re Guardianship of Barry, 445 So. 2d 365 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1984); In re P.V.W., 424 So. 2d 1015 (La. 1982); Custody of a Minor, 385 Mass. 697, 434
N.E.2d 601 (1982). Most cases have dealt with previously competent adult patients who are
now in a comatose, vegetative state with no reasonable possibility of returning to a cognitive,
sapient state. These patients are not dead under either of the legally recognized standards:
brain death or cessation of circulation. But they are kept alive only by the use of life support
systems. Life support systems generally involve mechanical replacements for one or more of
the body's vital functions. These life support systems offer no hope of curing the patient's
illness-they merely postpone the inevitable moment of death. Seegenerally 79 A.L.R.3d 237
(1977 & Supp. 1984) (power of court to order or authorize termination of extraordinary medi-
cal treatment); 93 A.L.R.3d 67 (1979 & Supp. 1984) (patient's right to refuse life sustaining
treatment).
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groups: those that require court approval before physicians withhold
or withdraw life support,36 and those that do not require judicial in-
volvement. The courts which fall into this latter group prefer that
the decision to withhold or withdraw life support be made within the
patient-physician-family relationship.37
The leading case requiring court approval before withholding
treatment, Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 38 held
that the decision could only be made by the court.39 The Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts stated: "We take a dim view of any
attempt to shift the ultimate decision-making responsibility away
from the duly established courts of proper jurisdiction to any com-
mittee, panel or group, ad hoc or permanent. '40
36 See, e.g., Custody of a Minor, 385 Mass. 697, 434 N.E.2d 601 (1982); Superintendent of
Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977); Leach v. Ak-
ron Gen. Medical Center, 68 Ohio Misc. 1, 426 N.E.2d 809 (1980); cf. In re Spring, 380 Mass.
629, 405 N.E.2d 115 (1980) (prior court approval not required, but if issue is brought to court,
the court must make the decision itself-not delegate it to others).
As an aftermath of Leach, the patient's husband filed a civil suit against the hospital and
the doctor, claiming that unwanted treatment violated the patient's constitutional rights.
The case is awaiting trial. Malcolm, Many See Aercy in Ending Empty Lives, N.Y. Times, Sept.
23, 1984, § 1, at 1, col. 3.
37 See, e.g., John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921 (Fla.
1984); In re Guardianship of Barry, 445 So. 2d 365 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); In re Dinner-
stein, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 466, 380 N.E.2d 134 (1978); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647
(1976); Storar v. Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 420 N.E.2d 64 (1981) (Storar v.
Storar addressed the issue of terminating blood transfusions for a terminally ill, profoundly
retarded adult cancer patient. Eichner v. Dillon addressed the issue of terminating life sup-
port for 83 year old Brother Fox. On appeal, the court consolidated Sorar and Eichner. Since
the focus of this case comment is life support termination, we are concerned with the court's
ruling in Eichner and will refer to the case as such throughout the remainder of this article.); In
re Welfare of Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 660 P.2d 738 (1983); cf. Dockery v. Dockery, 559
S.W.2d 952 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1977), cert. denied, (Dec. 12, 1977) (when no possibility of cure
exists, physician has no authority to continue use of respirator without family's consent).
38 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977).
39 Joseph Saikewicz, a 67 year old man with a mental age of approximately 2 years, 8
months, suffered from leukemia. A court appointed guardian ad litem recommended that it
would be in Mr. Saikewicz's best interests not to receive chemotherapy. This position was
supported by the following facts: (1) The illness was incurable. Even with treatment, the best
that could be hoped for was remission. (2) Mr. Saikewicz's advanced age reduced the chance
of remission. (3) Chemotherapy would cause Mr. Saikewicz significant adverse side effects
and discomfort. (4) Due to Mr. Saikewicz's retardation, he would be unable to understand
the need for the treatment and be unable to cope with its side effects. Id. at 729-35, 370
N.E.2d at 419-22. The court approved the guardian ad/item's recommendation, finding that
the fear and suffering Mr. Saikewicz would be subjected to was not justified by the possibility
of temporary remission. Id. at 753-55, 370 N.E.2d at 432.
40 Id at 758, 370 N.E.2d at 434. The court noted that the judge may find the advice of
attending physicians, other medical experts or hospital ethics committees helpful in reaching
a decision, but refused to require that such advice be sought or accorded any particular
weight in the decision-making process. In its ruling, the court expressly rejected the Quinlan
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The majority of cases, however, favor the patient-physician-fam-
ily context for decision-making. The leading case, In re Quinlan,41 spe-
cifically found that court confirmation of such decisions was
"inappropriate. '42 The Supreme Court of New Jersey felt such prac-
tice would be a "gratuitous encroachment upon the medical profes-
sion's field of competence" 43  and would be "impossibly
cumbersome." 44 Instead of prior court approval, the court required
a hospital ethics committee45 to review decisions made by the attend-
ing physician, the court appointed guardian and the family.46 The
court stressed that the decision-makers should focus their delibera-
tions on the "reasonable possibility of [the patient's] return to cogni-
tive and sapient life."147
The Washington Supreme Court, in In re Welfare of Coyer,48 also
found prior court approval "unresponsive and cumbersome, '49 not-
ing that when physicians and family agree to terminate life support,
court approval "becomes little more than a formality." 50 Colyer re-
approach of allowing the patient's guardian, family, physicians and hospital ethics committee
to decide whether life sustaining treatment will be withheld or withdrawn. Id.
41 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647; see note 30 supra.
42 Id. at 50, 355 A.2d at 669.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 The hospital ethics committee would be composed of physicians, social workers, attor-
neys and theologians. Id. at 49, 355 A.2d at 668 (quoting Teel, The Physician'r Dilemma: A
Doctor's View: What The Law Should Be, 27 BAYLOR L. REa. 6, 8-9 (1975)). The court sug-
gested that the ethics committee might offer the same advantages in the life support termina-
tion decision that multi-judge courts provide in deciding difficult questions of law at the
appellate level. 70 N.J. at 50, 355 A.2d at 669.
46 First, the attending physician must determine that no reasonable probability exists
that the patient will return to a cognitive, sapient state and that life support should be termi-
nated. Second, the guardian and family must agree to termination. Third, the hospital ethics
committee must agree with the attending physician's prognosis. At that point, life support
may be withdrawn without civil or criminal liability. 70 N.J. at 55, 355 A.2d at 671-72.
47 Id. at 51, 355 A.2d at 669.
48 99 Wash. 2d 114, 660 P.2d 738 (1983). Bertha Colyer sustained cardiopulmonary ar-
rest. She was resuscitated, but her body had been without oxygen for approximately ten
minutes. The resulting massive brain damage left her in a persistent vegetative state. Her
husband, acting as her court appointed guardian, sought an order to terminate life sustaining
systems. Id at 116-17, 660 P.2d at 740.
49 Id. at 127, 660 P.2d at 746. The court noted that many of the leading cases in this area
are those in which the patient died before the judicial process was completed. Id. (citing
Eichner v. Dillon, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 420 N.E.2d 64 (1981); In re Spring, 380
Mass. 629,405 N.E.2d 115 (1980)). Other courts have confronted the same situation. See, e.g.,
John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 1984); Superinten-
dent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977); f.
Dockery v. Dockery, 559 S.W.2d 952 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1977), cert. denied, (Dec. 12, 1977) (case
dismissed as moot when patient died while appeal was pending).
50 99 Wash. 2d at 127, 660 P.2d at 746.
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quired basically the same procedure as Quinlan, substituting a hospi-
tal prognosis board for the hospital ethics committee.5'
In Bludworth, the Florida Supreme Court spoke out even more
strongly against a requirement of prior court approval. The court
stated: "To require prior court approval for termination of life sup-
port systems in this type of case is too burdensome, is not necessary to
protect the state's interests or the interests of the patient, and could
render the right of the incompetent a nullity. '52
The Bludworth court was the first court to state as a general rule
that court appointment of a guardian was unnecessary if a spouse,
adult children or parents were willing to exercise the incompetent
patient's right to have life support systems terminated.5 3 The court,
adopting the holding of In re Guardianship of Baty,5 ' stressed that
while judicial intervention was not necessary, courts must be avail-
able to hear cases that are brought. 55 This is consistent with earlier
case law.56
The step taken by the Bludworth court is a small, but significant
development. By its decision, the Florida Supreme Court gives un-
qualified approval to removing the decision to terminate life support
systems from the courts. As the Bludworth court points out, "[t]he is-
51 Colyer required a physician to diagnose the patient incurable with no reasonable medi-
cal probability of returning to a cognitive state. The hospital prognosis board must unani-
mously concur. Then a court appointed guardian could decide whether to terminate life
support. Id. at 137, 660 P.2d at 751.
The court stated that, in normal cases, court involvement was only required in ap-
pointing the guardian. In the following types of cases, however, court approval would be
required to withhold or withdraw life support: (1) if family members disagree as to the in-
competent's wishes; (2) if physicians disagree on the prognosis; (3) if the patient's wishes can
not be known because he has always been incompetent; (4) if evidence exists of wrongful
motives or malpractice; or (5) if no family member can serve as guardian. Guardians, family
members, physicians or hospitals may petition for court intervention. Id. at 136, 660 P.2d at
750; see also Bany, 445 So. 2d at 372; In re Spring, 380 Mass. 629, 636-37, 405 N.E.2d 115, 120-
21 (1980).
52 452 So. 2d at 925.
53 Id. at 926. One justice, concurring in the result only, felt prior court approval was not
necessary to terminate life support systems but was presently inclined to require the appoint-
ment of a guardian. Id at 927 (McDonald, J., concurring).
Earlier in the year, the Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal had stated: "where...
the question concerns a young child, we do not think the parents must always qualify as legal
guardians and seek judicial sanctions to discontinue these extraordinary measures." Bany,
445 So. 2d at 372.
54 445 So. 2d 365, 372 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
55 The court stated that "families, guardians, affected medical personnel, or the state"
could bring the petition either because they wanted a judicial order, because doubt existed, or
because the family, physicians and hospital did not agree. 452 So. 2d at 926.
56 See note 51 supra.
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sue in these cases is not whether a life should be saved. Rather it is
how long and at what cost the dying process should be prolonged. '57
Families and physicians facing this sober decision do not need the
advice of the courts. Sufficient checks exist in the process, without
court intervention, to guard against hasty or ill-motivated action. In
cases where conflicts exist, interested parties always have recourse to
the courts. In cases where no conflicts exist as to the proper course of
action, family members and physicians no longer have to watch as
the patient is "held on the threshold of death" 58 while court proceed-
ings drag on.
In addition to speaking out in favor of removing courts from the
decision to terminate life support, the Bludworth court summarily
dealt with issues regarding the effect of a living will and the potential
for civil or criminal liability. Whenever courts or families exercise an
incompetent patient's right to withdraw life support systems, they do
so under the doctrine of "substituted judgment."59 "Substituted
judgment" requires the decision-maker to determine, to the best of
his ability, what the incompetent person would have done, if compe-
tent.6 0 The decision-maker should try to "ascertain the incompe-
tent's actual interests and preferences." 61
If the incompetent person, while still competent, had made prior
statements, either oral or written, about his wishes regarding termi-
nation of life support, the decision-maker's task is simplified. 62 The
57 452 So. 2d at 924.
58 Id. at 922.
59 The doctrine of "substituted judgment" originated over 150 years ago within the con-
text of administering the estate of an incompetent person. The original doctrine required
"the court to 'don the mental mantle of the incompetent.'" Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 751-52,
370 N.E.2d at 431 (quoting In re Carson, 39 Misc. 2d 544, 545; 241 N.Y.S.2d 288, 289 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1962)).
60 Bludworth, 452 So. 2d at 926; see also Barry, 445 So. 2d at 370-71; Spring, 380 Mass. at
634, 405 N.E.2d at 119; Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 749-55, 370 N.E.2d at 429-32.
The decision-maker is allowed to take past and future incompetency into consideration
when attempting to ascertain what the patient would decide. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 752-53,
370 N.E.2d at 431.
61 Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 752, 370 N.E.2d at 431.
62 See Severns v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., 425 A.2d at 158; Bludworth, 452 So. 2d
at 926; Eichner v. Dillon, 52 N.Y.2d at 371-72, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 270, 420 N.E.2d at 68; Leach
v. Akron Gen. Medical Center, 68 Ohio Misc. at 3-4, 426 N.E.2d at 811. But see In reQuinlan,
70 NJ. at 21-22, 355 A.2d at 653.
Three criteria have been suggested to determine the value of the patient's prior state-
ments: (1) the age and maturity of the patient when the statements were made; (2) the con-
text in which the statements were made; and (3) the connection of the statements to the
debilitating event. Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d at 131-32, 660 P.2d at 748.
In Quinlan, the court accorded little weight to Karen's prior statements. (1) She was
young and immature. (2) The statements were made in casual conversation. (3) They were
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Florida Supreme Court stated that a living will was "persuasive evi-
dence" of an incompetent patient's intention and should be given
"great weight" by those who substitute their judgment on the pa-
tient's behalf.63 While other courts have given credence to a patient's
prior expressions, 64 Bludworth is the first case in which the patient had
actually executed a living will. Since the court intends to remove
itself from the decision to terminate life support, it is necessary that
the ultimate decision-makers be given some direction. According
substantial weight to living wills is consistent with this goal. Those
who exercise an incompetent's right to terminate life support should
be guided, if not bound, by the patient's prior expressions in a living
will.
The Bludworth court, addressing the issue of potential civil or
criminal liability,65 followed other courts by applying the good faith
standard.66 But by defining good faith as a lack of "inten[t] to harm
made without serious contemplation that she might soon be in her present condition. 70 N.J.
at 21-22, 41, 355 A.2d at 653, 664; see Comment, In re Storar: The Right to Die and Incompetent
Patients, 43 U. Prrr. L. REV. 1087, 1089 (1982).
In Eichner, the court found Brother Fox's prior statements dispositive because (1) Brother
Fox was an elderly member of a religious order; (2) the statements were made during formal
scholarly discussions; and (3) the statements were reaffirmed only a couple of months before
Brother Fox's final hospitalization. 52 N.Y.2d at 371-72, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 270, 420 N.E.2d at
68; see Comment, 43 U. Prrr. L. REV. at 1094.
In the absence of an express statement by the patient while still competent, the court can
be guided by what close relatives infer the patient's desire to be from the patient's general
attitudes. See Coyer
, 
99 Wash. 2d at 132, 660 P.2d at 748; see also Comment, 43 U. PiTr L.
REV. at 1105-06 (how a decision can be reached when the patient has made no express state-
ments of his wishes prior to incompetency).
63 Bludworth, 452 So. 2d at 926. Compare the Florida Supreme Court opinion in Bludworth,
452 So. 2d at 926 with the Florida District Court of Appeals opinion in Bludworth, 432 So. 2d
611, 620 (1983).
In its holding, the lower court set forth the requirement that any alleged "living will" be
proven by testimony or recent affidavit of at least one of two disinterested witnesses to the
will. The witness must certify that the document was properly executed while the patient had
the mental capacity to do so. The District Court of Appeal said that a "living will" should
ordinarily serve as best evidence of the patient's intention. 432 So. 2d at 620. The court then
listed four factors which would determine in each case the weight courts would actually ac-
cord the document: "(1) the timeliness of its execution, (2) the circumstances under which it
was executed, (3) its contents and (4) any evidence of a contrary intention." Id.
Since the Florida Supreme Court quashed the decision of the Florida District Court of
Appeal, it appears the supreme court did not intend that stringent requirements be applied to
living wills.
64 See note 62 supra.
65 Most other cases that have specifically addressed this issue have granted civil and
criminal immunity. See Severns v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., 425 A.2d at 160-61;
Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 51-52, 54, 355 A.2d at 669-70, 71; Leach v. Akron Gen. Medical Center, 68
Ohio Misc. at 13, 426 N.E.2d at 816; cf. In re Spring, 380 Mass. at 639, 405 N.E.2d at 122.
66 Colyer, an earlier case which expressly utilized a good faith standard, failed to define it.
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the patient, ' 67 the Bludworth court fails to provide any clear-cut
guidelines. When speaking within the context of terminating life
support for terminally ill incompetent patients, one wonders what
specific type of harm the court anticipates. This is an area in need of
further judicial clarification.
The Bludworth court placed the decision to terminate life support
in the hands of the family after consultation with physicians. The
Florida legislature, addressing the same issue, placed heavier empha-
sis on the patient's intent as expressed in a living will.
B. Natural Death Acts
Five days after the Supreme Court of Florida rendered its deci-
sion in Bludworth, the Governor of Florida signed into law legislation
which: (1) recognized a competent patient's right to instruct physi-
cians to withhold or withdraw life prolonging measures, and (2) set
forth the means by which the patient could exercise this right if he
became incompetent.es Cases such as Bludworth, where physicians
and health care officials have sought judicial consent before termi-
nating life support, have prompted legislatures to set forth statutory
guidelines relieving courts of the burden of difficult decision-making
in this area.
Since 1976,69 twenty-one states have enacted legislation, 70 often
Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d at 138, 660 P.2d at 751. Spring stated that private medical decisions
would be "subject to judicial scrutiny if good faith or due care is brought into question in
subsequent litigation . . . with no immunity for action taken in bad faith or action that is
greviously unreasonable." In re Spring, 380 Mass. at 639, 405 N.E.2d at 122.
67 Bludworth, 452 So. 2d at 926. The court specifically listed "guardians, consenting fam-
ily members, physicians, hospitals, [and] their administrators" as coming within the good
faith standard.
68 Life-Prolonging Procedure Act of Florida, ch. 84-58, 3 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 40 (West
1984).
69 California enacted the first natural death act in the United States. CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-95 (West Supp. 1983) (enacted 1976).
70 Alabama, ALA. CODE §§ 22-8A-1 to 22-8A-10 (Supp. 1982); Arkansas, ARK. STAT.
ANN. §§ 82-3801 to 82-3804 (Michie Supp. 1983); California, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§§ 7185-95 (West Supp. 1983); Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 2501-09 (1983); Flor-
ida, Life-Prolonging Procedure Act of Florida, ch. 84-58, 3 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 40 (West
1984); Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. §§ 31-32-1 to 31-32-12 (Michie Supp. 1984); Idaho, IDAHO
CODE §§ 39-4501 to 39-4508 (Michie Supp. 1983); Illinois, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2,
§§ 701-710 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-85), Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-28,101 to 65-
28,109 (1980); Mississippi, Act of Apr. 16, 1984, ch. 365, 1984 Miss. Law 98; Nevada, NEv.
REV. STAT. §§ 449.540 to 449.690 (1983); New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-7-1 to 24-7-
11 (1981); North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-320 to 90-323 (1981); Oregon, OR. REv.
STAT. §§ 97.050 to 97.090 (1981); Texas, TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4590h (Vernon
Supp. 1983); Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 5251-5262 (Supp. 1984); Virginia, VA.
CODE §§ 54-325.8:1 to 54-325.8:13 (Michie Supp. 1984); Washington, WASH. REV. CODE
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termed natural death acts or right to die legislation. The Florida act,
which is representative of other states' enactments, enables an indi-
vidual to execute a written document, 71 stating his desire not to have
his life artificially prolonged if death becomes imminent and he is
unable to speak for himself.7 2 When acting pursuant to a validly exe-
cuted directive7 3 the physician, staff, and hospital are relieved of
civil and criminal liability for removing or withholding life sus-
taining treatment7 4 from an incompetent patient in a terminal
condition. 75
ANN. §§ 70.122.010 to 70.122.905 (West Supp. 1983-84); West Virginia, W. VA. CODE §§ 16-
30-1 to 16-30-10 (Michie Supp. 1984); Wisconsin, Act of Apr. 18, 1984, Act No. 202, 2 Wis.
Laws 1274 (to be codified at Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 154.01 to 154.15); Wyoming, Wyo. STAT
§§ 33-26-144 to 33-26-152 (Michie Supp. 1984). The District of Columbia also has an act
codified at D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 6-2421 to 6-2430 (Michie Supp. 1983). The New York legisla-
ture is drafting right to die legislation as this comment goes to print.
71 Florida also recognizes a witnessed oral statement. Life-Prolonging Procedure Act of
Florida, ch. 84-58, §§ 3-4, 3 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 40, 41-42 (West 1984); see also VA. CODE
§ 54-325.8:2 (Michie Supp. 1984).
72 Most natural death acts provide that a competent patient's wishes will supersede the
declaration. The declaration is valid only if the patient is incompetent when the decision to
remove life support must be made. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-8A-7 (Supp. 1982); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 110 1/2, § 707 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-85); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-28,106 (1980);
W. VA. CODE § 16-30-6 (Michie Supp. 1984).
73 Formalities regarding execution of a declaration vary among enactments. See, e.g.,
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-3802 (Supp. 1983); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7-3 (1981) (both requiring
the same formalities as in executing a will); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7188.5 (West
Supp. 1983) (requiring a member of a state agency to be present when a nursing home pa-
tient executes the declaration); VA. CODE § 54-325.8:3 (Michie Supp. 1984) (requiring no
formalities beyond two subscribing witnesses).
74 Generally, the acts limit their coverage to life sustaining procedures and do not cover
curative procedures. The definition of life sustaining procedures varies among jurisdictions.
Most acts define life sustaining procedures as a medical procedure or intervention which, by
artificial or mechanical means, "only serves to prolong the moment of death." Excluded from
the definition of life sustaining procedures in most acts are procedures necessary to provide
comfort, care, or to alleviate pain. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-8A-3 (Supp. 1982); CAL. HEALTH
& SAFETY AcT § 7187 (West Supp. 1983); Life-Prolonging Procedure Act of Florida, ch. 84-
58, § 3, 3 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 40, 41 (West 1984); IDAHO CODE § 39-4503 (Michie Supp.
1983); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-28,102 (1980); NEV. REV. STAT. § 449.570 (1983); TEx. REV.
Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4590h (Vernon Supp. 1983); VA. CODE § 54-325.8:2 (Michie Supp.
1984). Other acts also exclude nourishment or sustenance from the definition of life sus-
taining procedures. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, § 702 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-85);
ORE. REV. STAT. § 97.050 (1981); WYO. STAT. § 33-26-144 (Michie Supp. 1984).
75 Many acts define a terminal condition as an incurable condition resulting from illness,
disease, or injury which would cause death regardless of the application of life sustaining
procedures. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7186 (West Supp. 1983); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 24-7-2 (1981); OR. REV. STAT. § 97.050 (1981); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art.
4590h §2 (Vernon Supp. 1983); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5252 (Supp. 1984); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 70.122.020 (West Supp. 1983-84); W. VA. CODE § 16-30-2 (Michie Supp. 1984).
The words "would cause death regardless of the application of life sustaining procedures"
seem to exclude the situation where a person may be kept alive on life support indefinitely.
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The Bludworth decision differs from the Florida act in the weight
accorded to a patient's written instructions to withhold or withdraw
life support. Although the Bludworth court acknowledged that Fran-
cis Landy's living will was persuasive evidence of his intentions, 76 the
court looked to Mr. Landy's family rather than his living will to
speak for him. The court stated that a guardian's or family's "substi-
tuted judgment" 77 was the means by which an incompetent could
exercise his right to refuse or withdraw life support. Under most nat-
ural death acts, however, the patient's declaration governs the deci-
sion to terminate life support.78 It is only when a patient has failed
to execute a valid declaration that some acts authorize a guardian or
family member to substitute his judgment and determine if the pa-
tient would desire a natural death.7 9
In jurisdictions with right to die legislation, it is questionable
what impact the Bludworth decision will have in a situation where a
patient has validly executed a declaration expressing his intention to
die naturally. The Bludworth court states that normally the decision
to terminate life support should be made within the patient-physi-
cian-family relationship.80 If the parties disagree, the court suggests
that they seek judicial resolution. 8' Although some acts provide that
a patient's declaration binds the physician,82 most acts do not state
that the declaration binds unconsenting family members.83 Since
Other legislatures have avoided this problem by defining a terminal condition as a condition
which would cause imminent death if life support was not applied. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 449.590 (1983).
76 Bludworth, 452 So. 2d at 926.
77 Iad.; see also notes 59-61 supra and accompanying text.
78 See notes 82-83 inj/a.
79 See, e.g., Life-Prolonging Procedure Act of Florida, ch. 84-58, § 7, 3 Fla. Sess. Law
Serv. 40, 45 (West 1984); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7-8.1 (1981); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-322
(1981); OR. REV. STAT. § 97.083 (1981); VA. CODE § 54-325.8:6 (Michie Supp. 1984).
80 Bludworh, 452 So. 2d at 926.
81 Id.
82 Many acts do not impose liability on a physician who refuses to effect a patient's
declaration. Some acts, however, state that failure to take reasonable steps to transfer the
patient to a physician who will effect the directive will constitute unprofessional conduct. See,
e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7191 (West Supp. 1983); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN.
art. 4590h § 7 (Vernon Supp. 1983); Act of Apr. 18, 1984, Act No. 202, § 154.07, 2 Wis. Laws
1274, 1277.
83 Most acts provide a suggested form of declaration containing the statement "it is my
intention that this declaration shall be honored by my family and physician as the final ex-
pression of my legal right to refuse medical or surgical treatment and accept the consequences
for such refusal." Beyond this request that the declaration be honored and beyond certain
penalties imposed upon persons who wilfully destroy, alter, or conceal a declaration or revo-
cation, most acts fail to indicate that the declaration is binding on family members. See, e.g.,
ALA. CODE § 22-8A-4 (Supp. 1982); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §.7188 (West Supp.
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most natural death acts do not address the issue, it appears that un-
consenting family members may continue to take their grievances to
court. This suggestion by the Bludworth court, however, contradicts
the premise upheld by the same court that a person does not lose his
right to refuse life support when he becomes incompetent. 84 If un-
consenting family members take their dispute to court, the patient
who expressed his desire to die naturally remains on life support
while his right to refuse treatment is delayed, if not destroyed.
While the decision in Bludworth illustrates the trend toward re-
ducing judicial involvement in the decision to remove life support, it
falls short of fulfilling the patient's desire to die a natural death by
focusing on the family's opinion of what the patient desired instead
of on the patient's own written statements. Right to die legislation,
which does focus on the patient's written desire, fails to address the
issue of whether the patient's declaration binds unconsenting family
members. Although natural death acts and judicial decisions such as
Bludworth continue to expand a patient's right to refuse life support,
other issues, in particular who may contest a patient's wishes and
upon what grounds, will demand resolution in the near future.
IV. Conclusion
The Florida Supreme Court's decision in Bludworth reflects the
developing trend toward reducing restrictions on the exercise of a
patient's right to refuse life support treatment. The decision is one of
the first cases which expressly allows consenting family members to
exercise the patient's right on his behalf, without court appointment
of a guardian. Although, in the legal arena, Bludworth is a new step
toward expanding a patient's right to refuse treatment, it merely ac-
knowledges what has been practiced in the medical field for years.85
1983); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, § 703 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-85); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 65-28,103 (1980); NEV. REV. STAT. § 449.610 (1983); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art.
4590h (Vernon Supp. 1983); VA. CODE § 54-325.8:4 (Michie Supp. 1984); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 70.122.030 (West Supp. 1983-84); W. VA. CODE § 16-30-3 (Michie Supp. 1984).
Many acts, however, provide that a physician who refuses to follow a patient's directive may
be liable for failing to transfer the patient to a physician who will effect the declaration. See
note 82 supra.
84 Bludworth, 452 So. 2d at 923.
85 See Kutner, Euthanasia: Due Process for Death with Dignity." The Living Will, 54 IND. L.J.
201, 223 (1979) (withdrawal of life-prolonging treatment where biological death is imminent
is fairly common in hospital practice); Malcolm, note 36 supra (nationwide interviews with
hospital personnel indicate that termination of life support without court approval may be
increasing in frequency).
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In this way, Bludworth represents the law finally catching up to
reality.
Unfortunately, the decision fails to stipulate that the family
members are bound by the patient's previously expressed wishes em-
bodied in a living will. If, as the court states, an incompetent patient
has the same right as a competent patient to refuse life sustaining
treatment, his prior expression should be upheld. To allow his family
the opportunity to decide differently infringes upon this right.
Sharon A. Christie
Magr Lou Howard
Leigh Ann MacKenzie
FEDERAL ELECTION LAW-FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION V
MASSACHUSETTS CITIZENS FOR LIFE: NON-PROFIT CORPORATION
EXPENDITURES IN FEDERAL ELECTIONS.
In June 1984, the United States District Court for the District of
Massachusetts decided Federal Election Commission v. Massachusetts Citi-
zens for Lift.' In so doing, the court added yet another link to the
growing chain of decisions involving the limits on corporate contri-
butions connected with election campaigns.
In Massachusetts Citizens, the court held that a pro-life corpora-
tion's printing and distribution of a newsletter urging readers to vote
pro-life and listing various candidates' stands on abortion-related is-
sues were not prohibited expenditures under section 441b of the Fed-
eral Election Campaign Act.2 This section prohibits any corporation
from making a contribution or expenditure in connection with a fed-
eral election.3 The court attempted to clarify the type of expendi-
tures intended to be prohibited by section 441b, and also provided
some guidelines regarding prohibited communications during an
election campaign.
This comment first discusses the decision and holding in Massa-
1 589 F. Supp. 646 (D. Mass. 1984).
2 2 U.S.C. § 441b (1982).
3 Section 441b reads, in pertinent part:
(a) It is unlawful for ... any corporation whatever ... to make a contribution or
expenditure in connection with any election at which ... a Senator or Representa-
tive in, or a Delegate or Resident Commissioner to, Congress are to be voted for, or
in connection with any primary election or political convention or caucus held to
select candidates for any of the foregoing offices . ...
(b) (2) For purposes of this section. . . the term "contribution or expenditure" shall
include any direct or indirect payment, distribution, loan, advance, deposit, or gift
of money, or any services, or anything of value . . . to any candidate, campaign
committee, or political party or organization, in connection with any election to any
of the offices referred to in this section, but shall not include (A) communications by
a corporation to its stockholders and executive or administrative personnel and their
families. . . (B) nonpartisan registration and get-out-the-vote campaigns by a cor-
poration aimed at its stockholders and executive or administrative personnel and
their families . . . and (C) the establishment, administration, and solicitation of
contributions to a separate segregated fund to be utilized for political purposes by a
corporation, labor organization, membership organization, cooperative, or corpora-
tion without capital stock.
For a discussion of§ 441b and its predecessors, see notes 21-29 and accompanying text. For a
more detailed account of this history, see United States v. International Union United Auto.,
Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers of Am., 352 U.S. 567 (1957); Note, Corporate and
Labor Union Activity in Federal Eections.- "Active Electioneering"as a Constitutional Standard, 49 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 761 (1981).
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chusetts Citizens. It then briefly sketches the history of legislation lim-
iting corporate contributions connected with federal elections, and
examines some of the case law which has grown out of the various
statutes in this area. Finally, this comment concludes that the Massa-
chusetts Citirens decision is consistent with the legislative intent under-
lying section 441b, and observes that a like result can be expected in
any subsequent cases in which there are expenditures to advocate
positions on issues, rather than on candidates.
I. Federal Election Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life
Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc. (MCFL) is a non-profit cor-
poration formed to "foster respect for human life and to defend the
right to life of all human beings, born and unborn."' 4 In September
of 1978, just before a primary election involving candidates for the
House and Senate, MCFL published a "Special Election Edition" of
its newsletter, as it had done before three previous elections. The
newsletter listed all candidates in the election, as well as their posi-
tions on three "pro-life" issues.5 The newsletter also urged readers to
"vote pro-life," and carried the pictures of only those candidates
whose views were in line with MCFL's.6 The newsletter, however,
carried the caveat that it did not "represent an endorsement of any
particular candidate."'7
Pursuant to a citizen complaint, the Federal Election Commis-
sion (FEC) brought suit against MCFL for violating 2 U.S.C. § 441b,
which prohibits corporate contributions or expenditures in connec-
tion with a federal election.8 The complaint sought a civil penalty of
$5,000.
Section 441b of the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA)
prohibits a corporation from making "a contribution or expenditure
in connection with any election" in which Senators or Representa-
tives are to be elected. 9 The FEC believed that MCFL's expendi-
tures on its special election newsletter fell squarely within section
441b's prohibitions. These prohibitions are intended primarily to
prevent corporations from having an undue influence on elections,
thus undermining the integrity of, and public confidence in, the elec-
4 Mafsachusetts Citizens, 589 F. Supp. at 647.
5 Id at 648.
6 Id
7 Id
8 See note 3 supra.
9 Id
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toral process.' 0 The court, then, had to decide whether MCFL's
newsletter represented such a threat to this election.
The court held, first, that the publication of this newsletter did
not constitute a payment or gift on the part of MCFL, and therefore
did not fall within the prohibitions of section 441b. 11 According to
the court, the publication of the newsletter was uninvited by, and
uncoordinated with, any candidate's campaign; 12 also, the newsletter
expressed no preferences between two opposing candidates on the
same side of the issue.' 3 The small amount of money spent per can-
didate was also a factor in the court's holding.' 4
Second, the court found that the newsletters constituted "news
story, commentary, or editorial distributed through the facilities of
[a] . ..periodical publication." 5 Accordingly, the newsletters were
not prohibited by section 44 lb as they fell within section 431 (9) (B) (i)
of the FECA, which exempts such publications from the definition of
"expenditure."16
The court therefore concluded that MCFL's expenditures con-
stituted "speaking" rather then "spending," and were not the type of
evil Congress meant to prevent when it enacted the federal campaign
laws. It stated that if section 441b was intended to prohibit the pub-
lication of these newsletters, that prohibition would be unconstitu-
tional. 17 The court based its opinion, first, on the fact that the
newsletters were independent of any candidate or party, thus the
danger of real or apparent election corruption was nonexistent. Sec-
ond, MCFL was a non-profit corporation formed for the express pur-
pose of promoting a certain ideological cause, and the court reasoned
that the publication of its newsletter was less likely to have been im-
properly motivated than if it had been published by a capital stock
10 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976).
11 Massachusells Citizens, 589 F. Supp. at 649.
12 Id
13 Id
14 The court found that MCFL's expenditures in this election, when divided by the
number of candidates reported, amounted to about $20 per candidate, or about $80 per can-
didate for federal office. In the court's words, these were "hardly the sort of 'large' expendi-
tures. . . which the 1947 amendment to the Federal Corrupt Practices Act was aimed at."
Id at 649-50.
15 Id at 650 (quoting 2 U.S.C. § 431(9)(B)(i) (1982)).
16 2 U.S.C. § 431(9)(B)(i) (1982).
17 Massachusetts Citizens, 589 F. Supp. at 651. Earlier in its opinion, however, the court
admitted that "the facial constitutionality of § 441b is not an open question," id at 648, and
expressed its cognizance of the principle that if it could decide the case on non-constitutional
grounds, it ought not engage in constitutional analysis. Id at 649.
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corporation.' 8 Finally, the newsletters were "direct political speech"
rather than solicitations for campaign contributions, "speech by
proxy",' 9 or any other type of communication that would tend to
give the appearance of corruption or improper influence. 20 Thus,
had it chosen to rule on the constitutionality of section 441b as ap-
plied to these facts, the court would have ruled in the negative.
II. Massachusetts Citizens, Section 441b, and the Case Law
Prohibitions on corporate political contributions had their in-
ception early in this century. In his annual message to Congress in
1905, President Theodore Roosevelt called for a law forbidding "[a]ll
contributions by corporations to any political committee or for any
political purpose."'2' Congress responded in 1907 by enacting the
Tillman Act, which made it unlawful for "any national bank, or any
corporation organized by authority of any laws of Congress, to make
a money contribution in connection with any election to any political
office." 22
In 1925, the Federal Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) extended the
Tillman Act to prohibit any contribution, money or otherwise, by a
corporation in connection with federal general elections.23 Then, in
1947, the Taft-Hartley Act extended the prohibitions to expenditures
as well as contributions, labor unions as well as corporations, and
primaries and nominating conventions in addition to general elec-
tions.24 The purpose of extending the provisions was to prevent cor-
porations and unions from making expenditures to support particular
18 Id at 652. The court quoted Mr. Justice White's dissent in First National Bank v.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 802 (1978), in which he stated that the communications of profit-
making corporations "are not 'an integral part of the development of ideas, of mental explo-
ration and of the affirmation of self.'" id at 805 (quoting T. EMERSON, TOWARD A. GEN-
ERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 5 (1966)). Justice White noted, however, that
where, as here, a corporation is formed solely for the purpose of advancing an ideological
cause shared by its members, "association in a corporate form may be viewed as merely a
means of achieving effective self-expression. But this is hardly the case generally with corpo-
rations operated for the purpose of making profits." Id. The Massachusetts Citizens court was
of the opinion that Justices White, Brennan and Marshall would not have dissented in Belotti
had the holding in that case been limited to non-profit corporations. 589 F. Supp. at 652.
19 "'[Slpeech by proxy'. . . is not the sort of political advocacy. . . entitled to full First
Amendment protection." California Medical Ass'n v. Federal Election Comm'n, 453 U.S.
182, 196 (1981).
20 Massachusetts Citizens, 589 F. Supp. at 648.
21 40 CONG. REC. 96 (1905).
22 Tillman Act of 1907, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864.
23 Formerly 18 U.S.C. § 610.
24 Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, ch. 120, § 304, 61 Stat. 159, 159-60.
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candidates or parties.25
The enactment of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 197126
further clarified the law in this area. The so-called "Hansen Amend-
ment" to the FECA exempted certain types of spending from the
FCPA's prohibitions. These exemptions encompassed internal com-
munications, separate segregated funds (also known as political ac-
tion committees or PACs), and non-partisan voter registration and
get-out-the-vote drives within a corporation or union.2 7 Representa-
tive Orville Hansen stated that the amendment was in keeping with
the basic intent of the Act, which was to "prohibit the use of union or
corporate funds for active electioneering directed at the general
public." 28
In 1976, the anti-corporate contribution provision of the
FCPA29 was repealed and incorporated in the FECA, where it be-
came section 441b of that Act.
The Massachusetts Citizens court stated that the FEC had never
before sought to invoke section 441b's provisions against a noncom-
mercial corporation for making expenditures in connection with a
federal election. 30 Although none of the previous cases is directly on
point, certain relevant ideas emerge from these cases. Most pertinent
25 The following excerpts from the Senate debates on the Act help to illuminate the
intent behind these provisions:
Mr. MAGNUSON. . . . Would the provision in any way deny the right of a reli-
gious organization to publish pamphlets in behalf of a candidate because, let us say,
the organization supported him on moral grounds?
Mr. TAFT. If the organization is a corporation, I assume it could not do so directly.
If the organization publishes religious papers that it can sell, that is all right; but the
organization cannot take the church members' money and use it for the purpose of
teying to elect a candidate or defeat a candidate, and they should not do so.
Mr. MAGNUSON. Would the Anti-Saloon League, for example, be prohibited
from issuing pamphlets against a political candidate?
Mr. TAFT. As I understand, the League would probably receive contributions
from individuals, and it would be like the PAC or any other organization which was
organized for political purposes.
Mr. MAGNUSON. The Anti-Saloon League could use the dues paid by its mem-
bership to publish a pamphlet in behalf of a certain political candidate?
Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, I must know the circumstances before I can pass upon
the question. Different circumstances may arise in different cases. . . . All sorts of
questions arise in every case, and I cannot answer without knowing the
circumstances.
93 CoNG. REC. 6440-41 (1947)(emphasis added).
26 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-455 (1982).
27 Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, § 205, 86 Stat. 10, 10.
28 117 CONG. REC. 43,380 (1971).
29 18 U.S.C. § 610.
30 Massachusetts Citizens, 589 F. Supp. at 648.
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to the Massachusetts Citizens case are the ideas that (1) a court should
look to the legislative intent underlying section 441b and the facts of
the specific case in determining the applicability of section 441b; and
(2) certain acts of a corporation do not lend themselves to corruption
or the appearance of corruption, and thus do not come within section
441b's reach.
Courts have decided the applicability of section 441b based
upon the intent of Congress and the facts of each specific case. In
fact, the Supreme Court has not hesitated to resolve a case based
upon whether the facts presented the kind of problem Congress
meant to solve in enacting section 441b and its predecessors. In one
early decision, United States v. Congress of Industrial Organizations,3' the
defendant union published an in-house newsletter, aimed at union
members, which urged its readers to vote for a particular candidate.
The government contended that this was a violation of section 313 of
the FCPA (a predecessor of the current section 441b).32 The Court,
however, concluded that Congress did not intend to outlaw this type
of publication, and that section 313 did not reach such a use of cor-
porate or union funds. 33 The Court went on to state that it expressed
"no opinion as to the scope of [section 313] where different circum-
stances exist. ' '34 Thus, the Court left the door open to resolve future
cases based upon their individual fact patterns. More recently, in
Federal Election Commission v. Central Long Island Tax Reform Immediately
Committee,35 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found that a
John Birch Society-sponsored publication, which urged its readers to
express their displeasure toward politicians who voted for higher
taxes and big government, did not constitute express advocacy
31 335 U.S. 106 (1948).
32 Id at 123.
33 Id at 123-24.
34 Id at 124. In United States v. International Union of United Auto., Aircraft and
Agricultural Implement Workers of Am., 352 U.S. 567 (1957), the Court reached the opposite
conclusion. The defendant union used its general treasury to pay for television broadcasts
endorsing certain candidates for Congress. It was held that this was exactly the type of "indi-
rect contribution" that Congress meant to prohibit. Id at 589. The Court set out certain
questions as being pertinent to such cases:
[W]as the broadcast paid for out of the general dues of the union membership or
may the funds be fairly said to have been obtained on a voluntary basis? Did the
broadcast reach the public at large or only those affiliated with appellee? Did it
constitute active electioneering or simply state the record of particular candidates
on economic issues? Did the union sponsor the broadcast with the intent to affect
the results of the election?
352 U.S. at 592.
35 616 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1980).
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within the meaning of the FECA.36 Again, the court was willing to
interpret the scope of the election laws in light of the facts of the
specific case.
Courts have also been willing to decide cases based upon a de-
termination of a specific activity's susceptibility to corruption. In
cases involving corporate or union election expenditures, the courts
must balance two competing interests. One is the government's in-
terest in preventing corruption in elections and the erosion of public
confidence in the electoral process. The other interest is the right of
individuals and groups to speak and associate freely under the first
amendment. Two reasons stand out as justifying the limits on cam-
paign expenditures. First, these limitations can prevent overwhelm-
ing corporate influence on a campaign, and can avoid the political
quid pro quo that comes from corporate subsidization of politicians'
campaigns. Second, these limitations were designed to prevent cor-
porate officers from using shareholders' money to support candidates
whom the individual shareholders may not support.37 Of these two,
only the former has been held to be constitutionally sufficient to sup-
port the prohibition of corporate contributions.38
The Supreme Court has ruled that certain actions taken by cor-
porations are less susceptible to corruption or the appearance of cor-
ruption than others. In First National Bank of Boston v. Bellott 39 the
Court held that a corporation may make expenditures in connection
with a referendum. At issue was a Massachusetts statute prohibiting
corporations from making contributions or expenditures for the pur-
pose of influencing the vote on any question submitted to the electo-
rate.4° The Court held that this statute abridged the appellant
corporation's right of expression. In reaching this conclusion, the
Court determined that since the first amendment would have pro-
tected this speech if made by an individual, it was not unprotected
merely because the speaker was a corporation.41 The Court rejected
36 Id at 53.
37 See Federal Election Comm'n v. National Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197 (1982).
38 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); see aso Let's Help Fla. v. McCrary, 621 F.2d
195, 199 (5th Cir. 1980), aj'd, 454 U.S. 1130 (1982).
39 435 U.S. 765 (1978), reh g denied, 438 U.S. 907 (1978).
40 Id. at 767. The statute in question was MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN., ch. 55, § 8 (West
Supp. 1977).
41 Id at 784; see also Citizens Against Rent Control v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290 (1981), in
which the Supreme Court held that a city ordinance limiting contributions to committees
formed to support or oppose ballot measures was an impermissible restraint on both the right
ofassociation and speech guarantees in the first amendment. The Court stated that to place a
limit on a group of individuals wishing to "band together" to advance their views on a ballot
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Massachusetts' contention that the law was needed to prevent the
corruption of elections or to protect shareholders; its rejection was
based on the fact that the state did not show that the relative voice of
corporations had been significant in influencing referenda. The
Court took great pains, however, to distinguish referenda from elec-
tions of public officers, saying that "[t]he risk of corruption perceived
in cases involving candidate elections simply is not present in a popu-
lar vote on a public issue."'42 Apparently, corporations have greater
freedom to speak on issues than on candidates; the distinction be-
tween issues and candidates is a crucial one.
The Court drew another constitutional distinction between the
FECA's contribution limitations and its expenditure limitations in
Buckl v. Valeo.43 While this case did not deal specifically with corpo-
rate contributions and expenditures, it is important because of its
holding that the FECA's contribution limitations violated the Constitu-
tion, while its expenditure limitations did not. The possibility of large
individual contributors securing a political quidpro quo, and the ap-
pearance of impropriety such contributions would give, would be suf-
ficient to justify the government's limiting the amount that can be
contributed to a campaign. Such considerations, however, are not as
compelling in the case of expenditures, said the Court, especially ex-
penditures that are uncoordinated with a particular campaign: "Un-
like contributions, such independent expenditures may well provide
little assistance to the candidate's campaign and indeed may prove
counterproductive." 44 The primary effect of limiting expenditures,
the Court held, is to restrict the quantity of campaign speech by indi-
viduals, groups and candidates.45 Such restrictions limit political ex-
pression " 'at the core of our electoral process and of the First
Amendment freedoms.' "46
measure, without placing similar restrictions on individuals acting alone, was a clear restraint
on the right of association. While there are, said the Court, certain activities that are legal
when engaged in by one while illegal if performed in concert with others, "political expression
is not one of them." Id at 296.
42 First Nat'l. Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 790 (1978).
43 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
44 Id at 47. The Massachusetts Citizens court cited this, stating that "[t]o the extent that
[the newsletter] was distributed beyond defendant's membership, it probably lessened rather
than enhanced the prospects of election of candidates subscribing to defendants' platform
which, according to public opinion polls, is opposed by most citizens." Massachusetts Citizens,
589 F. Supp. at 649.
45 Buckle, 424 U.S. at 39.
46 Id (quoting Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32 (1968)).
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The background to Massachusetts Citiens, then, shows that a non-
profit corporation may:
1) distribute materials constituting express advocacy to its
members;47
2) distribute material to the general public regarding a referen-
dum; 48 and
3) engage in any form of protected political speech, as long as the
compelling governmental interest in preventing corruption is not
a factor.49
The Buckley and Bellotti cases held that certain actions by corpo-
rations do not give rise to a suspicion of corruption. Corporations
may more freely make expenditures than contributions, and may make
these expenditures to speak out on issues but not on particular candi-
dates. This is the Massachusetts Citizens fact pattern: a corporation
making expenditures in order to speak out on the issue of abortion,
albeit in the context of an election which involved candidates for
public office.
It can be seen, then, that certain shifts in the fact pattern of
Massachusetts Citizens would likely have altered the result in the case.
Had MCFL chosen to openly endorse certain candidates because of
their pro-life stances, the court would have found that this consti-
tuted express advocacy, and therefore would have been barred by
section 441b.50 If MCFL was a capital stock corporation, the court
would probably have scrutinized its motives more closely. 51 Were
MCFL to have encouraged its readers to contribute to the campaigns
of "pro-life" candidates, MCFL would have lost the case.52 On the
other hand, had MCFL not been a corporation, or had they set up a
separate, segregated fund or PAC, the cause might never have been
brought before the court. 53
47 United States v. Congress of Indus. Org., 335 U.S. 106 (1948).
48 Belotti, 435 U.S. 765.
49 Buckley, 424 U.S. 1.
50 As it happened, MCFL's newsletter carried the photographs of only those congres-
sional and gubernatorial candidates whose views were consistent with MCFL's. The text,
however, carried the caveat that the newsletter did "not represent an endorsement of any
particular candidate." The court did not find, nor did the Commission contend, that this
constituted express advocacy. 589 F. Supp. at 648.
51 See note 18 supra.
52 See note 48 supra and accompanying text.
53 In fact, after the suit was brought, MCFL formed a PAC pursuant to 2 U.S.C.
§ 441b(b)(2)(C). Massachusetts Citizens, 589 F. Supp. 646, 647 n.j. Because a civil penalty was
sought, the case was not moot.
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III. Conclusion
The district court's holding in Massachusetts Citizens appears to
be consistent with the legislative intent behind the corporate contri-
bution provisions of the FECA. It is difficult to imagine MCFL's
newsletter being used to exact political favors from any candidate.
Presumably, any "pro-life" candidates in the election held those
views before MCFL published its newsletter, not because it did so.
Accordingly, it is not likely that the newsletter was designed to influ-
ence or corrupt any of the candidates. Rather, it was designed to
alert readers to MCFL's point of view on a particular issue, and en-
able them to vote accordingly. MCFL was promoting its stand on an
issue, not a particular candidate. Thus, given the Bellotti distinction
between issues and candidates, the court's holding seems well-
founded.
Some may think, however, that the court's holding was too
broad. The FECA exempts news and editorial comment in a period-
ical publication from the definition of "expenditure." The court
found that MCFL's newsletter fell within this exemption. This was
probably a sufficient basis for holding in MCFL's favor. Some may
feel that it was unnecessary for the court to have gone further than
this in applying section 441b to the facts of this case; or, for that
matter, to ever apply section 441b on a case-by-case basis. There is,
perhaps, merit in the proposition that section 441b prohibits "any
corporation whatever" 54 from making expenditures in connection
with an election. Taken literally, this language does not allow a case-
by-case interpretation of section 441b: if a.corporation is involved,
the expenditures are illegal. Certainly, such a bright line is easier to
interpret than having to decide each case involving a corporation on
the specific facts presented. This argument is strengthened by the
fact that a corporation may form a PAC, as MCFL eventually did,55
to which its members may make voluntary contributions and
through which the corporation may promote certain views or candi-
dates. If section 441b already provides such a mechanism, should not
corporations be encouraged to take advantage of that mechanism,
rather than constantly challenge the applicability of section 441b to
a particular set of facts? Still, the Supreme Court has not shied away
from deciding this type of case on its facts, as it did in the CIO case.5 6
54 See note 3 supra.
55 589 F. Supp. 646, 647 n.L.
56 United States v. Congress of Indus. Org., 335 U.S. 106 (1948).
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If such a literal reading of section 441b had been desired, no doubt
the Court would have expressed that desire long ago.
These questions may well be answered shortly. An appeal has
been filed, and a decision may be forthcoming as early as the spring
of 1985. In the meantime, non-profit corporations such as MCFL
might do well to follow its lead and form a PAC for any election-
related expenditures.
Thomas S Nessinger
CRIMINAL LAW-LEE V. WINSTON. COURT-ORDERED SURGERY
AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT-A NEW ANALYSIS OF
REASONABLENESS?
In Lee v W'znston,' the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit considered the circumstances under which evidence
could be surgically removed from a criminal suspect without violat-
ing the suspect's rights under the fourth amendment. In Lee, the de-
fendant was allegedly shot while attempting to rob a market.2 The
court of appeals affirmed the denial of the state's motion to compel
the surgical removal of the bullet from Lee's chest.3 Accordingly, the
court enjoined Virginia from compelling surgery because such an act
would violate Lee's fourth amendment right against unreasonable
searches.4 In reaching this decision, the Lee court modified the stan-
dard previously used in examining the reasonableness of court-or-
dered surgery for removing evidence.
This comment will describe the Lee court's constitutional analy-
sis of court-ordered surgery and examine the differences between this
analysis and that used by previous courts. Part I will describe
Supreme Court decisions on bodily intrusion cases, focusing on.
Schmerber v. CafTornia. Part II will examine how state and lower fed-
eral courts have applied Schmerber to surgical searches. Part III will
recount the facts of Lee v. Winston and part IV will analyze the court
of appeal's decision in Lee. Finally, part V will discuss the potential
impact of Lee v. Winston.
I. Bodily Intrusion Cases in the-Supreme Court:
Rochin, Breithaupt and Schmerber
The United States Supreme Court has considered searches in-
volving the removal of evidence from within the human body on
only three occasions. In the first of these cases, Rochin v. Califomia,5
the police had forcibly entered the defendant's apartment and after
unsuccessfully attempting to remove morphine capsules from his
mouth, ordered that his stomach be pumped.6 The Court reversed
1 717 F.2d 888 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 1906 (1984).
2 Id. at 890.
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
6 Id. at 166.
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the state court conviction because these methods "shock[ed] the con-
science" and therefore violated the due process clause of the United
States Constitution. 7 The Court refused to "legalize force so brutal
and so offensive to human dignity .... "8
In Breithaupt v. Abram,9 a less egregious case, the Supreme Court
affirmed a state court conviction based on the results of a blood sam-
ple taken from an unconscious drunk driving suspect.' 0 The Court
held that the taking of a blood sample, without the suspect's consent,
did not violate the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. "
According to the Court, a simple blood test, performed by a doctor in
a hospital, was not the type of offensive conduct denounced by
Rochin.'2 In reaching its decision, the Court balanced the interests of
the individual in being free from bodily invasions against society's
interest in deterring drunk drivers through the use of "modern scien-
tific methods of crime detection."' 3 The Court concluded that soci-
ety's interest outweighed that of the individual. 14
In Schmerber v. Cafornia,15 unlike Rochin and Breithaupt, the
Supreme Court applied a fourth amendment analysis to a search for
evidence within the human body.' 6 Based on this analysis, the
Schmerber Court affirmed a state court conviction based on the results
of a blood test taken from a drunk driving suspect.' 7 State and fed-
eral courts have relied primarily on Schmerber when considering the
constitutionality of surgical searches.' 8
In determining whether the results of the blood test should have
been suppressed pursuant to the exclusionary rule, the Schmerber
Court made two inquiries.' 9 First, the Court considered whether the
7 Id. at 172.
8 Id. at 174.
9 352 U.S. 432 (1957).
10 Id. at 434, 437.
11 Id
12 Id at 435.
13 Id at 439.
14 Id
15 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
16 Id at 766. In Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), the exclusionary rule was
adopted for federal prosecutions to protect the fourth amendment right to be free from unrea-
sonable searches and seizures. The rule was first applied to the states in Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961). Since both Rochin (1952) and Breithaupt (1957) were decided before 1961, the
exclusionary rule under the fourth amendment of the federal Constitution was not yet appli-
cable to those searches. Since Schmerber (1966) was decided after 1961, the exclusionary rule
was applicable.
17 384 U.S. at 758-59, 772.
18 See notes 28-30 in/fa.
19 384 U.S. at 768.
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police, under traditional fourth amendment law, were justified in re-
quiring the suspect to submit to a blood test. Applying this analysis,
the Court determined that, in general, the police must secure a
search warrant before forcing a person to submit to a blood test.20
Failure to secure a warrant may be excused, however, if the police
officer encounters exigent circumstances. 2t In Schmerber, the Court
f6und such exigent circumstances;22 by the time the officer could
have obtained a search warrant, the evidence, the alcohol in the
blood, would have dissipated.23
The Court then considered whether the procedures used to ob-
tain the blood sample were consistent with fourth amendment stan-
dards of reasonableness. The Court examined the reasonableness of
the procedures in light of the risks to the suspect's health. It found
the blood test reasonable because the test effectively determined in-
toxication, it was performed in a hospital by a doctor using accepted
medical procedures, and it involved "virtually no risk, trauma, or
pain." 24
Although the Court held that a blood test performed without
the suspect's consent did not violate the fourth or fourteenth amend-
ment,25 it nevertheless emphasized the high value society places on
the integrity of the person.26 The Court concluded: "[t]hat we today
hold that the Constitution does not forbid the States minor intrusions
into an individual's body under stringently limited conditions in no
way indicates that it permits more substantial intrusions, or intru-
sions under other conditions. ' 27
20 Id. at 769-70.
21 The exigent circumstances exception developed from a concern that evidence might
be destroyed, especially when the evidence is under the immediate control of the accused, see
Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964). Where the evidence is alcohol inside a
suspect's body, as in Schmerber, the exigency presented is the metabolic elimination of the
alcohol, 384 U.S. at 770-71. The question of exigency may also arise in bullet removal cases
because lead may deteriorate inside the human body. Although rare, the striation marks on
the bullet may deteriorate before the end of the Crowder mandated pre-surgical appellate
review. Regardless of the exigency, a pre-surgical hearing and appeal are required under
Crowder; this makes exigency moot. See note 125 infra.
22 384 U.S. at 770.
23 Id. at 770-71.
24 Id. at 771.
25 The Court found that its holding in Breithaupt v. Abram required the rejection of the
defendant's argument under the due process clause. Id. at 760.
26 Id. at 772.
27 Id.
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II. Application of the Schmerber Analysis
Despite the Court's admonition that its holding in Schmerber was
fact-specific, the courts in nine states, 28 a District of Columbia
court,29 and one federal court of appeals,30 have approved court-or-
dered surgery for the removal of bullets from a criminal defendant.3'
For example, in Creamer v. State,32 the Supreme Court of Georgia
broadly interpreted Schmerber as permitting a court-ordered surgical
intrusion. The court, however, failed to examine whether involun-
tary surgery differed significantly from an involuntary blood test.33
Of the courts which have addressed the issue, only the Supreme
Court of Indiana has concluded that involuntary surgery, under a
court order, to recover a bullet for evidence is per se unreasonable
under the fourth amendment. 34
A. State Court Application of Schmerber
Creamer v. State35 first expanded the Schmerber decision from the
blood test scenario to the surgical removal of bullets. In Creamer, the
Supreme Court of Georgia upheld a search warrant ordering the re-
moval of a bullet from the chest of a man accused of murder.3 6 In its
analysis, the court cited Schmerber as authority for surgical intrusions
without distinguishing between a blood test and involuntary sur-
28 Bowden v. State, 256 Ark. 820, 510 S.W.2d 879 (1974); Doe v. State, 409 So. 2d 25
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Creamer v. State, 229 Ga. 511, 192 S.E.2d 350 (1972), cert. dis-
missed, 410 U.S. 975 (1973); Allison v. State, 129 Ga. App. 364, 199 S.E.2d 587 (1973) cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1145 (1974); State v. Martin, 404 So. 2d 960 (La. 1981); Hughes v. State, 56
Md. App. 12, 466 A.2d 533 (1983) cert. denied, 298 Md. 394, 470 A.2d 353 (1984); State v.
Overstreet, 551 S.W.2d 621 (Mo. 1977); State v. Richards, 585 S.W.2d 505 (Mo. Ct. App.
1979); State v. Lawson, 187 N.J. Super. 25, 453 A.2d 556 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1982);
People v. Smith, 80 Misc. 2d 210, 362 N.Y.S.2d 909 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Crim. Term 1974); State
v. Allen, 277 S.C. 595, 291 S.E.2d 459 (1982).
29 Hughes v. United States, 429 A.2d 1339 (D.C. 1981).
30 United States v. Crowder, 543 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062
(1977).
31 Courts, however, have not approved court-ordered surgery on a non-defendant. See,
e.g., State v. Haynie, 240 Ga. 866, 242 S.E.2d 713 (1978) (the court refused to order surgery on
a shooting victim, holding that only a defendant may be subjected to such a search).
32 229 Ga. 511, 192 S.E.2d 350 (1972), cert. dismissed, 410 U.S. 975 (1973).
33 See text accompanying notes 35-39 infra. The Georgia court cited Schmerber as author-
ity for its holding that court-ordered surgery was not unconstitutional. It does not appear
that the court felt it was expanding the holding of Schmerber. See also United States v.
Crowder, 543 F.2d 312, 322 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Robinson, J., dissenting); Note, Constitutional
Law--Search and Seizure-Georgia Supreme Court Expands Upon Extent of Penissible Body Intrusion,
24 MERCER L. REV. 687 (1973).
34 See text accompanying notes 41-45 infra.
35 229 Ga. 511, 192 S.E.2d 350.
36 Id. at 518, 192 S.E.2d at 355.
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gery.3 7 One year later, in Allison v. State,38 the Court of Appeals of
Georgia noted the absence of analysis in the Creamer decision. Never-
theless, the court reluctantly ordered surgery to remove a bullet from
just below the skin of a defendant who was allegedly shot in the back
during a market robbery.3 9 The Allison court indicated that Creamer
was erroneously decided because Schmerber did not include, nor
should it be expanded to include, surgery.40
The Supreme Court of Indiana, in Adams v. State,4' also recog-
nized the distinction between a Schmerber-type blood test and involun-
tary surgery. Adams was arrested as a suspect in a supermarket
robbery.42 The court held that the involuntary surgical removal of
bullets was per se unreasonable under the fourth amendment. 43
Even though the surgery could be performed under local anesthesia
and posed little risk to the defendant,44 the court concluded that sur-
gery was distinguishable from a blood test and was not constitutional
under Schmerber.45
Within two years after Creamer, two other state courts decided
bullet removal cases.46 The courts in both Arkansas and New York
determined court-ordered surgery would be permissible under cir-
cumstances other than those presented. 47 In both cases, the courts
refused to order surgery due to the grave medical risks the surgery
would pose to the defendant.48
37 Id. at 514-15, 192 S.E.2d at 352-53. The court merely stated that a minor intrusion is
permissible under Schmerber. The court then analyzed the issue under the Constitution of
Georgia.
38 129 Ga. App. 364, 199 S.E.2d 587 (1973).
39 Id. at 364-65, 199 S.E.2d at 588.
40 Id. at 365, 199 S.E.2d at 589. Judge Evans stated that "the Georgia Supreme Court
misinterpreted Schmerber v. California. . . . [l]t is very doubtful that the Supreme Court
would extend that case further, for a surgical knife is considerable more intrusion into the
human body than a mere needle inserted for blood testing." Id.
41 260 Ind. 663, 299 N.E.2d 834, (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 935 (1974).
42 Id. at 664, 299 N.E.2d at 835.
43 Id. at 668, 299 N.E.2d at 837.
44 Id. at 665, 299 N.E.2d at 836.
45 Id. at 668-69, 299 N.E.2d at 837.
46 Bowden v. State, 256 Ark. 820, 823, 510 S.W.2d 879, 881 (1974) (doctors testified that
the proposed surgery, removing a bullet from the petitioner's spinal canal, would worsen his
condition); People v. Smith, 80 Misc. 2d 210, 211-12, 362 N.Y.S.2d 909, 911 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Crim. Term. 1974) (removal of a bullet from behind the rhomboid muscle would require
"major surgery" under general anesthesia and, while presenting little danger to his life, the
surgery was too involved).
47 256 Ark. at 823, 510 S.W.2d at 881; 80 Misc. 2d at 211-12, 362 N.Y.S.2d at 911.
48 256 Ark. at 823, 510 S.W.2d at 881; 80 Misc. 2d at 211-12, 362 N.Y.S.2d at 911.
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B. Court-ordered Surgeg in Federal Courts
Prior to Lee v. W4inston, only one federal court of appeals had
addressed the constitutional issue of obtaining evidence through
court-ordered surgery. In United States v. Crowder,49 the Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia upheld a warrant ordering surgery
under circumstances which did not pose any significant danger to the
defendant's health. The Crowder court extrapolated a four part test
from the Supreme Court's language in Schmerber.50 The Crowder test
attempts to define the circumstances under which a bullet can be
surgically removed, by court order, without violating the defendant's
fourth amendment rights.51 This test, relied upon by later courts,52
requires that in order for court-ordered surgery to be constitutionally
valid: (1) the evidence must be relevant and obtainable in no other
way; (2) the operation must be minor in that the risk of permanent
injury is minimal; (3) the defendant must be given an adversarial
hearing before the surgery is performed; and (4) the defendant must
be given an opportunity to appeal before the surgery is performed. 53
The first prong of the Crowder test can be traced to Schmerber's
requirement that the search actually produce the particular evidence
sought and that the method used to recover the evidence be reason-
able. 54 The Crowder court clarified this requirement by specifying
that the evidence must be relevant 55 and obtainable in no other
way.56 Similarly, Crowder required a showing of probable cause that
the operation would produce the evidence; this is a stricter require-
49 543 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc) (on rehearing) (5-4 decision) (the court or-
dered removal of a bullet from Crowder's forearm, but refused to order the removal of the
bullet in his thigh due to the possibility of permanent injury), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062
(1977). The appellate court originally "held that surgery was a major intrusion and therefore
prohibited by the guidelines set by the Supreme Court in Schmerber v. Californiza." See Note,
Surgery andthe Searchfor Evidence: United States v. Crowder, 37 U. P=TT. L. REv. 429 (1975). This
note was written on the original panel opinion of the court of appeals, 513 F.2d 395 (D.C. Cir.
1975). The opinion was withdrawn at the request of the court.
50 See text accompanying notes 54-63 infra.
51 543 F.2d at 316. See Note, Constitutional Law-Search and Seizure-Court-ordered Surgical
Removal of a Bulletfom an Unconsenting Defendant for Evidentiagv Purposes Held Unreasonable Under
the Fourth Amendment. Crowder v. United States, 543 F2d 312 (D.C Cir. 1976). 55 TEx. L.
REV. 147 (1976).
52 See text accompanying notes 64-65 in/ra.
53 543 F.2d at 316.
54 See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 764-70.
55 See Doe v. State, 409 So. 2d 25, 27 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (removal not allowed
because the bullet had only speculative evidentiary value even though the surgery met the
other three tests of Crowder).
56 See People v. Bracamonte, 15 Cal. 3d 394, 540 P.2d 624, 124 Cal. Rptr. 528 (1975) (the
court excluded seven balloons filled with heroin which the defendant swallowed because they
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ment than Schmerber, which only required that the procedure be rea-
sonably calculated to produce the evidence.
The second prong of the Crowder test focuses on medical risk.
This emphasis evolved from the Schmerber Court's discussion that a
blood test posed "virtually no risk, trauma, or pain" and was con-
ducted in a reasonable manner, by a doctor in a hospital environ-
ment.57 Crowder extended the medical risk analysis by requiring the
procedure to be a "minor operation" 58 performed by a skilled sur-
geon 59 with minimal risks to the defendant. 60
A pre-surgical adversarial hearing coupled with an opportunity
for appellate review, 6' the third and fourth prongs, are procedural
safeguards. The only similar provision in Schmerber was the require-
ment that a search warrant be obtained unless exigent circumstances
were present.62 By requiring a full adversarial hearing, Crowder pro-
vides a far greater opportunity for review by a detached magistrate
than the mere issuance of a search warrant. This hearing has become
a battle of experts attempting to assist the court in determining
whether the operation would constitute "minor surgery. ' 63
C. Decisions After Crowder
Subsequent to the court of appeal's approval of court-ordered
could have been recovered in a less intrusive manner than a forced intake of an emetic
solution).
57 See Schmerkr, 384 U.S. at 771.
58 See, e.g., Hughes v. United States, 429 A.2d 1339 (D.C. 1981) (a search warrant order-
ing the surgical removal of bullets was upheld since the bullets were close to the skin surface
and surgery would be minor); Creamer v. State, 229 Ga. 511, 192 S.E.2d 350 (1972) (removal
of bullet from defendant's chest permitted when it would be a minor procedure), cert. dis-
missed, 410 U.S. 975 (1973); State v. Lawson, 187 N.J. Super. 25, 453 A.2d 556 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1982) (removal of bullet from defendant's thigh permitted because the surgery
would be minor); State v. Allen, 277 S.C. 595, 291 S.E.2d 459 (1982) (removal of bullet super-
ficially below the skin was permitted since it was minor surgery). But see Bowden v. State, 256
Ark. 820, 510 S.W.2d 879 (1974) (issuance of a search warrant for removal of a bullet from
the defendant's spine was denied since this was medically a major intrusion involving pain
and risk to life); People v. Smith, 80 Misc. 2d 210, 362 N.Y.S.2d 909 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Crim.
Term. 1974) (major operation to remove bullet from defendant not permitted).
59 Crowder, 543 F.2d at 316.
60 See, e.g., Bowden v. State, 256 Ark. 820, 823, 510 S.W.2d 879, 881 (1974); Hughes v.
United States, 429 A.2d 1339, 1340 (D.C. 1981).
61 State v. Overstreet, 551 S.W.2d 621 (Mo. 1977) (excluding evidence obtained by mi-
nor surgery according to doctor's testimony, because the defendant was not provided with a
pre-operative adversary hearing or appellate review).
62 See notes 20-22 supra and accompanying text.
63 The difficulty in distinguishing major and minor surgery in the courtroom is demon-
strated by the disagreement between the majority and dissenting opinions in Lee. Compare 717
F.2d at 900 with id. at 905-07 (Widener, J., dissenting).
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surgery in Crowder, courts in four states ordered surgical removal of
bullets.64 Two other states favored ordering surgery, but were not
presented with the appropriate circumstances. 65 The courts in each
of these states, nevertheless, strictly applied the test enunciated in
Crowder.
The Crowder decision has had significant impact. Prior to
Crowder, only one of the four state courts faced with bullet removal
cases actually ordered surgery.6 6 After Crowder, four of six state
courts which addressed the issue approved of court-ordered surgery.67
Every state court, including the Virginia court which originally
heard Lee, has applied the Crowder analysis in bullet removal cases. 68
Lee v. Winston, only the second bullet removal case to be heard by a
federal court of appeals, should have a similar impact.
III. Lee v. Winston
In Lee v. Winston,69 an armed man approached Ralph Watkinson
while he was closing his shop.70 Watkinson, seeing that the man was
armed, drew his own pistol.71 The ensuing exchange of gunfire left
both men injured.72 Within twenty minutes, the police found Ru-
64 Hughes v. State, 56 Md. App. 12, 466 A.2d 533 (1983) (removal of three bullets from
the defendant's abdomen, hip and back was "not constitutionally repugnant"), cert. denied, 298
Md. 394, 470 A.2d 353 (1984); State v. Overstreet, 551 S.W.2d 621 (Mo. 1977) (did not order
removal because of inadequate procedural protections under Crowder), see note 61 supra, State
v. Richards, 585 S.W.2d 505 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979) (court ordering a bullet removed from four
inches below the surface of the skin held risks of harm or injury were minimal); State v.
Lawson, 187 N.J. Super. 25, 453 A.2d 556 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1982) (the removal of a
bullet from defendant's thigh was permitted because the surgery would be "minor"); State v.
Allen, 277 S.C. 595, 291 S.E.2d 459 (1982) (court ordered the removal of a bullet from appel-
lant, but not from a co-defendant based on the differing degrees of risk involved).
65 Doe v. State, 409 So. 2d 25 (Fla. Dist Ct. App. 1981) (removal not allowed because the
bullet had only speculative evidentiary value even though the surgery met the other three
tests of Crowde); State v. Martin, 404 So. 2d 960 (La. 1981) (the court approved the appoint-
ment of a three-doctor panel to determine the amount of risk involved in the proposed re-
moval of a bullet from the appellant).
66 See notes 35-48 supra and accompanying text.
67 See notes 64-65 supra and accompanying text.
68 Hughes v. United States, 429 A.2d 1339, 1340-41 (D.C. 1981); Doe v. State, 409 So. 2d
25, 27 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); State v. Martin, 404 So. 2d 960, 961-62 (La. 1981); Hughes
v. State, 56 Md. App. 12, 19, 466 A.2d 533, 536 (1983), cert. denied, 298 Md. 394, 440 A.2d 353
(1984); State v. Overstreet, 551 S.W.2d 621, 628 (Mo. 1977); State v. Richards, 585 S.W.2d
505, 506 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979); State v. Lawson, 187 N.J. Super. 25, 29, 453 A.2d 556, 558
(NJ. Super. App. Div. 1982); State v. Allen, 277 S.C. 595, 599, 604, 291 S.E.2d 459, 461, 463
(1982).
69 717 F.2d 888 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 1906 (1984).
70 Id at 890.
71 Id.
72 Id.
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dolph Lee suffering from a bullet wound to his chest.7 3 At the time,
he was only eight blocks from the scene of the shooting.74 Lee and
Watkinson were taken to the same hospital,75 and were placed in the
-same emergency room.7 6 While there, Watkinson immediately iden-
tified Lee as his assailant." Lee was subsequently charged with four
felony counts.78
The Commonwealth of Virginia filed a motion to compel evi-
dence, seeking to recover the bullet in Lee's chest. Following a series
of hearings, the Richmond Circuit Court granted the motion7 9 based
on a finding that the surgery would be performed under local anes-
thesia and involved little risk to the defendant. 80 Lee appealed the
decision;8 ' the Supreme Court of Virginia upheld the lower court
order to proceed with the surgery.82 Lee then brought an action in
federal district court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 "to enjoin the state
from proceeding with the surgery." 83
The district court examined the validity of the proposed surgery
under the fourth amendment.84 The court held that the surgery
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id. Watkinson and Lee were placed in the same emergency room by hospital
personnel.
77 Id
78 The four felony counts were malicious wounding, attempted robbery, and use of a
firearm in each of the previous offenses. Lee v. Winston, 551 F. Supp. 247, 248 (E.D. Va.
1982).
79 717 F.2d at 890.
80 Id.
81 Id at 891.
82 Id.
83 Id. The district court recognized Lee's section 1983 claim. Lee also filed a petition for
a writ of habeas corpus which .the district court granted. Id. The court of appeals held, how-
ever, that issuance of the writ was error because Lee was not challenging the propriety of his
confinement but was trying to enjoin a search that might violate his fourth amendment
rights. Id.
84 Id at 891. The district court originally upheld the surgery, but when the doctors took
additional x-rays, they discovered the bullet was deeper than they originally thought. The
bullet was 2.5-3.0 centimeters below the skin, lodged in the muscle tissue rather than located
in the layer of fat tissue 0.5-1.0 centimeter below the skin. The surgery would be performed
under general anesthesia.
Upon discovery of this new information, the federal district court remanded the case to
the Supreme Court of Virginia. The Virginia court again approved the surgery and Lee
brought the case in federal court for a second time. It was at this point that the federal
district court reversed the Virginia holding, declaring the proposed surgery under the new
circumstances too intrusive.
The district court also faced a collateral estoppel problem under the full faith and credit
clause, as the Supreme Court of Virginia had already determined that the proposed surgery
did not violate the petitioner's fourth amendment rights. The district court determined that
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would be an unreasonable search in violation of the fourth amend-
ment.8 5 On this ground, the district court enjoined the Common-
wealth of Virginia from proceeding with the surgery. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district
court's decision.8 6
IV. Analysis of Lee v. Winston
The reasoning of the court of appeals in Lee v. Winston differed
from the analysis in other bullet removal cases. Previous cases had
relied solely on medical analyses of the physical risks involved in the
procedure.8 7 The Lee court, however, relied not only on an analysis
of the physical risks, but also on a legal analysis of the intrusiveness
to personal dignity.88 According to the Lee court, the issue was
"[w]hether the proposed involuntary surgery under general anesthe-
sia would be so invasive that it would constitute a constitutionally
unreasonable search of Lee's person. '8 9 Before addressing this issue,
the court had to define "reasonableness."
Under Schmerber, an intrusion is unreasonable if it is more than a
minor intrusion. 90 In determining when a surgical procedure consti-
tutes only a "minor intrusion," the courts have looked to the medical
profession for an assessment of the physical risks of surgery. 91 Thus,
"minor intrusion" and "minor surgery" seem to be synonymous
terms in the courts' view.92 Applying this rationale, a minor surgical
the petitioner was not accorded sufficient time to prepare his case after the new location of
the bullet was discovered. The court's denial of Lee's request for a continuance violated Lee's
fourteenth amendment due process rights, and thus the federal courts were not required to
give preclusive effect to the prior state court determination. Id.
85 Id. at 891.
86 Id. at 901.
87 See note 58 supra.
88 717 F.2d at 900-01. In body cavity searches, however, which are also considered
searches beyond the body's surface, a legal analysis of the affront to dignity is made rather
than a medical analysis. This is probably due to the lack of any medical risk in a simple body
cavity search. See United States v. Cameron, 538 F.2d 254 (9th Cir. 1976); Rivas v. United
States, 368 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1966); People v. Scott, 21 Cal. 3d 284, 293-94, 578 P.2d 123,
127, 145 Cal. Rptr. 876, 880 (1978). The Scott court created a complicated balancing test for
searches beyond the body's surface: "the more intense, unusual, prolonged, uncomfortable,
unsafe, or undignified the procedure contemplated, or the more it intrudes upon essential
standards of privacy, the greater must be the showing for the procedure['s] necessity." Id.
89 Id. at 899.
90 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
91 See note 58 supra. See generally Note, Nonconsensual Surgeq." The Unkindest Cut of All, 53
NOTRE DAME LAw. 291 (1977).
92 Four courts permitting surgical removal of a bullet from a defendant have termed the
procedure "minor surgery" and have cited the Schmerber "minor intrusion" standard. Two
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procedure usually performed with local anesthesia would be consid-
ered a minor intrusion and therefore a constitutionally permissible
search under Schmerber.9 3 This analysis seems erroneous, however.
The minor surgery/minor intrusion framework departs from Schmer-
ber's concern with the personal dignity and the physical well-being of
the defendant.9 4 The concept of minor surgery is related to physical
well-being, while the concept of a minor intrusion is related to per-
sonal dignity. By equating the two concepts, the courts have merged
what were two separate analyses under Schmerber.
The Lee court attempted to return to a Schmerber analysis by ap-
plying a two step "totality of the circumstances" test.95 The court
examined both "the extent of the surgical intrusion and the extent of
the risks to the subject. '96 Using this analysis, the court held that
although the risks to Lee may be minimal by medical standards, for
the purposes of the fourth amendment the risks were too great and
the intrusion was too extensive to proceed with the surgery. 97
This two-pronged analysis is evident in the majority's focus on
the use of general anesthesia. The court looked first at the physical
risks of putting Lee under general anesthesia. It found those risks to
be minimal. 98 Yet, even though the use of general anesthesia in sur-
gery may be commonplace and relatively risk-free, 99 the Lee court
believed that "a medical designation of this procedure as minor sur-
gery is not controlling, because. . . 'a medical term of art [need not
courts refusing to order the surgical removal of a bullet have termed the procedure "major
surgery" and have cited the "minor intrusion" standard of Schmerber. See note 58 supra.
93 See note 58 supra.
94 The Supreme Court has stated that "the overriding function of the Fourth Amend-
ment is to protect personal privacy and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the State."
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 767.
95 Lee v. Winston, 717 F.2d at 899, 901.
96 Id. at 899. The court initially, albeit briefly, examined the physical risks of the surgical
procedure to Lee before examining the legal risks. Testimony at the pre-surgical adversary
hearing led the court to determine that Lee was in the group with the lowest risk from general
anesthesia. Upon determining the physical risks were minimal, the court proceeded to the
second phase of its analysis. It looked at the risks to the defendant's dignity and privacy
which would result from allowing the state to render him unconscious and to search within
his body for a bullet. They found this procedure so intrusive as to be constitutionally indistin-
gnishable from the "rack and the screw." The risks to Lee's dignity and privacy were simply
too great to permit the procedure. "The proposed surgery is too intrusive and presents too
great a risk. . . to this defendant and to the privacy interests of a free society. . . to be
condoned as permissibile police practice." Id.
97 Id. at 900-01.
98 Id. at 900 ("the specific physical risks from putting Lee under general anesthesia may
* be considered minimal.").
99 Id. at 906 (Widener, J., dissenting) (one of Lee's surgeons testified that the "use of
general anesthesia in minor surgery is commonplace.').
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necessarily] coincide with the parameters of a constitutional stan-
dard.' "100 The court of appeals emphasized this point stating: "the
judicial inquiry is not to make the medical estimate in medical terms,
but is whether, under the totality of the circumstances presented, the
procedure proposed by the state is constitutionally unreasonable."' 101
In adopting this two step analysis, the court of appeals broke from
Crowder and its progeny, and returned to a Schmerber-type analysis. 10 2
Departing from this reasoning, the Lee court adopted the two
step test because a medical analysis of the "risk of permanent injury"
did not sufficiently protect Lee's fourth amendment rights to privacy
and dignity.10 3 By also examining surgery as an affront to personal
dignity, that is, as a legal intrusion, 10 4 Lee has broadened the applica-
tion of the fourth amendment and limited Schmerber-s expansion. 10 5
This is evident in Lee itself. In Lee, the surgery would have been
ordered under a proper Crowder physical risk analysis. '0 6 Because the
court of appeals in Lee applied the personal dignity standard in addi-
tion to the medical standard, it found the surgery unconstitutionally
intrusive. 107
The previous expansion of Schmerber had changed the concept of
"minor intrusion" from a needle to a knife, thereby increasing "the
extent to Which the arm of government may reach inside the human
body. ' 10 8 Although the Lee decision represents a contraction, the po-
tential impact of the Lee two step analysis may be mitigated consider-
ably by continued ambiguity over what constitutes an affront to
100 Id at 900-01.
101 Id at 901. Indeed, the dissent noted that the court's detailed description of a routine
surgical procedure entailing as little risk as crossing the street was wholly designed to portray
"the rude insult to the body and to the dignity" of Lee, rather than to evince medical risk. Id
at 907 (Widener, J., dissenting).
102 Although Crowder's test was a natural extrapolation from Schmerber as applied to the
new area of bullet removals, Lee returned to a stricter, more orthodox Schmerber analysis. See
notes 50-63 supra and accompanying text.
103 See note 94 supra.
104 See 717 F.2d at 900-01 (emphasizing that a constitutionally unreasonable search, i.e.,
one that is legally too intrusive, need not necessarily be medically considered major surgery).
105 Id.
106 The fact that the Virginia courts and the district court originally upheld the surgery
demonstrates that the surgery would have been ordered under a proper Crowder test. It would
have been ordered because: (I) the bullet was relevant and obtainable in no other way; (2)
medically, the surgery was minor; (3) Lee was given an adversarial hearing before surgery;
and (4) Lee was permitted pre-surgical appellate review. See note 53 supra and accompanying
text. But see 717 F.2d at 909 (Widener, J., dissenting) (the first test of Crowder, that the evi-
dence sought was necessary, had not been met satisfactorily).
107 Id at 900-01.
108 Crowder, 543 F.2d at 324.
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personal dignity.'0 9
Rochin and Breithaupt demonstrate the difficulty in determining
what constitutes an affront to personal dignity1O° The Rochin and
Breithaupt Courts recognized that they could not formulate a specific
standard that would protect an individual's dignity in all cases."'
They simply held that a procedure which "shocks the conscience"12
of the court, or one which fails to abide by community perceptions of
"decency and fairess,''' 3 is an unconstitutional affront to a person's
dignity. These illusive "tests" necessitate ad hoc determinations
which are inevitably inconsistent. A particular surgical procedure
may shock the conscience of one court and not another.' '4 Thus, the
rights of an individual become subject to the "hard-hearted" nature
of some courts and the "fastidious squeamishness" of others.' '5 It is
therefore essential that definite standards be employed for analyzing
cases which involve conduct that is not clearly egregious by all
standards.
While preserving this discretionary protection,116 Schmerber es-
tablished a physical risk standard to protect fourth amendment
rights."' 7 Under the physical risk test a court should disallow a
health-threatening procedure, whether or not the procedure shocks
the conscience of that particular court. Yet, a procedure involving
no physical risk would also be disallowed if it shocked the conscience
of the court.' '8 Crowder provided an even more restrictive test,' 9 an-
alyzing searches solely under Schmerber's fourth amendment physical
risk test. Thus, under Crowder, if a procedure involved no physical
109 The dissent felt that this ambiguity would lead either to "unprincipled holdings,"
since no standard to guide other courts was established, or to a per se prohibition of surgery
under a general anesthetic. 717 F.2d at 908 (Widener, J., dissenting).
110 See Breithaupt, 352 U.S. at 436; Rochin, 342 U.S. at 169.
111 352 U.S. at 436; 342 U.S. at 169.
112 352 U.S. at 437; 342 U.S. at 172.
113 352 U.S. at 436; 342 U.S. at 173.
114 717 F.2d at 908 (Widener, J., dissenting).
115 But cf 342 U.S. at 172 (the conduct must "do more than offend some fastidious squea-
mishness or private sentimentalism about combatting crime too energetically. This is con-
duct that shocks the conscience. . . . [It is] bound to offend even hardened sensibilities.");
id. at 173 (intrusion must conform to "fair play and decency'). Compare United States v.
Cameron, 538 F.2d 254 (9th Cir. 1976) (involuntary rectal search); People v. Scott, 21 Cal. 3d
284, 578 P.2d 123, 145 Cal. Rptr. 876 (1978) (en banc) (involuntary search and seizure of
sperm sample); with Rivas v. United States, 368 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1966) (involuntary rectal
search).
116 Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 759-60.
117 Id at 770.
118 The procedure should involve "virtually no risk, trauma, or pain." 384 U.S. at 771.
119 See notes 51-63 supra and accompanying text.
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risks, the court could not find the procedure to be unconstitu-
tional. 120 Lee reincorporated the discretionary protection of Schmerber
by adding a second step to the Crowder physical risk test. Unlike
Schmerber, however, the Lee court incorporates discretionary protec-
tion within the framework of the fourth amendment. 121
The dissent in Lee charged the majority with subjecting the
fourth amendment protections to disparate interpretations of the
"shocks the conscience" standard.122 This criticism, however, is not
entirely valid. By resurrecting a two step analysis, Lee has again sub-
jected law enforcement attempts to ad hoc judicial interpretations.
Lee, however, retains the medical risk standard as a protective floor
below which judicial insensitivity cannot fall.1 23 Thus, under Lee, the
defendant is provided the same protections which the Crowder test
ensured, and, additionally, the defendant has whatever protection
the courts may feel is necessary to protect personal dignity.
V. Future Applications of Lee
One possible application of Lees two step test is a prohibition of
court-ordered surgery as being per se unconstitutional. In Lee, the
use of general anesthesia was held unreasonably intrusive, and there-
fore a violation of the fourth amendment.124 The use of general anes-
thesia, however, was considered unreasonably intrusive not because
of the medical risks involved, but rather, because of its affront to
personal dignity. If courts accept Lee-s prohibition of general anes-
thesia because it affronts personal dignity, they may also choose to
expand that prohibition. The Supreme Court of Indiana in Adams v.
120 Id. Yet, if the defendant was given no pre-surgical adversarial hearing or appellate
review, or the evidence was not relevant or was obtainable in some other way, the surgery
would be unconstitutional. This approach furthers Breithaupt's policy of allowing society to
utilize modem science to protect itself from crime, thereby balancing society's need for law
enforcement against the individual's rights. See Breithaupt, 352 U.S. at 439 ("Modern commu-
nity living requires modem scientific methods of crime detection lest the public go
unprotected.").
121 717 F.2d at 899-900.
122 Id. at 908 (Widener, J., dissenting) ("I do not believe these cases should be decided on
[the ground of the insult to the body and dignity of the person] because there is no sufficient
stated principle to guide the decisions of the courts.").
123 See id. at 899 ("the reasonableness of removing [the bullet] forcibly from a person's
body is judged by the extent of the surgical intrusion and the extent of the risks to the
subject.').
124 See 717 F.2d at 901.
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State,125 for example, used the "shocks the conscience" standard in
finding all court-ordered surgery unreasonably intrusive.
A more likely application of Lee, though, is a per se prohibition
of court-ordered surgery which requires the use of general anesthe-
sia.' 26 Such an application is more likely for five reasons. First, the
lower courts will attempt to apply both Lee and Crowder. In so doing,
they will probably combine Crowder's permissiveness towards minor
surgery involving local anesthesia with Leek rejection of minor sur-
gery involving general anesthesia. The logically consistent result is to
reject any surgery that involves the use of general anesthesia. Sec-
ond, the emphasis Lee itself placed on the affront to dignity which
results from forcibly subjecting an individual to general anesthesia
will be accorded great weight by lower courts. 27 A court, however,
might erroneously overemphasize the use of general anesthesia rather
than focusing on the affront to dignity. Third, Lee may be limited to
a ban on court-ordered surgery under general anesthesia due to its
unclear language. The court did not clearly distinguish between its
analysis of the risk to Lee's health and the risk to his dignity. 28 This
lack of clarity and focus is likely to limit the potential impact of Lee.
Fourth, Lee may be limited due to the simplicity of the Crowder test.
Lees addition of an ad hoc determination of what "shocks the con-
science" to Crowder-' simple four step analysis may not be applied.
The courts' desire for a simple test is evident in the widespread appli-
cation of Crowder. 129 Lees two step analysis frustrates this desire by
reincorporating the vague standard of what "shocks the conscience"
under Rochin. Therefore, courts are likely to apply Lee by concluding
that general anesthesia violates personal dignity under the fourth
amendment. Determining whether a procedure involves the use of
125 260 Ind. 663, 299 N.E.2d 834 (1973) (involuntary surgical removal is per se unreasona-
ble under the fourth amendment).
Another latent argument that could lead to per se prohibitions of involuntary surgical
removal of bullets can be seen when one juxtaposes Crowdets fourth test (the availability of
pre-removal hearing and appellate review) with the fact that a bullet in the human body may
deteriorate over time. Since the markings that make a bullet identifiable could deteriorate by
the time appellate review has ended, the bullet may no longer be probative in the case. Since
Schmerber required the evidence be probative, the surgery may become unconstitutional on
those grounds. Lee, 717 F.2d at 901 n.15; see also Doe v. State, 409 So. 2d 25, 26-27 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1982) (on rehearing). Butsee 717 F.2d at 908 n.3 (Widener, J., dissenting) (medical
literature reveals that such deterioration is rare and, when it does occur, yields symptoms of
lead poisoning).
126 See 717 F.2d at 907.
127 Id. at 900-01.
128 See id.
129 See notes 64-65 supra.
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general anesthesia is far easier than determining whether it "shocks
the conscience."' 130 Finally, courts may simply follow the recent
trend of allowing bullet removal surgery,131 rather than utilizing the
second step of the Lee test.
VI. Conclusion
In an attempt to determine when an involuntary surgical proce-
dure is a "minor intrusion," Lee v. Winston applied a legal analysis of
the intrusive effect on personal dignity in addition to a standard
medical analysis of the physical risks to the defendant. The court
found that general anesthesia, while presenting minimal medical
risks, was unconstitutionally intrusive to Lee's personal dignity. The
probable impact of this case will be to make court-ordered surgery,
requiring general anesthesia, per se unreasonable under the fourth
amendment. This interpretation, however, would fail to consider the
policy behind Leeks two pronged test and would neglect the impor-
tance of a person's dignity. Such an oversight would be unfortunate.
Blake A. Bailey
Elaine A. Martin
Jeffiey A Thompson
130 The general/local anesthesia distinction presents courts with a clear choice whereas a
determination of what "shocks the conscience" is much more complicated. It is possible,
however, that the desire for retrieving evidence might influence the type of anesthetic em-
ployed. The doctor in Lee testified that the procedure could be performed under local anes-
thesia, but that it was safer under general anesthesia. Thus, such a distinction may result in
surgery performed under local anesthesia when general anesthesia would be safer. 717 F.2d
at 905-06.
131 See note 68 supra.
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TORT LAW-CNINO V. NEW YORK NEWS, INc.: NEW JERSEY PER-
MITS DEFAMATION ACTION TO SURVIVE
At common law, according to the maxim actio personalis moritur
cum persona,I all personal tort actions terminated upon the death of
either the plaintiff or the defendant. In order to mitigate the harsh-
ness of this rule,2 state legislatures enacted survival and abatement
statutes which prevent the death of a party from extinguishing cer-
tain personal tort actions.3 A majority of jurisdictions, however, con-
tinue to apply the common law rule to defamation actions.4 In
Canino v. New York News, Inc.,5 the New Jersey Supreme Court de-
parted from the majority view and permitted a libel suit to proceed
despite the death of the original plaintiff.
In examining the Canino decision, this comment will first outline
the principal facts and the holding of the case. Next, it will analyze
the reasoning that the Canino court and other American courts have
employed in deciding whether a defamation action should survive or
abate upon the death of one of the parties. After assessing the deci-
sion's probable impact in other jurisdictions, this comment concludes
that the Canino opinion represents the better view because it fosters
the remedial purpose of survival statutes.
I. Canino v. New York News, Inc.
The Canino case involved an article published in the New York
1 Translated, the maxim means "a personal right of action dies with the person."
2 W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 126, at 900 (4th ed. 1971); see also
Hunt v. Authier, 18 Cal. 2d 288, 169 P.2d 913 (1946) (where the court provides a good discus-
sion of early survival statutes).
3 While no necessary relation exists between the survival of a cause of action and the
abatement of a pending action, courts often fail to distinguish between the two distinct ques-
tions and confuse them to the extent that it is often impossible to determine whether a partic-
ular case refers to one issue or the other. See Annot., 134 A.L.R. 717 (1941) and sources cited
therein.
The issue of whether a defamation action survives generally does not depend on which
party has died. For example, few courts would hold that a defendant's death terminates a
defamation suit while the plaintiff's death does not. Ohio, however, at one time seems to have
made this distinction. Id. at 724-25.
4 W. PROSSER, supra note 2, § 126, at 899. See, e.g., Blodgett v. Greenfield, 101 Cal. App.
399, 281 P. 694 (1929); Chiagouris v. Jovan, 43 Ill. App. 2d 213, 193 N.E.2d 205 (1963);
Begole v. Ferguson, 299 Mich. 416, 300 N.W. 146 (1941); Jones v. Matson, 4 Wash. 2d 659,
104 P.2d 591 (1940).
5 96 N.J. 189, 475 A.2d 528 (1984).
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Daily News reporting that the plaintiffs, James Canino and Alvin
Raphael, had "mob connections" and that they had stolen millions
in state housing funds.6 On October 16, 1980, approximately a year
after the article appeared, Raphael and Canino filed suit against the
New York Daily News and its reporter for libel, seeking damages for
injuries to their reputations and businesses. 7 The New York Daily
News contended that the contents of its publication were constitu-
tionally privileged."
On January 5, 1981, Raphael died. In December of that year,
Raphael's widow and executrix, Kathleen Raphael, was substituted
as a plaintiff in the action. The defendants subsequently moved to
dismiss, citing a 1915 New Jersey Supreme Court case which held
that defamation actions abate on the death of the defendant. 9 The
trial court denied the defendants' motion, citing more modern cases
to the contrary. The New Jersey Appellate Division affirmed in. an
unreported opinion' 0 and the New Jersey Supreme Court granted
leave to appeal."
The supreme court affirmed, holding that an action for libel or
slander does not abate upon the death of the plaintiff.' 2 The court
based this conclusion on its construction of the phrase "trespass...
to the person" in the New Jersey survival statute.' 3 In additon, the
6 Id at 190, 475 A.2d at 528.
7 Id
8 Id. at 197, 475 A.2d at 532.
9 Id (the defendants relied on Alpaugh v. Conkling, 88 NJ.L. 64, 95 A. 618 (Sup. Ct.
1915)).
10 96 N.J. at 191, 475 A.2d at 529.
11 Id
12 Id at 198, 475 A.2d at 533. The court also held that the survival of a defamation
action does not conflict with the guarantees of the first amendment, since first amendment
concerns are already taken into account in the constitutional limitations on the substantive
law governing defamation suits. Id at 197-98, 475 A.2d at 532-33.
13 The statute provides: "Executors and administrators may have an action for any tres-
pass done to the person or property, real or personal, of their testator or intestate against the
trespasser, and recover their damages as their testator or intestate would have had if he was
living." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-3 (West 1952 & Supp. 1984).
Although the Canino court expressly held that the death of a plaintiff does not abate a
defamation action, presumably the court would also hold that the death of a defendant
would not abate a libel or slander suit nor affect its survivability. The Canino decision rested
on the court's interpretation of the words "trespass to the person" in the New Jersey survival
statute. The court decided that defamation was a "trespass to the person" within the mean-
ing of the statute. The same language is employed in the statute governing the survival of an
action upon the death of a defendant or potential defendant. The statute states:
Where any testator or intestate shall, in his lifetime, have taken or carried away
or converted to his use, the goods or chattels of any person, or shall, in his lifetime,
have committed any trespass to the person or property, real or personal, of any
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court examined a number of nineteenth century tort cases to deter-
mine how lawyers and judges of that time viewed libel and slander.
The Canino opinion concluded that those courts recognized that libel
or slander "was a trespass or, as it was known then and now, a
tort."1 4 Thus, the court inferred that the New Jersey legislature in-
tended to permit defamation actions to survive.
By holding that the death of a party does not terminate a libel
action, the Canino court chose not to follow a 1915 New Jersey
Supreme Court decision, Apaugh v. Conkling.15 In Alpaugh, the court
relied on the general common law rule and held that the New Jersey
survival statute did not allow libel actions to survive the death of the
defendant. 16 Two modern interpretations of the New Jersey statute
had taken the opposite.view, however. In Weller v. Home News Pub-
lishing Co.,' 7 a New Jersey Superior Court allowed a libel action to
survive the plaintiff's death.'8 A federal district court, in MacDonald
v. Time, Inc.,19 also interpreted the New Jersey survival statute as sav-
ing a deceased plaintiff's libel claim from abatement.20 Like the
courts in Weller and MacDonald, the Canino court found little basis for
the general common law rule. The court pointed out that the New
person, such person, his executors or administrators, shall have and may maintain
the same action against the executors or administrators of such testator or intestate
as he or they might have had or maintained against the testator or intestate, and
shall have the like remedy and process for the damages recovered in such an action
as are now had and allowed in other actions against executors or administrators.
NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-4 (West 1952).
14 96 N.J. at 195, 475 A.2d at 531.
15 88 NJ.L. 64, 95 A. 618 (Sup. Ct. 1915).
16 Id. at 67, 95 A. at 619. The New Jersey statute has been amended since the A/paugh
decision in 1915. The earlier statute and the statute interpreted by the Canino court contain
substantially similar language though. Both refer to "trespass to the person." The earlier
statute read:
That where any testator or intestate shall, in his or her lifetime, have taken or car-
ried away or converted to his or her use, the goods or chattels of any person or
persons, or shall, in his or her lifetime, have committed any trespass to the person or
property, real or personal, or any person or persons, such person or persons, his or
her executors or administrators, shall have and maintain the same action against the
executors or administrators of such testator or intestate as he, she or they might have
had or maintained against such testator or intestate, and shall have the like remedy
and process for the damages recovered in such action as are now had and allowed in
other actions against executors or administrators.
2 NJ. COMP. STAT. 2260, § 5 (1911).
17 112 N.J. Super. 502, 271 A.2d 738 (Law Div. 1970) (the defendant newspaper alleg-
edly portrayed the deceased plaintiff as a charity patient at a local hospital).
18 Id. at 508, 217 A.2d at 741.
19 554 F. Supp. 1053 (D.NJ. 1983) (the defendant alleged that the deceased plaintiff was
involved in criminal activities).
20 Id at 1060.
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Jersey survival statute is "highly remedial in its character."' In en-
acting it, the legislature meant to relieve the harsh injustices of the
common law rule that personal tort actions ceased upon the death of
either of the parties. Thus, the court rejected the vestiges of an an-
cient common law rule, stating that "this decision is in accord with
our modern values." 22
II. Analysis of the Canino Decision
A number of factors led to the majority rule that defamation
actions abate upon the death of one of the parties to the suit, 23 in-
cluding the evolution of tort law. According to Dean Prosser, tort
remedies developed as an incident to criminal punishment. 24 If the
criminal died, no one was left to punish. By analogy, common law
courts held that if a defendant to a tort claim died, the action termi-
nated as well. 25 In addition, because the early common law courts
viewed the recovery of damages as a victim's personal revenge, the
death of the plaintiff also abated the action.26
In the first half of the nineteenth century, many state legisla-
21 96 N.J. at 194, 475 A.2d at 531 (quoting Ten Eyck v. Runk, 31 N.J.L. 428, 430 (N.J.
Sup. Ct. 1866)).
22 Id. at 198, 475 A.2d at 533.
23 W. PROSSER, supra note 2, § 126, at 900-01.
24 Id. at 898; see also Winfield, Death as Afecting Liabilio in Tort, 29 COLUM. L. REv. 239
(1929). In Canino, the court discussed the nexus between tort remedies and criminal penalties
existing at early common law as one of the reasons behind the original common law rule that
tort actions abate on the death of one of the parties. The court stated that:
Most agree that the rule came about because tort remedies were adjunct to criminal
penalties. If a criminal died, there could no longer be punishment; it was thought
by analogy that tort claims terminated at death as well. Since the recovery of dam-
ages was viewed as a matter of personal revenge between the victim and wrongdoer,
death erased the purpose of a civil action between them: "Death pays all when the
criminal has gone. 'The party cannot be punished when he is dead.' And even if he
survives, and it is the injured party who has died, surely it is the king and not the
representatives who should take up redress." Review of the doctrine's origins should
convince us that it bears little relevance to a modern system ofjustice. "[Tlhe ques-
tion is. . . why a fortuitous event such as death should extinguish a valid cause of
action."
96 N.J. at 192, 475 A.2d at 529-30 (citations omitted).
25 W. PROSSER, supra note 2, § 126, at 898.
26 As one commentator noted:
So long as the recovery of damages was regarded as a matter of personal ven-
geance and punishment as between the transgressor and his victim, death erased the
purpose of a civil action between them. The legal successor of the deceased party
was neither the wronged nor the wrongdoer and had no personal involvement in the
wrong. . . . [W]hen the function of damages awards came to be recognized as com-
pensatory rather than punitive, the reason for the rule ceased to exist.
Smedley, Wrongful Death-Bases of the Common Law Rules, 13 VAND. L. REV. 605, 608-09
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tures began enacting survival statutes to change this harsh common
law rule which effectively extinguished any remedy.2 7 Yet some leg-
islatures excluded defamation from statutory coverage presumably
because libel, which was criminal in origin, remained "adjunct and
incident to criminal punishment. ' 28 Thus, at that time the common
law rule against the survival of tort actions had some lingering valid-
ity regarding libel and slander suits.
In determining whether a tort action survives, courts have also
focused on whether the defendant, as a result of his actions, realized
some sort of gain in assets or property.2 9 For example, in Jones v.
(1960), quoted in Harrison v. Loyal Protective Life Ins. Co., 379 Mass. 212, 216, 396 N.E.2d
987, 990 (1979).
27 In Hunt v. Authier, 28 Cal. 2d. 288, 269 P.2d 913 (1946), the court provides a good
discussion of early survival statutes. See aso Comment, Abatement and Revival- Survival of Ac-
tions: Public Liability Insurance, 18 CAL. L. REv. 44 (1930); Schumacher, Rights of Action Under
Death and Survival Statutes, 23 MICH. L. REv. 114 (1925).
28 See, e.g., Moyer v. Phillips, 462 Pa. 395, 399, 341 A.2d 441, 442-43 (1975). In Moyer, the
court stated:
In the early nineteenth century survival statutes were enacted, along with
wrongful death acts, to modify what was considered the harsh and unjust rule of
common law. The history of their development in Pennsylvania is one of gradual
expansion by the legislature limited by some narrow interpretation by the
courts. . .. [T]he Court read the survival statute as having no application to suits
involving less tangible interests in personalty such as malicious prosecution and
criminal conversation. As a result, the legislature restated the survival provisions in
the Act of 1917 so as to clearly state that all causes of action except libel and slander
survived the death of either party. Presumably, libel and slander were excepted
because at the time, they were still considered as adjunct and incident to criminal
punishment.
Id
29 Courts have been much less reluctant to allow tort actions for damages to the tangible
property interests of a plaintiff to survive the death of one of the parties. See W. PROSSER,
supra note 2, § 126, at 900. At common law, causes of action arising from injuries to less
tangible interests, such as reputation, did not survive in most jurisdictions because of a notion
that a judgment in such a case is in the nature of a penalty rather than a compensation.
Hence, if the defendant did not realize a material gain through his tortious conduct, the
action would not survive. See Survival of Claims For and Against Executors and Administrators, 19
Ky. LJ. 195, 205-06 (1931).
At least one court has read this tangible versus intangible distinction into its interpreta-
tion of its state's survival statute.
Among others, we find Section 419 of the code, wherein it is provided that cause of
action for. . . injuries to the person or personal property, shall survive. It will be
noted that the General Assembly was careful in not including actions for injury to
character. An action for libel is one ex deicto, and is a personal action. . . . It is
clear, therefore, that an ordinary cause of action for libel or slander dies with the
person. No matter how wickedly a libel may be made and published, and no matter
how serious may be the consequences and the damages suffered by reason of such
libel, if the person who utters the libel should die, the injured party has no redress
whatsoever in the courts, the cause of action being buried with the decedent.
Carver v. Morrow, 213 S.C. 199, 202-03, 48 S.E.2d 814, 816 (1948).
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Matson,30 the Washington Supreme Court distinguished tangible
from intangible injuries in deciding that a defendant's death termi-
nated a libel action. The court in Matson stated that "actions in tort,
where the tort was not connected with contract or the estate of the
tort-feasor was not enriched thereby, were originally designed for the
punishment of the wrongdoer."' 3' The court stated further that "if
the tort-feasor died, his personal representative, not having commit-
ted in his personal capacity any wrong, could not be prosecuted for
such tort. '32 Because defendants to defamation actions rarely realize
a financial gain as a result of their actions, the purpose of a libel and
slander suit is to punish the defendant, the Matson court reasoned.
Since a dead defendant cannot be punished, defamation actions can-
not survive.33
Modern tort law, including the law of defamation, is viewed as
compensatory rather than punitive in nature;34 courts no longer con-
sider the recovery of damages a matter of personal vindication be-
tween the original parties. 35 As Sir Frederick Pollock has stated,
"once the notion of vengeance has been put aside and that of com-
pensation substituted, the rule actio personalis moritur cum persona seems
to be without plausible ground. ' 36 The criminal origins of libel
therefore have no relevance in a system predicated upon compensa-
tion of the injured party rather than punishment of the wrongdoer.
In contrast to the situation in which courts have argued that the
defendant's death in a defamation action leaves no one to punish,
some courts have also reasoned that a plaintiff's death in such an
action leaves no one to compensate. These courts maintain that,
since defamation involves an injury of an intangible personal nature,
compensation would constitute a windfall to the plaintiff's heirs, who
have suffered no injury.37 Other courts have rejected this contention,
holding that a deceased plaintiff's family has a strong interest in re-
30 4 Wash. 2d 659, 104 P.2d 591 (1940) (libel allegedly caused a third party to back out
of a business deal).
31 Id at 668, 104 P.2d at 595 (quoting Bartle v. Oxborn, 155 Wash. 585, 594, 285 P. 425,
429 (1930)).
32 Ad.
33 Id.
34 See note 42 infta, see also W. PROSSER, supra note 2, § 2 at 7-9; 1 T. SEDGWICK, A
TREATISE ON THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES §§ 29-30 (9th ed. 1920).
35 Mqyer, 462 Pa. at 398, 341 A.2d at 442. See also Smedley, supra note 26, at 609; F.
POLLOCK, THE LAW OF TORTS 61-62 (12th ed. 1923).
36 F. POLLOCK, supra note 35, at 62.
37 W. PROSSER, supra note 2, § 126, at 901; see also Menefee v. Columbia Broadcasting
Sys., Inc., 458 Pa. 46, 329 A.2d 216 (1974) (survival of defamation actions would lead to
unwarranted windfalls for the heirs of plaintiffs).
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storing the victim's reputation. In MacDonald v. Time, Inc.,3 8 quoted
with approval in Canino, the court stated:
To say that a man's reputation dies with him is to ignore the
realities of life and the bleak legacy which he leaves behind.
There is no valid reason which should deny the family of
[the plaintiff] the right to clear his name and seek compensation
for its destruction. Why should a claim for a damaged leg sur-
vive one's death, where a claim for a damaged name does not.
After death, the leg cannot be healed, but the reputation can.
The cases which have held that a defamation claim does not
survive death rest on some contrived fiction or technical label. If
a man's livelihood has been destroyed because of defamation,
why should that claim not survive, while a claim based upon neg-
ligence or breach of contract does survive.
39
Similarly, the court in Moyer v. Phillips40 held that termination
of a defamation action upon the death of either party unjustly pre-
cludes either the victim's estate or the victim himself from restoring
his good name.4 ' The court noted that, as the Restatement (Second)
of Torts indicates,42 defamation law serves the purpose of compensa-
tion for and restoration of the plaintiff's reputation.43 The Penn-
sylvania court concluded that a survival statute which fails to
encompass defamation actions frustrates this purpose and is contrary
to the remedial nature of survival statutes.44 Thus, even in defama-
tion actions which involve only an intangible injury, it is arguable
that recovery by the victim's survivors, who have an understandable
interest in restoring the victim's reputation, does not constitute a
38 554 F. Supp. 1053 (D.N.J. 1983).
39 Id. at 1054.
40 462 Pa. 395, 341 A.2d 441 (1975).
41 Id. at 401-02, 341 A.2d at 444.
42 According to the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 623 Special Note on Reme-
dies for Defamation Other Than Damages (1977), defamation law serves three separate func-
tions: "(1) to compensate the plaintiff for the injury to his reputation, for his pecuniary losses
and for his emotional distress, (2) to vindicate him and aid in restoring his reputation and (3)
to punish the defendant and dissuade him and others from publishing defamatory state-
ments."
The court in Moyer emphasized the first two purposes, stating: "Today a defamation
action as any other tort action is punitive only in the sense that it serves the social objective of
regulating the conduct of defendant while alive and the conduct of others. Its purpose above
all is compensation for and restoration of the victim's good name." 462 Pa. at 401-02, 341
A.2d at 444; see a/so notes 34-36 supra and accompanying text.
43 462 Pa. at 401-02, 341 A.2d at 444.
44 Id at 402, 341 A.2d at 444. The court also held that the exception of defamation
actions from the Pennsylvania survival statute is an arbitrary distinction and constitutes a
denial of equal protection. See note 64 infra.
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windfall. 45
The argument that the intangible character of a defamation ac-
tion should preclude its survival is further weakened by the recent
trend to construe survival statutes liberally, 46 a trend which has re-
sulted in the survival of other actions which are equally intangible in
nature.47 In addition, not all defamation actions involve only an in-
tangible interest. In Moyer, for example, the plaintiff suffered the loss
of his livelihood and was placed on state welfare. 48 In such instances,
financial hardship to the plaintiff or to the plaintiff's survivors may
result if the right to recover for such loss is terminated.
Another concern which apparently accounts for the general re-
luctance of courts to permit defamation actions to survive is the no-
tion that the death of one of the parties creates problems of proof.49
Prosser, however, notes that no serious difficulties have arisen with
respect to contract or tort actions which presently survive the death
of the parties. 50 Furthermore, several courts have held that difficul-
ties of proof do not justify the complete denial of relief for serious
invasions of emotional tranquility5 or reputation. 52
45 Moreover, as the victim's family members may be unable to maintain an action in
their own right, exclusion of defamation from actions which survive may very well foreclose
all means of remedying an injury which the family has indirectly suffered. See, e.g., Insull v.
New York World-Telegram Corp., 172 F. Supp. 615, 636 (N.D. Ill. 1959) (that the plaintiff
may have been affected by the libel of his deceased father does not itself afford him an in-
dependent cause of action), aJ'd, 273 F.2d 166 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 942 (1960);
Kelly v. Johnson Publishing Co., 160 Cal. App. 2d 718, 725-26, 325 P.2d 659, 664 (1958)
(surviving relatives suffered no injury themselves when their deceased brother was defamed);
Bello v. Random House, Inc., 422 S.W.2d 339, 341 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1968) (no right of action
exists in favor of surviving relatives who are not directly defamed).
46 W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 126, at 943 (5th ed. 1984) (herein-
after cited as PROSSER & KEETON).
47 For example, the court in Harrison v. Loyal Protective Life Ins. Co., 379 Mass. 212,
396 N.E.2d 987 (1979), held that the statutory language "damage to the person" encom-
passed harm to the mind or emotions as well as harm to the body, permitting an action for
intentional infliction of emotional distress to survive the death of the plaintiff. See also Em-
manuel v. Bovino, 26 Conn. Sup. 356, 223 A.2d 541 (1966) (alienation of affections); Posner v.
Koplin, 94 Ga. App. 306, 94 S.E.2d 434 (1956) (alienation of affections); Gray v. Wallace, 319
S.W.2d 582 (Mo. 1958) (malicious prosecution).
48 462 Pa. at 402, 341 A.2d at 444. See also Matson, 4 Wash.2d at 660, 104 P.2d at 592
(defamation allegedly caused decedent to lose option to purchase property).
49 W. PROSSER, spra note 2, § 126, at 901.
50 Id
51 Harrison, 379 Mass. at 217-18, 396 N.E.2d at 990.
52 MacDonald, 554 F. Supp. at 1059-60. See also Moyer, 462 Pa. at 406-08, 341 A.2d at 446-
47 (Roberts, J., concurring). Justice Roberts noted that at common law the testimony of the
defendant was particularly crucial in defamation actions. The litigation typically focused
upon the defenses of truth and privilege, with the latter involving proof of the defendant's
state of mind. As the burden of proof on these issues rested with the defendant, the death of
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Courts which follow the traditional majority approach often
rely upon the view that statutes which are inconsistent with the com-
mon law must be narrowly construed.53 These courts reason that
since no personal tort actions survived at common law, survival stat-
utes must be strictly interpreted. This rule has been criticized by one
legal commentator who states: "Remedial developments through
case law have been hampered because judges have seldom brought
common law flexibility into the interpretation of the statutes on...
survival. They have been blinded by the maxim that statutes in der-
ogation of the common law must be strictly construed. '5 4
Not all jurisdictions continue to follow this rule of statutory con-
struction, however. The court in Harrison v. Loyal Protective Life Insur-
ance Co., 55 concluding that previous narrow interpretations of the
survival statute did not control its decision,5 6 stated that the legisla-
ture intended the survival statute to be flexible enough to reflect
changes in judicial analysis affecting what actions should survive.57
At least one court has taken the position that, in order to effect the
purpose of the statute, an action must be presumed to survive unless
specifically excluded from the statute.58 Such interpretations are in
accord with the modern trend to extend survival statutes or to con-
strue them liberally5 9 and better accomplish the remedial purpose of
these statutes.
Finally, legal commentators have long criticized the termination
the defendant made it difficult for the decedent's estate to defend such an action. 462 Pa. at
406-07, 341 A.2d at 446.
The decision in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), requiring some show-
ing of fault on the part of the defendant before liability may be constitutionally imposed,
effectively shifted the burden of proof in defamation actions. Justice Roberts concluded that,
as a practical matter, a plaintiff must now prove falsity, as well as negate the existence of a
conditional privilege, in order to establish the necessary element of fault. Thus, in the ab-
sence of the former burdens of defending a defamation action brought against a deceased
defendant, Justice Roberts argued, the exclusion of defamation from survival statutes is no
longer justified. 462 Pa. at 407-08, 341 A.2d at 447.
53 See, e.g., Catchings v. Hartman, 178 Miss. 672, 679-80, 174 So. 553, 553 (1937). (In
holding that a slander action did not survive the death of the plaintiff, the court confirmed an
earlier holding that the Mississippi statute, "being in derogation of the common law, must be
strictly construed, and that the term 'personal action' must be interpreted according to its
strictly technical meaning.").
54 Miller, Dead People in Torte: A Second Installment, 22 CATH. U.L. REv. 73, 74 (1972).
55 379 Mass. 212, 396 N.E.2d 987 (1979).
56 Id. at 214, 396 N.E.2d at 989.
57 Id. at 215, 396 N.E.2d at 989.
58 Reinhard v. City of New Haven, 23 Conn. Supp. 321, 324, 182 A.2d 925, 927 (1961).
59 See PROSSER & KEETON, sufra note 46, § 126, at 943 (stating that modem courts tend
to extend survival statutes or construe them liberally in case of doubt).
1984]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
of any tort action upon the death of one of the parties as a remnant
of an archaic common law rule.60 One legal scholar has maintained
that the most satisfactory statute would provide for the survival of all
actions. 61 Similarly, Prosser notes:
[T]he modern trend is definitely toward the view that tort causes
of action are as fairly a part of the estate of either plaintiff or
defendant as contract debts, and that the question is rather one
of why a fortuitous event such as death should extinguish a valid
action. Accordingly, survival statutes gradually are being ex-
tended; and it may be expected that ultimately all tort actions
will survive to the same extent as those founded on contract. 62
Thus, while Canino represents a departure from traditional views, its
position is in accord with persuasive authority and the recent trend
of the courts.
III. The Impact of the Canino Decision
The effect which Canino may have upon other jurisdictions will
largely depend upon the language of each jurisdiction's survival stat-
ute. For instance, statutes in a number of states expressly prohibit
the survival of defamation actions.63 Absent further legislative ac-
tion, those jurisdictions will remain unaffected by Canino.64
Canino will not go unnoticed, however, in those states whose stat-
utes employ relatively broad language. The provisions of such stat-
utes vary considerably from state to state. 65  Even in those
60 Sir Frederick Pollock described the effect which the death of either party has upon
liability for a wrong as "one of the least rational parts of our law." F. POLLOCK, supra note 35,
at 60. See also Inadequacies of English andState Suroival Legislation, 48 HARV. L. REv. 1008, 1008
(1935), which contends that most survival statutes "invite criticism of both their limited scope
and their frequently unfortunate draftsmanship. That considerable portions of the rule ex-
pressed in the maxim actio personais moritur cum persona still exist is explicable only by the
antipathy of legislatures and courts to change."
61 F. HARPER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 301, at 675 (1933).
62 W. PROSSER, supra note 2, § 126, at 901.
63 See, e.g., ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14-3110 (1975); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, § 27-6
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 6-401 (1984).
64 The Pennsylvania survival statute similarly excluded defamation actions until the
court in Moyer v. Phillips, 462 Pa. 395, 341 A.2d 441 (1975), held that such a distinction
constitutes a denial of equal protection under both the United States and Pennsylvania Con-
stitutions. Similarly, the court in Thompson v. Estate of Petroff, 319 N.W.2d 400 (Minn.
1982), declared that the statutory exception of intentional torts from Minnesota's survival
statute violates the equal protection clause of the Minnesota Constitution. Such judicial ap-
proaches are apparently unique, however. In the absence of legislative reform, therefore,
even the strongest policy arguments seem unlikely to override the express language of such
statutes.
65 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-599 (West Supp. 1984) (all causes of action
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jurisdictions whose statutes contain similar language, the results are
anything but uniform.6 6 Whether these jurisdictions will choose to
depart from the majority position and adopt the approach taken by
the Canino court will ultimately depend upon the continued validity
of traditional distinctions between defamation and other tort actions.
Courts have recently displayed some tendency to extend survival
statutes in general, 67 and distinctions between tangible and intangi-
survive); MISS. CODE ANN. § 91-7-233 (1972) ("personal actions" survive); N.Y. EST. POWERS
& TRUSTS LAW § 11-3.2 (McKinney 1967 & Supp. 1982) (through reference to its general
construction law, N.Y. GEN. CONSTR. LAW § 37-a (McKinney 1951), expressly allows libel
and slander to survive); TFx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5525 (Vernon 1958) (actions for
"injuries to the reputation" survive); W. VA. CODE § 55-7-8a (1981) (actions for "injuries to
the person" survive).
66 For example, Georgia and South Carolina have survival and abatement statutes which
contain similar language. Both statutes provide that causes of action which result in "injury
to person" survive:
Causes of action for and in respect to any and all injuries and trespasses to and
upon real estate and any and all injuries to the person or to personal property shall
survive both to and against the personal or real representative, as the case may be,
of a deceased person and the legal representative of an insolvent person or a defunct
or insolvent corporation, any law or rule to the contrary notwithstanding.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-5-90 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
No action for a tort shall abate by the death of either party, where the wrong-
doer received any benefit from the tort complained of; nor shall any action or cause
of action for the recovery of damages for homicide, injury to the person, or injury to
property abate by the death of either party. The cause of action, in case of the
death of the plaintiff and in the event there is no right of survivorship in any other
person, shall survive to the personal representative of the deceased plaintiff. In case
of the death of the defendant, the cause of action shall survive against said defend-
ant's personal representative. However, in the event of the death of the wrongdoer
before an action has been brought against him, the personal representative of the
wrongdoer in such capacity shall be subject to the action just as the wrongdoer
himself would have been during his life, provided that there shall be no punitive
damages against the personal representative.
GA. CODE ANN. § 3-505 (Supp. 1982).
The two states interpret the phrase "injury to the person" differently, however. In
Carver v. Morrow, 213 S.C. 199, 48 S.E.2d 814 (1948), the court interpreted the South Caro-
lina statute as not permitting defamation actions to survive.
In contrast, Georgia courts have allowed defamation actions to survive. In Johnson v.
Bradstreet, 87 Ga. 79, 13 S.E. 250 (1891), the court, in interpreting the statute to permit the
survival of defamation actions, stated that "there is no good reason to conclude that [the
legislature] intended to use [the words "injury to the person"] in such a restricted sense as
would confine them alone to bodily or physical injuries." Id. at 83, 13 S.E. at 251.
In a subsequent case, however, the Georgia Supreme Court held that an executor is not
liable in damages for allegedly libelous material contained in a will. Citizens' & S. Bank v.
Hendricks, 176 Ga. 692, 168 S.E. 313 (1933). Hendricks was distinguished by a Georgia ap-
peals court in Posner v. Koplin, 94 Ga. App. 306, 94 S.E.2d 434 (1956), on the grounds that
the Hendricks case "was not pending at the time of the defendant's death, although the right
had accrued." 94 Ga. App. at 310, 94 S.E.2d at 437.
67 PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 46, § 126, at 943.
1984]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
ble interests are gradually being discarded. 68 Some courts and com-
mentators have also rejected strict rules of statutory construction
which often preclude the survival of defamation actions. 69 In light of
these developments, Canino may very well provide guidance for those
jurisdictions whose survival statutes may reasonably be interpreted to
encompass defamation actions.
IV. Conclusion
The Canino decision is significant because it represents a depar-
ture from a traditional common law view which continues to prevail
in a majority of jurisdictions. While the majority position may have
some justification, it is based, at least in part, on anachronistic histor-
ical distinctions. The Canino opinion is in accord with the goals of
defamation law, compensation for and restoration of the victim's rep-
utation. Furthermore, the remedial purpose of survival statutes is
better effectuated under Canino. In defamation suits, as in any other
tort action included in survival statutes, either the victim or his rep-
resentatives should have the right to seek compensation for both the
tangible and intangible harm suffered.
Joseph C Chapelle
Karen L. Sterchi
68 See note 47 supra and accompanying text.
69 See notes 54-58 supra and accompanying text.
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CRIMINAL LAW- UNITED STATES v LYON:- ABOLISHING THE VO-
LITIONAL PRONG OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE
Under Anglo-American criminal law, legal insanity, if proved, is
an effective criminal defense. The rationale is that the blameworthy
should be punished and the legally insane are not blameworthy.'
The key question, of course, is: What constitutes "legal insanity"?2
For decades, courts have struggled to answer this question and to
fashion a standard which will distinguish those who are legally in-
sane and thus entitled to be relieved from criminal responsibility
from those who are not.3 Although this defense has always aroused
disagreement, several widely publicized trials have injected new fer-
vor into the controversy.4
The test which most of the federal courts currently use 5 has re-
ceived much attention in the wake of the outcome of the Hinckley
trial.6 Most agree that reform of the insanity defense, and specifi-
1 As the District of Columbia court stated in Holloway v. United States, "our collective
conscience does not allow punishment where it cannot impose blame." 148 F.2d 665, 666-67
(D.C. Cir. 1945); see also I. Kaufman, The Insaniy Plea on Trial, N. Y. TIMES MAG., Aug. 8,
1982, at 1, col. 1, (reprinted in Insanity Defense in Federal Courts: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Criminal Jstice of the House Comm. on theJudici'', 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 448 (1982) [hereinafter
cited as Insanity Defense in Federal Courts].
2 A. GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE 10 (1967).
Legal insanity differs from a psychiatric determination of insanity. The language of the
test used to determine legal insanity is crucial. See notes 13-29 infra and accompanying text.
Scholars have extensively evaluated and criticized the particular language of the various tests
that have been used because the test chosen determines who will or will not be found insane
and relieved of criminal responsibility. For another scholarly work on the insanity defense see
generally R. GERBER, THE INSANITY DEFENSE (1984).
3 See notes 13-29 inf a and accompanying text.
4 The trial and acquittal of John Hinckley aroused public furor. When the jury re-
turned with their verdict acquitting the defendant of attempting to assassinate President Rea-
gan, the public demanded reform of the defense.
In San Francisco, Dan White, a member of the board of supervisors, an ex-policeman
and former fireman, shot and killed the mayor of San Francisco and a city supervisor in their
offices at city hall. After many experts testified as to the defendant's mental state, the jury
found the defendant guilty of a lesser included offense: two counts of manslaughter. Again
the public questioned the use of the insanity defense. See W. WINSLADE, THE INSANITY PLEA
21-51 (1983) for lengthier descriptions of these events.
5 This is the American Law Institute Model Penal Code test [hereinafter ALI], discussed
in detail at notes 25-29 incfa and accompanying text.
6 See note 4 supra. As a preface to their comments, witnesses testifying in congressional
hearings on the insanity defense cited the public furor resulting from the Hinckley verdict as
a provocation to change the insanity defense. Seegeneral4' Insanity Defense in Federal Courts, supra
note 1; The Insanity Defense: Hearings on S 2572 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judciay, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) [hereinafter cited as The Insanity Defense: Hearings].
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cally the test to determine insanity, is necessary. The recommenda-
tions, however, are as numerous and varied as the groups proposing
these changes. 7 While Congress has never legislated in this area,
many of these proposed changes have been formulated into bills and
introduced into the United States Congress.8
Recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit, on its own initiative,9 changed the insanity test used in its juris-
diction. In Lyons v. United States,10 the court, which had previously
7 Recommendations for reform of the insanity defense can be broken down into three
general categories. The first type proposes abolishing the insanity defense as it is used today,
but allowing evidence of a mental disorder to raise a reasonable doubt as to the lack of the
required mens rea for the offense. See The Insanity Defense." Hearings supra note 6, at 9-16 (state-
ment of Sen Orrin G. Hatch); The Insanity Defense: Hearings, supra note 6, at 71-76 (statement of
David Robinson); H.R. 6718, Insanity Defense in Federal Courts, supra note 1, at 117 (statement of
Peter Areneus).
The second type of reform proposals redefines the insanity test by placing the burden of
proving insanity by a preponderance of the evidence on the defendant, and in some cases
proposes limiting psychiatric testimony. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDING COMMIT-
TEE ON ASSOCIATION STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PROPOSED CRIMINAL JUSTICE
MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS 7-6.9 (1984) [hereinafter cited as ABA STANDARDS]; see also
STATEMENT ON THE INSANITY DEFENSE 12-13 (American Psychiatric Association 1982)
[hereinafter cited as APA Statement].
The final type of recommendations provides for a fourth possible verdict of "guilty but
mentally ill." H.R. REP. No. 577, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 8-9 (1984) [hereinafter cited as HOUSE
REP.]; see also ABA STANDARDS, infra, at 386-88; APA STATEMENT, infra, at 9-10.
8 S. 818, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (limit insanity defense); S. 1106, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1981) (reform insanity defense); S. 1558, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (amend title 18 to
limit the insanity defense and to establish a verdict of not guilty only by reason of insanity); S.
1995, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (remedy procedural and structural defects in the criminal
justice system); S. 2572, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. § 701 (1982) (abolish insanity defense and adopt
mens rea test); S. 2658, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) (delimit insanity defense); S. 2669, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) (amend title 18 and limit insanity defense). For a discussion of these
bills, see Limiting the Insanity Defense: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Criminal Law of the Senate
Comm. on theJudiciaqy, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-85 (1982); H.R. 6716, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982)
(create verdict of guilty but insane). H.R. 6783, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) (limit expert
testimony); see generaly Insanity Defense in Federal Courts, supra note 1; S. 1762 and H.R. 2151
(limit insanity defense and shift the burden of persuasion to the defendant to prove insanity
by clear and convincing evidence). These proposals are part of the Comprehensive Crime Act
of 1983, S. 1762, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. (1983); H.R. 2151, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984). See
Reform of the Federal Insanity Defense: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on CriminalJustice of the House
Comm. on theJudiday, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); see also Note, The Proposed Federal Insanity
Defense: Should the Quality of Mercy Suffer for the Sake of Safety?, 22 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 49 (1984)
[hereinafter cited as Note, The Proposed Federal Insanity Defense].
9 The court could have disposed of the case without reaching the question of the ade-
quacy of the insanity test in its jurisdiction. See 731 F. 2d 243, 250 (5th Cir. 1984) (Rubin,
Williams, J.J., dissenting) (Politz, Tate, Higginbotham, J.J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part).
10 731 F.2d 243 (5th Cir. 1984).
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used the American Law Institute Model Penal Code test (ALI test), I I
abolished the volitional prong of the test.12 This note will discuss the
holding and reasoning of Lyons and its impact on the insanity de-
fense. Part I provides an historical background to the various tests
used by American courts. Part II discusses the particular facts of
Lyons and analyzes the court's justifications for abolishing the voli-
tional prong. Part III discusses the impact of this decision on the
federal insanity test.
I. Historical Background
The first insanity test adopted by American courts was the
M'Naghten Rule.t 3 This test requires proof that
at the time of committing the act, the party accused was laboring
under such a defect of the mind as not to know the nature and
quality of the act he was doing; or if he did know it, that he did
not know he was doing what was wrong.14
Soon after its formulation, the M'Naghten test attained accept-
ance in most American jurisdictions. 15 In spite of its widespread use,
11 Blake v. United States, 407 F.2d 908 (5th Cir. 1969); For the text of the ALI test see
text accompanying note 25 in/ra.
12 The phrase "cognitive prong" refers to the portion of the test that concerns the defend-
ant's capacity to appreciate the criminality or wrongfulness of his conduct. The phrase "voli-
tional prong" refers to the portion of the test which speaks to the defendant's capacity to
conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.
13 This rule was borrowed from an 1843 opinion of the House of Lords given after the
acquittal of Daniel M'Naghten for the murder of Prime Minister Robert Peel's private secre-
tary. M'Naghten believed that the Prime Minister of England was conspiring against him.
In an attempt to assassinate the Prime Minister, M'Naghten mistakenly shot and killed the
Prime Minister's private secretary, Drummond. M'Naghten's trial became the battleground
for the medical profession and the law. Nine medical witnesses testified that M'Naghten was
insane. The medical evidence was so persuasive that the trial court judge virtually directed a
verdict for the accused. He stated to the jury,
I cannot help remarking that the whole of the medical evidence is on one side and
that there is no part of it which leaves any doubt in the mind. . . . We feel the
evidence, expecially that of the last two medical gentlemen who have been ex-
amined, and who are strangers to both sides and only observers of the case, to be
very strong, and sufficient to induce my learned brother and myself to stop the case.
The Queen v. Daniel M'Naghten, 4 State Trials, N.S. 847, 924 (1843). Following
M'Naghten's acquittal, Queen Victoria expressed concern over the verdict and asked the
House of Lords to examine the case. In response to questions regarding criminal responsibil-
ity, Lord Chief Justice Tindal articulated what has come to be known as M'Naghten's Rule.
Id at 730-52. For a lengthier description of this case, see R. GERBER, supra note 2, at 22-24.
14 M'Naghten's Case, House of Lords, 10 Cl. and F. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843).
15 New Hampshire promulgated its own test, similar to the Durham test, discussed in
notes 22-24 in/a and accompanying text. State v. Pike, 49 N.H. 399 (1869). In 1967, 30 states
used the M'Naghten test alone. For a complete list of all jurisdictions, see A. GOLDSTEIN,
supra note 2, at 241 n.1; see also Weiner, Not Guilty By Reason of Insanity: A Sane Approach, 56
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commentators have criticized the test for focusing exclusively on the
cognitive functions of the mind, claiming that it represents a far too
restrictive rule.16
Agreeing with the criticism, some courts supplemented the
M'Naghten standard with the irresistible impulse test. 17 This test is
perhaps misnamed because no exact formulation or particular lan-
guage including the phrase "irresistible impulse"'18 is used by the
courts which have apparently adopted it. Generally stated, however,
the jury is instructed to acquit a defendant if they find the defendant
suffered from a mental disease or defect which kept him from con-
trolling his actions.' 9
The M'Naghten-irresistible impulse combination also has been
criticized. 20 Nevertheless, the M'Naghten-irresistible impulse combi-
nation remained the predominant standard in the United States for
determining insanity until the 1950's.21
In 1954, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit announced a different insanity standard in Durham
CHICAGO-KENT L. REV. 1057, 1084 (1980). For a list of jurisdictions currently using the
M'Naghten test alone, see Note, The Proposed Federal Insanity Defense, supra note 8, at 52 n.24.
16 The test divides the mind into separate cognitive, emotional and control components,
thus ignoring current psychological thought which views the mind as an integrated unit. A.
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 2, at 46-47.
Moreover, because this approach refers to intellectual awareness and cognition alone, it
does not relieve individuals of criminal responsibility who may know that what they are doing
is wrong but are unable to control their actions. Kuh, The Insanity Defense - An Effrt to
Combine Law and Reason, 110 U. Pa. L. Rev. 771, 782 (1962). See note 52 inra and accompany-
ing text.
17 In 1967, eighteen states and the federal system supplemented the M'Naghten Rule
with the irresistible impulse test. For a complete list of all jurisdictions, see A. GOLDSTEIN,
supra note 2, at 241 n.l. Today, only a few states use both the M'Naghten Rule and the
irresistible impulse test: Alabama (Lokos v. State, 278 Ala. 586, 179 So.2d 714 (1965)); Colo-
rado (COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-8-101 (1973); Georgia (GA. CODE ANN. §§ 26-702, 703 (1978));
New Mexico (State v. White, 58 N.M. 324, 270 P.2d 727 (1954)); Virginia (Davis v. Com-
monwealth, 214 Va. 681, 204 S.E.2d 272 (1974)); Wyoming (Reilly v. State, 496 P.2d 899
(Wyo. 1972)).
18 A. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 2, at 69.
19 Parsons v. State, 81 Ala. 577, 2 So. 834 (1887).
20 Like the M'Naghten Rule, the irresistible impulse test is criticized for its compart-
mentalization of thought processes. A. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 2, at 76. Commentators also
focus on the test's requirement of a sudden, impulsive loss of control, which ignores the possi-
bility of long-term, gradual loss of control. R. GERBER, supra note 2, at 39. Finally, critics
state that the test broadens the insanity test too far. A. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 2, at 77.
21 H. FINGARETTE, THE MEANING OF CRIMINAL INSANITY 12 (1972). New Hampshire
remained the only jurisdiction to reject the M'Naghten Rule, the irresistible impulse test or
some combination of the two. It applied a "product" test much like the Durham test later
adopted by the District of Columbia Circuit. See notes 22-24 infra and accompanying text.
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v. United States.22 Using as its fundamental principle that thought
processes are an integrated, functional unit, the court stated that: "an
accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the prod-
uct of mental disease or mental defect. '23
Although the Durham test never received widespread accep-
tance,24 the break from the traditional M'Naghten test encouraged
legal scholars and the courts to explore other approaches to the in-
sanity defense. Most notable among these approaches is the Ameri-
can Law Institute proposal:
A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of
such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks sub-
stantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality [wrongful-
ness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the
requirements of the law.25
The ALI test has received wide acceptance; it has been adopted
in all but one of the federal circuits. 26 Proponents argue that the ALI
test is more consistent with the available medical testimony regard-
22 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
23 Id. at 874-75 (emphasis added).
24 Commentators attribute this to the lack of definition for "product," the notion that a
mental disease can cause an act, and the conclusory effect that psychiatric testimony seems to
have on ajury. H. FINGARETrE, supra note 21, at 246-47. See also R. GERBER, supra note 2, at
43-48; A. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 2, 82-86.
25 MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (Official Draft 1962).
26 The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit is the only circuit which has
not adopted any variation of the ALI Model Penal Code test. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit, on the other hand, adopted only the volitional prong of the
ALI test (a defendant must have lacked substantial capacity to conform his conduct to the
requirements of the law) in United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1961) (see note 68
infta). The National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers argues that the Court of Ap-
peals for the First Circuit also adopted the Currens approach in Beltran v. United States, 302
F.2d 48 (1st Cir. 1962). Brief Amicus Curiae of the National Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers at 18, 731 F.2d 243 (5th Cir. 1984). This is a rather liberal interpretation of the
Beltran opinion, however. Justice Aldrich, in his decision, stated that the record was insuffi-
cient to pass on the issue of the proper insanity standard to apply. He merely "commended"
the trial court's consideration of cases such as Currenr. He did not expressly adopt this ap-
proach.
See Bonner v. City of Pritchard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11 th Cir. 1983) (en banc) (the court in
Bonner held that the decisions of the fifth circuit prior to September 30, 1981 are "binding as
precedent" in the Eleventh Circuit. 661 F.2d at 1207); United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d
969 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Wade v. United States, 426 F.2d 64 (9th Cir. 1970); United States v.
Smith, 404 F.2d 720 (6th Cir. 1968); United States v. Chandler, 393 F.2d 920 (4th Cir. 1968);
Pope v. United States, 372 F.2d 710 (8th Cir. 1968); United States v. Shapiro, 383 F.2d 680
(7th Cir. 1967); United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1966); Wion v. United
States, 325 F.2d 420 (10th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 946 (1964). The Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit adopted the ALI test in Blake v. United States, 407 F.2d 908 (5th Cir.
1969). This has been overruled by Lyons.
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ing insanity, 27 is less rigid,28 and is simpler for a jury to apply and
understand than other tests.2 9 While some courts still use other tests,
the majority have adopted some version of the ALI standard. Thus,
the action of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Lyons repre-
sents a major event in the evolution of the insanity defense.
II. The Lyons Decision
In Lyons v. United States,30 a grand jury had indicted Lyons on
twelve counts of knowingly and intentionally securing controlled
narcotics by misrepresentation, fraud, deception and subterfuge in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(a)(1976) and U.S.C. § 2 (1976).31 Before
his trial, Lyons indicated that he planned to rely on the insanity de-
fense. 32 To support his claim, Lyons offered to present expert testi-
mony which would show he had become involuntarily addicted to
narcotics and that this involuntary addiction had rendered him inca-
pable of conforming his conduct to the requirements of the law.33
27 The ALI test requires that a defendant lack substantial capacity to conform his con-
duct to the law, while the M'Naghten standard requires total incapacitation. Blake v. United
States, 407 F.2d 908, 914 (5th Cir. 1969); United States v. Smith, 404 F.2d 720, 727 (6th Cir.
1968); United States v. Shapiro, 383 F.2d 680, 685 (7th Cir. 1967). "The extremity of these
conceptions is. . . the point that poses largest difficulty to psychiatrists when called upon to
aid in their administration." MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 comment 4 (Proposed Official
Draft 1955). The Model Penal Code views the mind as a "unified entity" and appreciates the
numerous ways which a mental disease or defect can impair the mind's functioning. United
States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606, 622 (2d Cir. 1966). It also balances the mind's cognitive and
volitional functions in the two prongs of the test. Combining both a cognitive prong (lack of
substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality (wrongfulness) of his conduct) and a
volitional prong (inability to conform conduct to the requirements of the law), the test allows
for an inquiry into the defendant's entire personality to determine his criminal responsibility.
United States v. Chandler, 393 F.2d 920, 926 (4th Cir. 1968).
28 A defendant need only lack substantial capacity, not be totally incapacitated. Wade
v. United States, 426 F.2d at 71; United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d at 622. As the Model
Penal Code states, "[t]he law must recognize that when there is no black and white it must
content itself with enforcing different shades of gray." MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.07 comment
4 (Proposed Official Draft 1955).
29 United States v. Shapiro, 383 F.2d at 685; United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d at 623.
The terms of the Model Penal Code test are precise and readily comprehensible. United
States v. Smith, 404 F.2d. at 727; United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d at 623. The test is
structured so that despite the expert testimony, the ultimate issue of fact is still within the
province of the jury. 357 F.2d at 623; see also United States v. Chandler, 393 F.2d at 926,
Wion v. United States, 325 F.2d at 430.
30 731 F.2d 243 (5th Cir. 1984).
31 Id. at 243.
32 Id. at 244.
33 Id. Lyons was basing his defense on the standard then used in the Fifth Circuit, the
ALI test. See note I 1 supra and accompanying text. Lyons' proffer of evidence appears in full
at 704 F.2d at 744-47.
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The trial court excluded all evidence relating to Lyons' drug addic-
tion.34 Lyons was convicted and appealed the court's ruling regard-
ing the exclusion of the evidence of his drug addiction.3 5 *On appeal,
the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, en banc, 36 summarily dis-
posed of the precise question on appeal 37 and proceeded to reexam-
ine 38 the insanity test in its jurisdiction.3 9  In doing so, the court
abolished the volitional prong of the ALI Model Penal Code test.40
34 731 F.2d at 244.
35 Id.
36 While neither the panel decision, 704 F.2d 743 (5th Cir. 1984), nor the en banc court
cite the trial court's justification for excluding evidence, that justfication appears to have been
based on the general rule that intoxication is not a mental disease or defect for the purpose of
sustaining the insanity defense. The court, en banc, cites the following cases in support of the
general rule: Bailey v. United States, 386 F.2d 1, 3-4 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 946
(1968); accord, United States v. Coffman, 567 F.2d 960, 963 (10th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Moore, 486 F.3d 1139, 1181 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 980 (1973); United
States v. Stevens, 461 F.2d 317, 321 (7th Cir. 1972); Gaskins v. United States, 410 F.2d 987,
989 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Green v. United States, 383 F.2d 199, 201 (D.C. Cir 1967); cert. denied,
390 U.S. 961 (1968); United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606, 625 (2d Cir. 1966); Berry v.
United States, 286 F. Supp. 816, 820 (E.D. Pa. 1968), rev'don other grounds, 412 F.2d 189 (3d
Cir. 1969).
37 Initially, a panel of the Fifth Circuit had reversed the trial court's ruling, holding that
whether drug addiction constituted a mental disease or defect presented a question for the
jury. The court subsequently decided to rehear the issue en banc. 731 F.2d at 245.
38 Initially, the question on appeal was whether the trial court properly excluded the
evidence of Lyons' drug addiction. The panel of the court of appeals stated that the question
whether Lyons' involuntary addiction constituted a mental disease or defect was a matter to
be considered by thejury. 704 F. 2d at 744. On rehearing, en banc, the court considered that
very question and, following the general rule, held that drug addiction, voluntary or invoiun-
tary, is not a mental disease or defect for legal purposes. 731 F.2d at 246; see note 36 supra.
39 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, en bane, claimed that new policy consider-
ations justified the reexamination. The only policy consideration that the court alluded to,
however, was the court's disappointment in psychiatry's inability to support the test then
being used in that jurisdiction. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Rubin discussed what he
thought were the principal bases for consideration: (1) the potential threat to society of of-
fenders manipulating the criminal justice system through the use of the volitional prong and
(2) factfinders, especially juries, may be confused and manipulated by the vagueness of legal
standards and the notorious "battle of the experts." 739 F.2d 994, 995-96 (Rubin, J. dissent-
ing). In Justice Rubin's dissent, however, he criticized the court for even taking up the issue
of the test for insanity in the Lyons case, because this was not the issue on which the appeal
was taken. 731 F.2d at 250 (Rubin, J. dissenting).
40 Until Lyons, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit had used the ALI Model Penal
Code test, see note 25 supra and accompanying text, which it had adopted in Blake v. United
States, 407 F.2d 908 (5th Cir. 1969). At that time, the court believed it better reflected the
current state of knowledge regarding behavioral science. In the court's words, the ALI Model
Penal Code test would "serve as a vehicle to enable the court and jury to give effect to the
defense of insanity in terms of what is now known about the mind." Id. In reexamining its
position and evaluating the present state of science, the court in Lyons admitted that it may
have been premature in concluding that the current state of knowledge in the medical and
behavioral health fields would provide enough data for jurors using the ALI test to effectively
evaluate a defendant's sanity. 731 F.2d at 248.
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The court of appeals held that "a person is not responsible for crimi-
nal conduct on the grounds of insanity only if at the time of that
conduct, as a result of a mental disease or defect, he is unable to
appreciate the wrongfulness of that conduct." 41 Thus, in the Fifth
Circuit, the insanity defense is not available to a criminal defendant
on the sole basis that he was unable "to conform his conduct to the
requirements of the law."'42
The Lyons court abolished the volitional prong, first, because it
felt that the volitional prong did not comport with current medical
and scientific knowledge.43 In the 1950s, a growing optimism devel-
oped in the ability of the psychiatric profession to evaluate a person's
volitional capacity.44 This ability, according to the court, has not
materialized.4 5 Lack of knowledge regarding volition has led some
authorities to argue that the volitional prong is too broad since it
would categorize someone as insane who is "fundamentally ra-
tional."' 46 Thus, the critics object to any standard for relieving crimi-
nal responsibility based on a defendant's inability to control his
conduct.47
Despite the critics' objections, neither the lack of knowledge re-
garding volition nor the difficulty in distinguishing the impulse
which could not be resisted from the one which merely was not re-
sisted 48 jusitfies the court's abolition of the volitional prong. The
Lyons court does not argue that individuals can always control their
41 731 F.2d at 249. The court also modified the test by using the phrase "is unable" as
opposed to "lacks substantial capacity" to simplify the standard and reduce the possibility of
a "loose" interpretation by the jury. Id; see ABA STANDARDS, supra note 7, at 334.
42 MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (Official Draft 1962).
43 731 F.2d at 248; see also Stansfiel, The Questionable Sanity of the Insanity Defense, 8 BARRIS-
TER 19, 48 (Spr. 1981)
44 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 7, at 330. The court left open the possibility that it might
reinstate the volitional prong if the scientific evidence were available to apply it. 731 F.2d at
248 n.9.
45 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 7, at 330; see also APA STATEMENT, supra note 7, at 11;
Insanity Defense in the Federal Courts, supra note 1, (Statement of Stephen J. Morse, Professor of
Law and Psychiatry and the Behavioral Sciences, University of Southern California Law
Center and School of Medicine) [hereinafter cited as Morse]; Bonnie, The Moral Basis of the
Insanity Defense, 69 A.B.A. J. 194, 196 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Bonnie].
46 Morse, supra note 45, at 232.
47 The APA argues that "[t]he line between an irresistible impulse and an impulse not
resisted is probably no sharper than that between twilight and dusk." APA STATEMENT,
supra note 7, at 11. "It is not possible to establish with sufficient consistency with scientific
precision whether an individual was able to exercise meaningful choice in the commission of a
socially harmful act." Stansfiel, supra note 43, at 48. Therefore, it follows that providing a
defense based on the defendant's inability to exercise meaningful choice would be quite prob-
lematic. Morse, supra note 45, at 233.
48 R. GERBER, supra note 2, at 38.
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conduct and therefore the volitional prong is superfluous. Rather,
the court only states that psychiatry cannot accurately measure ca-
pacity for self-control.49 Thus, it is entirely possible that a defendant
who could not make a meaningful choice as to his conduct would be
held morally and legally responsible for it under the Lyons court's
new test.
The Lyons court also eliminated the volitional prong because
mistakes as to the moral blameworthiness of a defendant are most
likely to occur when a jury is asked to speculate on the issue of a
defendant's control.50 The court implies that this narrower test
would achieve morally correct results more often.5' The objective of
the law, however, should not be to achieve morally correct results
more often, but rather to avoid morally incorrect results at all times.
Historically, criminal law has been based on the idea that it is better
to let ten guilty persons go free than to convict one innocent person.
By eliminating the volitional prong, the court infers that it is willing
to accept mistakes as to the moral blameworthiness of defendants
who truly cannot control their conduct. The court's opinion admits
that persons such as this do exist,5 2 but it makes no provision for
them.
The Lyons court's third basis for abolishing the volitional prong
was that psychiatric testimony regarding the volitional prong was
more confusing to jurors than testimony relating to the cognitive
test.53 This occurs because there is a stronger scientific basis for eval-
uating a person's cognitive capacity than his volitional capacity. 54
Also, psychiatric testimony relating to volition generally is combined
with vague or broad interpretations of the term "mental disease or
defect."'55 This combination forces a jury to evaluate a great volume
of expert opinion56 of a highly speculative nature. Since both sides
49 731 F.2d at 248.
50 Id.; see also Bonnie, supra note 45, at 196.
51 See 731 F.2d at 249; HOUSE REP., supra note 7, at 10-11.
52 See 731 F.2d at 249 ("most psychotic persons who fail a volitional test would fail a
cognitive test.") This implies that there are people who would fail only the volitional test.
53 Id
54 Id.
55 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 7, at 329; see also APA STATEMENT, srupra note 7, at 11.
56 The Model Penal Code supported the widespread use of expert testimony in applying
the insanity standard. The Official Comment to § 4.07 states that
a psychiatric expert who has examined the defendant will have an opportunity to
state and explain his diagnoses of the defendant's mental condition at the time of
the conduct charged, and his opinion as to the extent of the defendant's mental
impairment at that time, without such a witness being restricted to the latter testi-
mony alone and without his having to state his opinion in hypothetical form.
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generally have several experts testify, it is not difficult to understand
why the court was concerned with the possibility of juror confusion.
Although this may be an excellent argument for limiting the
admissibility of certain expert evidence,57 it is not a valid justification
for eliminating the volitional prong of the insanity defense. The ulti-
mate question to be answered by the judge or jury is not whether the
"choice" of the defendant was determined by his mental disorder,58
but whether this defendant should be held accountable for his
"choice. ' 59 In this respect, the insanity defense is much like the de-
fenses of mistake, duress, and necessity.60 The focus is whether the
MODEL PENAL CODE §4.07 comment 4 (Proposed Official Draft 1955).
The Federal Rules of Evidence tend to support the Model Penal Code position. Rule
702 states that an expert may testify as to scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge
if it will assist the factfinder in determining a fact in issue. This testimony may be in the form
of an opinion. See FED. R. EVID. 702. Rule 704 states that opinion testimony is admissible
even if it "embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact." FED. R. EVID. 704.
These rules, in effect, allow a psychiatrist to testify as to the criminal responsibility of a de-
fendant in terms of sanity or insanity. See FED. R. EvID. 704 advisory committee note.
57 Recently, the ABA, the APA, and the House Judiciary Committee have recommended
that the rules regarding expert testimony in insanity cases be limited. The APA believes that
the psychiatrist should present "medical information and opinion about the defendant's
mental state and motivation and to explain in detail the reason for his medical-psychiatric
conclusions." See APA STATEMENT, supra note 7, at 14. But, were a psychiatrist asked to give
his opinion as to the ultimate issue of fact, he would no longer testify as to medical concepts.
Id Rather, he would testify as to the "probable relationship between medical concepts and
legal or moral constructs .. " Id This is an issue of fact which is to be decided by a jury.
Professor Morse suggests that psychiatric testimony be limited even further. He believes
that the expert should testify only as to the defendant's behavior, and not as to diagnoses or
speculations about the causes. Morse, supra note 45, at 235.
Professors Bonnie and Slobogin disagree with Professor Morse. In a recent article they
argue that in certain instances diagnoses can be useful information to a jury. Bonnie &
Slobogin, The Role of Mental Health Professionals in the Criminal Process, 66 VA. L. REV. 427, 473
(1980). Although Bonnie and Slobogin admit that in many cases diagnoses will provide little
or no help, they state that diagnoses can yield "insights that are both probative and valuable
to the fact finder on the 'mental disease' issue." Id. at 468. Without these opinions, they
conclude, the factfinder would be left with the description of mere symptoms and his own
conceptions of mental illness to aid in his interpretation. Id. at 468-69.
The House Judiciary Committee appears to support the position of Professors Bonnie
and Slobogin. In its report on H.R. 3336, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983), the Committee ex-
pressed the idea that an expert witness should testify neither as to the ultimate issue of fact
(whether the defendant was able to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct) nor as to
whether the defendant had the requisite mental state for the crime. HOUSE REP., supra note
7, at 16.
58 Hermann, Book Review, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 329, 338 (1983) (reviewing N. Mor-
ris, MADNESS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (1982)) [hereinafter Hermann]. Expert testimony
would be necessary to resolve this question as it deals with a deterministic relationship be-
tween a mental disorder and an act.
59 Hermann, supra note 58, at 338.
60 Id.
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defendant, but for his excuse of insanity, should be held accountable
for an otherwise criminal act.61 Thus, expert testimony in this in-
stance would be limited to the issue of the defendant's mental condi-
tion at the time of the criminal act.62 The jury would then be asked
to determine whether the defendant's choice should be excused.
The court further justified its decision on the grounds that the
existence of the volitional prong increases the risk that a defendant
may fabricate a claim of insanity.63 The lack of scientific knowledge
regarding volition further increases this risk.64 Since a defendant's
self-control, or lack thereof, cannot be proved, nothing discourages
an insanity defense based on the volitional prong of the ALI test.
The fear of fabrication, however, does not support the abolition
of the volitional prong.65 The problem is not the volitional prong
itself, but rather the confusing and conflicting expert testimony
which accompanies the defendant's invocation of the volitional
prong. Thus, the solution is not to abolish the volitional prong, but
rather to amend the rules of evidence so as to limit the type of expert
testimony in insanity cases. 66
Finally, the Lyons court felt that the volitional test was unneces-
sary.67 The court stated that a considerable overlap existed between
the volitional and cognitive prongs of the ALI test and that most
psychotic persons who would fail the volitional test would also fail
the cognitive test.68 The key phrase in the court's reasoning is "most
psychotic persons."' 69 Since only "most" would fail both tests, there is
still the problem of the few who would fail only the volitional test.
61 Id. at 338-39.
62 "The availability of expert testimony and the probative value of such testimony are
basically evidentiary problems that can be accommodated within the existing test." United
States v. Lyons, 739 F.2d 994, 998 (5th Cir. 1984) (Rubin, J., dissenting); set note 57 supra.
63 731 F.2d at 249.
64 Id.; see also ABA STANDARDS, supra note 7, at 330; Bonnie, supra note 45, at 196.
65 See note 57 supra.
66 See notes 57-62 supra and accompanying text.
67 731 F.2d at 249.
68 Id. Contra United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751, 774 n.32 (3d Cir. 1961) (the court
held that the cognitive prong should be eliminated as it overemphasizes the cognitive element
in criminal responsibility and therefore is superfluous).
69 731 F.2d at 249 (emphasis added); see note 52 supra and accompanying text; Professor
Morse also notes:
In fact, however, a strong impulse to offend almost always will be the result of some
cognitive irrationality. For instance, in the case of a defendant who feels he 'must'
kill because he delusionally believes the Lord commanded him to do so (or because
it is necessary to foil a plot against him), the impulse arises from the crazy belief,
and thus the situation can be dealt with by a cognitive test.
Morse, supra note 45, at 231 (emphasis added).
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The new test formulated by the court fails to provide for the
person who genuinely could not control his conduct. Thus, under
the new test, it is possible that certain defendants will be convicted
even though they are not morally or legally blameworthy. This of-
fends a basic concept of our criminal justice system. Accordingly, the
Lyons court's decision to eliminate the volitional prong of the ALI
Model Penal Code test cannot be justified.
III. Impact and Conclusion
The decision of the court of appeals in Lyons is not a sound judg-
ment. It eliminates a viable and necessary prong of the insanity de-
fense 70 without considering less drastic alternatives. 71 In abolishing
the volitional prong, the court seems to have responded to recent de-
mands for reform of the insanity defense. As a result of the court's
decision, the number of insanity pleas will decrease, along with the
number of "moral mistakes" as to a defendant's blameworthiness.
Although the public may be satisfied, the court, nevertheless, elimi-
nated a vital prong of the insanity defense, thereby potentially al-
lowing for the conviction of persons deserving acquittal. 72
The federal courts soon may all be forced to eliminate any claim
of insanity based on the volitional test. Congress currently is consid-
70 But see HOUSE REP., supra note 7, at 11. "[Ihe volitional portion of the ALI test is
contrary to the 'free-will' premise of the Anglo-American criminal justice system-that an
adult, with an accurate knowledge of a factual situation, can freely choose between right and
wrong, and can therefore be held morally blameworthy (and criminally responsible) for anti-
social conduct."
The ABA argues that if a defendant were able to appreciate the wrongfulness of his
conduct, he should be held morally responsible regardless of his ability to control his conduct.
Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Bar Association at 11-12, United States v. Lyons, 731
F.2d 243 (5th Cir. 1984); see also Bonnie, supra note 45, at 196-97.
71 Six weeks after the fifth circuit decided Lyons, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit had the opportunity to reconsider its standard for insanity in United
States v. Torniero, 735 F.2d 725 (2d Cir. 1984). The Torniero court narrowed the definition of
the volitional prong but did not eliminate it. The Second Circuit now requires, in terms of
the volitional test, that a defendant show that his alleged disorder is a mental disease or defect
and that there is a relevant connection between the disorder and the defendant's inability to
control his conduct. Id. at 731-32.
According to Justice Rubin, dissenting in Lyons, a defendant must show (1) "that
respected authorities in the field share the view that the disorder is a disease or defect that
could have impaired the defendant's ability to desist from the offense charged. . . and (2) the
alleged disease or defect must be relevant to the crime charged." 739 F.2d at 998 (Rubin, J.
dissenting).
Professor Morse also suggested that the volitional prong could be retained if it were
written so narrowly as to "excuse only those who were utterly overwhelmed by their im-
pulses." Morse, supra note 45, at 233.
72 See note 52 supra and accompanying text.
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ering bills which eliminate the volitional prong and further restrict
the definition of "mental disease or defect. '73 This movement to
eliminate the volitional prong and narrow the definition of "mental
disease or defect" is also advocated by organizations such as the ABA
and APA and by certain notable scholars.74
With this strong base of support, the law on the insanity defense
is likely to change. 75 Whether other courts will follow the lead taken
by the Lyons court is uncertain. Nonetheless, the chief impact of the
Lyons case will not be in limiting the number of insanity pleas and
verdicts, but rather in calming the fervor which presently surrounds
the insanity defense. Since the insanity plea is rarely used anyway,76
it is unrealistic to assume that the Lyons decision will have a dramatic
impact on the number of insanity pleas. Granted, the Lyons decision
may limit the use of the insanity defense to some extent within the
Fifth Circuit, but not to the extent which the public expects. 77 Thus,
to the public, Lyons represents an effort, by one court, to do some-
thing about the "John Hinckleys" of this world.
Judith A. Morse
Gregory K. Thoreson
Addendum
On October 12, 1984, President Reagan signed into law the Comiprehen-
sive Crime Control Act of 1983. This act amends 18 US C § 20(a) to read
as follows:
Afftmative Defense- it is an affmnative defense to a prosecution
under any Federal statute that, at the time of the commission of the acts
constituting the offense, the defendant, as a result of mental disease or defect,
73 See notes 7-8 supra.
74 See note 45 supra.
75 See addendum infra.
76 In New Jersey in fiscal year 1982, 0.16% of all adult defendants pleaded insanity. In
Virginia the figure was less than 1%. New York's rate was less than 2%. California had a rate
of 1.3%, and in Wyoming only 0.47% of all felony indictments resulted in insanity pleas.
HOUSE REP., supra note 7, at 5 n.7.
77 Justice Rubin cited a Wyoming study which examined the public's perceptions of the
insanity defense. Estimates of the frequency for which the defense was invoked ranged from
13% to 57% of the time. The actual figure was 0.47%. Estimates regarding the success rate
ranged from 19% to 44%, whereas less than 1% actually succeeded. 739 F.2d at 995 n.8 (citing
Pasewark, Insanity Plea: A Review of the Research Literature, 9 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 357, 360-61
(1981)).
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was unable to appreciate the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his
acts. Mental disease or defect does not otherwise constitute a defense.
This test, which is essentialy the same standard for insanity that the Lyons
court enunciated, is now the standard for legal insaniy in the federal system.
The arguments against the validity of the Lyons rationale appl equa4y to the
new federal standard, and should be considered by state courts faced with a
question similar to that presented in Lyons.
TORT LAW - KELLY V GWINNELL: THE SOCIAL HOST AND His
VISIBLY INTOXICATED GUEST: JOINT LIABILITY FOR INJURIES TO
THIRD PARTIES AND PROPER EVIDENTIARY TESTS
On June 27, 1984, in Kelly v. Gwinnell,I the New Jersey Supreme
Court held:
[A] host who serves liquor to an adult social guest, knowing both
that the guest is intoxicated and will thereafter be operating a
motor vehicle, is liable for injuries inflicted on a third party as a
result of the negligent operation of a motor vehicle by the adult
guest when such negligence is caused by the intoxication. 2
Many jurisdictions have imposed criminal and civil liability upon
licensees who furnish alcoholic beverages to either minors or visibly
intoxicated adults.3 Few jurisdictions, however, have extended civil
liability to social hosts for injuries related to their providing liquor to
minors. Even fewer jurisdictions have extended liability where the
consumer is an adult.4 The Kelly decision represents the forefront of
imposing liability on social hosts.
This comment examines the Kelly court's imposition of liability
on the social host for the negligent acts of the host's intoxicated guest.
The first section analyzes the court's decision. The second section
discusses the viability of the Kelly decision as opposed to a legislative
response. The third section addresses evidentiary problems which
may arise with this expansion of social host liability.
I. Kelly v. Gwinnell
On the evening of January 11, 1980, Catherine and Joseph Zak
served their guest, Donald Gwinnell, several drinks.5 Mr. Zak then
1 476 A.2d 1219 (N.J. 1984).
2 Id. at 1224.
3 See Drunk Driver, 70 A.B.A. J. 31 (Sept. 1984):
Nineteen states have dram shop statutes and 17 others have case law on the subject,
said Ronald Beitman, editor of Dram Shop and Alcohol Reporter and a Falmouth,
Mass., lawyer who represents drunk driving victims. Although many of the statutes
have been in place for many years, they are being used much more now. Beitman
said dram shop case filings in the first half of 1984 ran 300 percent ahead of the
same period last year. The laws generally hold servers liable for injuries that follow
after alcohol is served to persons who are visibly intoxicated.
4 See generaly Annot., 97 A.L.R. 3d 528 (1980).
5 476 A.2d at 1220. After unsuccessfully trying to extricate Joseph Zak's truck from the
mud, Gwinnell joined Mr. and Mrs. Zak for a couple of drinks at the Zaks' home. According
to the Zaks and Gwinnell, Gwinnell had only two or three drinks of scotch.
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accompanied Gwinnell to his car and watched as Gwinnell drove off
to go home.6 On the way home, Gwinnell's car collided head-on
with a car driven by Marie Kelly. Kelly suffered serious injuries in
the accident. 7 After the accident police gave Gwinnell a blood test
which indicated a blood alcohol concentration of 0.286 percent.8
Upon phoning Gwinnell's home to see if he had arrived safely, Mr.
Zak was informed of the accident by Mrs. Gwinnell. 9
Kelly initially sued only Gwinnell, but subsequently amended
her complaint to include the Zaks as defendants.10 The Zaks filed a
motion for summary judgment, and the trial court held as a matter
of law that a social host was not liable for the negligence of his guests
who drove after becoming intoxicated at the host's home. 1I The Ap-
pellate Division affirmed the trial court's final judgment in favor of
the Zaks, noting that its own precedent, as well as virtually every
other jurisdiction's case law, supported this result. 12
In a 6-1 decision, the New Jersey Supreme Court reversed the
Appellate Division and specifically held that a social host, who serves
alcohol to an adult guest with knowledge both that the guest is intox-
icated and will soon be driving, is liable to third parties who are in-
jured by the guest's negligent driving when intoxication is the cause
of his negligence. 13 The court, while declaring that many of the
traditional bases for tort liability were present, 14 acknowledged that
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 Id. This level is significantly higher than New Jersey's statutory level of 0.10 percent
which subjects a driver to criminal liability for driving while under the influence of intoxicat-
ing liquor. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:4-50 (West 1973), amended by N.J. STAT. ANN. § 1983, c.
444 (West Supp. 1984-85). At trial, plaintiff's expert testified that this level indicated con-
sumption of approximately thirteen drinks, rather than the two or three drinks to which
defendants testified. 476 A.2d at 1220; see note 5 supra and note 91 infra.
9 476 A.2d at 1220.
10 Id
11 Kelly v. Gwinnell, 190 N.J. Super. 320, 325-26, 463 A.2d 387, 390-91 (1983). The trial
court entered final judgment on this order pursuant to NJ. Court Rules 4:42-2 to allow im-
mediate appeal of this order. 476 A.2d at 1221.
12 463 A.2d at 390. Moreover, the appellate court, stating that New Jersey had not im-
posed liability on a social host in this situation, specifically declined to expand this field on its
own initiative. Id. Thus, the Supreme Court was squarely faced with the opportunity to do
so, if it wished.
13 476 A.2d at 1224; see text accompanying note 2 supra.
14 476 A.2d at 1221. The Kelly court stated that "[w]hen negligent conduct creates such
a risk, setting off foreseeable consequences that lead to plaintiff's injury, the conduct is
deemed the proximate cause of the injury." The court felt that a reasonable person in the
Zaks' position, observing a severely intoxicated person to whom he had served many drinks,
could foresee the likelihood of the person's injuring someone by his inability to drive his car
carefully. Therefore, "[t]he usual elements of a cause of action for negligence [were] clearly
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the imposition of such a duty to third parties represented a change. ' 5
The court gave three major reasons for its decision: (1) the trend of
past New Jersey decisions pointed clearly to this result;' 6 (2) few fac-
tors distinguished social hosts from licensees on whom liability al-
ready had been imposed; 17 and (3) strong public policy reasons
favored imposing liability.'8
First, the court noted that New Jersey courts have gradually
widened the scope of liability for providers of alcoholic beverages
where intoxicated drivers subsequently injured third parties. New
Jersey first imposed liability on the provider of alcohol in Rappapori v.
Nichols,'9 where a tavern owner, who had served alcohol to a minor,
was held liable to a member of the general public subsequently in-
jured by the intoxicated minor. Later, the court extended the duty
to hold a tavern owner liable for injuries to third parties caused by
either intoxicated minor customers or intoxicated adult customers.20
The appellate court subsequently imposed liability on a social host
present: an action by defendant creating an unreasonable risk of harm to plaintiff, a risk that
was clearly foreseeable, and a risk that resulted in an injury equally foreseeable." 476 A.2d at
1222.
This reasoning is a departure from the common law rule, however, which stated that the
proximate cause of the injury in drunken driving cases was the consumption, not the provi-
sion of alcohol. See Annot., supra note 4, at 533; see, e.g., Klien v. Raysinger, 470 A.2d 507, 510
(Pa. 1983) (social host not liable for providing alcohol to a visibly intoxicated guest because
the proximate cause is the consumption, not the provision of alcohol); Nevin v. Carlasco, 130
Mont. 512, 515-16, 365 P.2d 637, 639 (1961) (tavern owners not liable for selling alcoholic
beverages to intoxicated patron who pushes another patron to the floor since the "proximate
cause is the act of [he] who imbibes the liquor").
15 476 A.2d at 1229. California and Oregon had previously extended liability, but the
legislatures of these states modified the rule. See note 65 infra. Otherwise, courts have not
held a social host liable. See Annot., supra note 4, at 568-71, 574-77.
16 476 A.2d at 1222.
17 Id. at 1224.
18 Id. The court stated that it "impose[d] this duty on the host to the third party because
[it] believe[d] that the policy considerations served by its imposition far outweigh those as-
serted in opposition." Id.
19 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959). The court in Rappaport also based its decision on
common law negligence. The tavern owner sold alcohol to a minor who was then involved in
an auto accident in which the plaintiff's decendent was killed. The court established that the
licensee owed a duty to members of the general public. Rejecting the common law rule, the
court stated that the proximate cause of the accident was furnishing alcohol, thus making the
tavern owner liable. Id. at 203-04, 156 A.2d at 9.
20 Sorenen v. Olde Milford Inn, Inc., 46 N.J. 582, 218 A.2d 630 (1966). In Sorenen, an
adult patron in a bar became intoxicated, fell, and killed himself. New Jersey had a statute
making it illegal to sell alcoholic beverages to intoxicated people. But the court stated, "[i]f
despite the regulation, Frei wrongfully served Sorenen though he then knew or should have
known of Sorenen's intoxicated condition, Frei and the Olde Milford Inn subjected them-
selves to common law negligence claims for damages proximately resulting from the wrongful
service." Id at 587, 218 A.2d at 633.
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who served liquor to a visibly intoxicated minor, knowing the minor
would be driving, if the minor then injured a third party.2 1 Thus,
given this precedent, the Kelly court felt that imposing a duty repre-
sented a logical and foreseeable extension of liability.22
Second, the court could not logically reconcile extending liabil-
ity to a tavern keeper who provided liquor to an obviously intoxi-
cated adult but not to a social host.23 The court noted that the duty
not to serve alcohol to intoxicated persons existed independently of
any statute, and thus a social host "guilty of the same wrongful con-
duct [should not have immunity] merely because he is unlicensed. '24
Thus, a social host could not avoid liability by arguing that liability
is derived from a statute and that the statute applies only to tavern
21 Linn v. Rand, 140 N.J. Super. 212, 356 A.2d 15 (1976). The appellate court stated
"[t]he forward-looking and far-reaching philosophy expressed in Rappaport should also be ap-
plicable to negligent social hosts and should not be limited to holders of liquor licenses and
their employees." Id. at 216, 356 A.2d at 17-18. The court never specifically stated that the
decision applied only to minors, but rather said that each case must "be decided on a case by
case basis." Id. at 220, 356 A.2d at 19. The Kely court explicitly endorsed the Linn decision.
476 A.2d at 1223.
22 476 A.2d at 1222. Moreover, in noting each case, the court mentioned that the deci-
sions were not restricted to the facts of the cases. Id at 1223. In addition, the court analo-
gized the Kely situation to the situation where car owners lend their vehicles to intoxicated
persons and are held liable for any injuries such people cause. Id. at 1224; see generally Annot.,
19 A.L.R. 3d 1175 (1968).
23 Courts, however, have had many reasons for drawing a distinction between imposing
liability on a tavern owner but not on a social host. First, a tavern owner may purchase
insurance to cover his liability. See Comment, California Finds Social Host Can Be Liable to Third
Parties For Intoxicated Guest's Negligent Acts, 12 CREIGHTON L. REv. 945, 968-69 (1979); see also
notes 32-33 infia and accompanying text. Also, because of a tavern owner's daily association
with customers, a tavern owner can better judge when someone is intoxicated than can a
social host. See, e.g., Kelly v. Gwinnell, 476 A.2d 1219, 1233 (N.J. 1984) (Garibaldi, J., dis-
senting); Edgar v. Kajet, 84 Misc. 2d 100, 103, 375 N.Y.S.2d 548, 552 (1975), afd, 55 A.D.2d
597, 389 N.Y.S.2d 631 (1976) (court, in considering extending liability to a social host, ques-
tioned how a host will know a guest is intoxicated); see also notes 87-95, 125-35 infra and
accompanying text. Finally, courts fear that imposing liability on a social host would restrict
social interactions because individuals might be less inclined to entertain if they felt they had
a duty to monitor their guests. 476 A.2d at 1224. In response, the Kelly court felt that the
benefits outweighed the problems:
[G]iven society's extreme concern about drunken driving, any change in social be-
havior resulting from the rule will be regarded ultimately as neutral at the very
least, and not as a change for the worse; but then in any event if there be a loss, it is
well worth the gain.
Id.
24 476 A.2d at 1223-24 (quoting Linn v. Rand, 140 N.J. Super. 212, 217, 356 A.2d 15, 18
(1976)). In some states, tavern owners are liable because of dram shop acts. See Annot., supra
note 4, at 545-51. For a brief history of dram shop acts see Note, Social Host Liabilityfor Injuries
Caused By the Acts of an Intoxicated Guest, 59 N.D.L. REv. 445, 448-51 (1983). In New Jersey,
however, the courts established the liability of tavern keepers judicially in Rappaport. See note
19 supra. For the law in other states, see Annot., supra note 4, at 535-66.
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keepers. In addition, the Kelly court dismissed the proposition that a
tavern owner who derives a profit from providing alcohol should be
held liable, but a social host should not.25 Finally, the court stated
that the narrower duty of a social host will compensate for the differ-
ences which exist between a social host and a licensee. The tavern
keeper is liable whenever he serves an intoxicated patron.26 The so-
cial host, however, must personally serve alcohol to someone whom
he knows will drive.27 But in both cases, the courts hold the provider
liable for foreseeable injuries.
Finally, the court relied on a public policy argument for impos-
ing the duty.28 The court observed that public concern for the prob-
lem has grown.29  While recognizing the social importance of
drinking,30 the court believed the benefits of this social behavior were
outweighed by the "added assurance of just compensation to the vic-
tims of drunken driving as well as the added deterrent effect of the
rule on such driving." 3' Furthermore, the court stated that present
insurance policies would protect the homeowner from excessive fi-
nancial hardship.32 Insurance would spread the cost throughout so-
ciety. 33 Imposing all costs on the victim, which would occur in the
25 476 A.2d at 1224. The court focused on the fact that both parties are pioviders of
alcohol and as such are responsible for such provision, stating that "the provider has a duty to
the public not to create foreseeable, unreasonable risks by this activity." Id. Also, the profit
that a tavern owner receives relates more to the insurance issue. For a discussion of this, see
notes 32-33 infra and accompanying text.
26 This level of duty is reflected in Sorenen v. Olde Milford Inn Inc., 46 N.J. 582, 218
A.2d 630 (1966), where the court held that the tavern keeper is liable "when he knows or
should know that the patron is intoxicated." Id. at 587, 218 A.2d at 633.
27 The Kelly court emphasized this point several times: See notes 84-86 infla and accom-
panying text. The court stated "we decide only that where the social host directly serves the
guest and continues to do so even after the guest is visibly intoxicated, knowing that the guest
will soon be driving home, the social host may be liable for the consequences of the resulting
drunken driving." 476 A.2d at 1228. The court states that it will consider other cases as they
come before it. Id
28 See note 18 supra.
29 476 A.2d at 1222.
30 476 A.2d at 1224. For a general overview of the social aspects of drinking, see Snyder
& Pittman, Dinking and Alcoholism, 4 INT'L. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOC. Sci. 265, 268-74 (1968).
31 476 A.2d at 1224. The dissent argues that New Jersey auto insurance policies would
cover all situations. Id. at 1232. In the event the victim is a pedestrian and the driver has no
insurance, however, the victim would be left with all of the costs. As the Kell majority indi-
cates, it seems unfair to burden the innocent injured third party with the costs instead of the
negligent social host. Id at 1225.
32 Id at 1225. See Note, Social Host Liability For Furnishing Liquor-Finding a Basisfor Recovery
in Kentucky, 3 N. Ky. ST. L.F. 229, 245 (1976). The costs to raise liability limits would be
minimal. See Note, Extension of the Dram Shop Act: New Found Liability of the Social Host, 49
N.D.L. REv. 68, 81 n. 74 (1972).
33 476 A.2d at 1229. Since this new liability would probably increase homeowner's insur-
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case of an uninsured driver, would be unfair.
The court's reasoning is sound. Undoubtedly drunken driving
has become a serious problem. 34 The Ke4ly court was willing to ex-
tend liability to effect social change and deter drunken driving.35 Al-
though there is no empirical evidence that imposing liability will
deter drunken driving,36 logic supports the conclusion that holding
two parties liable, rather than only one, will persuade more people to
act responsibly.37
The Kelly court relied heavily on public policy to impose the
social host's duty to third parties. The next section, however, ad-
dresses whether the judiciary is the proper branch to establish public
policy, such as the one established in this case.
II. Kelly and the Legislature
By extending the liability of social hosts to third parties for the
negligent provision of alcohol to adults, the New Jersey Supreme
Court realized it could be criticized for acting legislatively. 38 Indeed,
legislation proposed immediately after the announcement of the Kell
decision would abrogate the court's holding.39 To determine
ance rates, see note 32 supra, the cost of social drinking will be imposed on all homeowners
with policies.
34 "According to the Department of Transportation, 250,000 Americans were killed in
alcohol-related accidents in the past 10 years, one every 20 minutes, and more than 700,000
are injured in such accidents each year." N.Y. Times, Dec. 14, 1983, at A24, col. 1. Public
concern with the problem increased in recent years. See Kraft, The Drive to Stop the Dri'nker
From Driving: Suggested CivilApproaches, 59 N.D.L. REv. 391, 391-92 (1983). Citizens through-
out the country are forming groups to combat drunken driving. Some of these groups include
Truckers Against Drunk Drivers, Students Against Driving Drunk, Physicians Against Drunk
Driving, Mothers Against Drunk Driving, Dealers Against Drunk Driving, Citizens For Safe
Drivers, and Remove Intoxicated Drivers. N.Y. Times, Aug. 9, 1983, at A12, col. 1. Exten-
sion of liability is another step in trying to alleviate the problem of drunken driving. 476 A.2d
at 1222.
35 476 A.2d at 1229. The court states that this decision reflects "the upheaval of prior
norms by a society that has finally recognized that it must change its habits and do whatever
is required, whether it means but a small change or a significant one, in order to stop the
senseless loss inflicted by drunken drivers." Id.
36 Even the court admitted that imposing liability on a social host gives "no assurance
that it will have any significant effect" in deterring drunken driving. Id. at 1226.
37 Indeed, the likelihood that it will deter drunken driving is reflected in the dissent's
argument that the holding will put a "heavy burden [on hosts] to monitor and regulate
guests." Id. at 1230. In noting the possible change in social events where alcohol is served, the
dissent must assume that fewer alcoholic beverages will be served. Thus, if less alcohol is
served, fewer alcohol related accidents will occur.
38 Id. at 1226-29.
39 New Jersey Assembly Resolution 43 (1984) reads as follows:
An Act concerning the Service of Alcoholic Beverages and Supplementing Title 33
of the Revised Statutes. Be it enacted by the Senate and General Assembly of the
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whether the courts or the legislature should decide the issue, two
questions must be answered. Is the imposition of such liability a
proper function of the judiciary? Moreover, even if this is a proper
function of the judiciary, should the courts nevertheless defer to the
legislature because of the nature of the problem? The Kell court
focused on the question of power;40 other courts and critics have fo-
cused on the question of deference to the legislature.4'
In Ke ly, the New Jersey Supreme Court defended the propriety
of its judicial determination on two grounds: 1) determining the
scope of liability in negligence actions traditionally has been a judi-
cial function;42 and 2) the legislature previously acquiesced to judi-
cial expansion of liability to third parties for the negligent provision
of alcohol.43
To support its contention that the judiciary has traditionally de-
termined the scope of liability in negligence actions, the court cited
numerous cases where it "decided many significant issues without
prior legislative study."44 These decisions included the limitation of
a plaintiff's recovery under the Comparative Negligence Act, 45 the
abrogation of the state's sovereign immunity from tort claims,46 the
abrogation of charitable immunity,47 and the abrogation of inter-
State of New Jersey: 1. No person, other than a person licensed according to the
provisions of title 33 of the Revised Statutes to sell alcoholic beverages, who fur-
nishes any alcoholic beverage to a person at or over the age at which a person is
authorized to purchase and consume alcoholic beverages shall be civilly liable to
any person or the estate of any person for personal injuries or property damage
inflicted as a result of intoxication by the consumer of the alcoholic beverages. 2.
This act shall take effect immediately.
40 In other words, the court's inquiry is limited to whether it has the authority in a consti-
tutional sense to "legally" impose liability in this instance. Once this question is answered in
the affirmative, the court does not elaborate on whether it should exercise this authority. 476
A.2d 1226-29; see Bischoff, The Dynamis of Tort Law: Court or Legislature?, 4 VT. L. ReV. 35, 38
(1979).
41 The dissent in Kelly, as well as most of the courts which have left the question for the
legislature, do not address the problem in terms of whether the court has the authority to
impose social host liability. Instead, these courts look to see which body is capable of making
a better decision. See notes 68-77 inja and accompanying text. Thus, the majority and the
dissent are really arguing different issues. Both issues, however, are discussed in this
comment.
42 476 A.2d at 1226.
.43 Id.
44 Id. at 1227-28. These cases were also cited to support the proposition that the legisla-
ture is free to act in these areas as well. For the discussion of this issue, see notes 57-67 in/ra
and accompanying text.
45 Van Horn v. Blanchard Co., 88 N.J. 91, 438 A.2d 552 (1981).
46 Willis v. Department of Conservation and Economic Dev., 55 N.J. 534, 264 A.2d 34
(1970).
47 Dalton v. St. Luke's Catholic Church, 27 N.J. 22, 141 A.2d 273 (1958); Collopy v.
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spousal48 and parent-child 49 immunity in automobile negligence
cases. Each of these holdings determined the scope of a duty in a
negligence action. 50 Few authorities argue that these decisions were
not within the proper function of the judiciary.51 The court con-
cluded that just as it could competently decide those prior issues, it
could properly resolve the issue in Kel. 52
The approaches in other jurisdictions support the Kelly court's
position.53 Similarly, commentators have observed that such deter-
minations are commonly involved in negligence cases.54 Thus, this
type of determination falls within the scope of the judiciary's proper
function. 55
Additionally, the Kelly court felt justified in imposing social host
liability because of the legislature's acquiescence to judicial activism
in this area of tort law.56 Legislative inaction is an important consid-
eration because the power of the courts to decide a question properly
within the judicial function 57 can only be removed by legislative ac-
Newark Eye & Ear Infirmary, 27 N.J. 29, 141 A.2d 276 (1958); Benton v. Y.M.C.A., 27 N.J.
67, 141 A.2d 298 (1958).
48 Immer v. Risko, 56 N.J. 482, 267 A.2d 481 (1970).
49 France v. A.P.A. Transport Corp., 56 N.J. 500, 267 A.2d 490 (1970).
50 See Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 1014, 1030 (1928).
Professor Green characterizes the determination of duty as "the judgment required of a judge
in giving or denying the protection of government to the interest involved." Each of these
cases involves the court's giving or denying the protection of the government to the plaintiff's
interest where the other elements of a cause of action exist.
51 "Proper function" refers to legitimate authority. See, e.g., Bischoff, supra note 40, at 38;
Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases: II, 29 COLUM. L. REv. 255, 279-84 (1929); see also
note 54 infra.
52 476 A.2d at 1228.
53 See, e.g., Rampone v. Wanskuck Bldgs., Inc., 227 A.2d 586 (R.I. 1967) (expanding the
landlord's duty to persons on the premises with the tenant's consent); Cohen v. Kaminetsky,
36 N.J. 276, 176 A.2d 483 (1961) (expanding the duty of a driver to a guest passenger); Dini v.
Naiditch, 20 Ill.2d 406, 170 N.E.2d 881 (1960) (expanding the duty of an occupier of land to
firemen). For an exhaustive list of "overruling decisions," see R. KEETON, VENTURING To
Do JUSTICE 169-79 app. (1969). While Kelly does not overrule a previous decision, the same
reasoning applies whether the decision overrules an earlier one or is instead a case of first
impression. See W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON
THE LAW OF TORTS § 3 (5th ed. 1984).
54 See, e.g., Green, supra note 51, at 279-84; Green, The Submission of Issues in Negligence
Cases, 18 MIAMI L. REV. 30, 36-37 (1963); James, Scope of Duty in Negligence Cases, 47 Nw. U. L.
REv. 778, 814-16 (1953).
55 See Bischoff, supra note 40, at 38. The courts' power to decide such issues is not often
questioned except when a statute is involved. It must be examined, however, because it is on
this basis that the Kelly court defends its choice not to defer to the legislature. See note 40
supra and accompanying text.
56 476 A.2d at 1226-27.
57 See note 40 supra and accompanying text.
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tion.58 As the Kely court indicated, it had been expanding liability
in this area since 1959. 59 The only legislative activity in the area was
an approval of the Linn60 holding.61 Thus, in the development of law
imposing liability for the negligent provision of alcohol, both the
New Jersey legislature and the courts seem to feel that the courts can
competently resolve problems in this area.62
The impact of Kelly may differ in other jurisdictions; some courts
do not have the same relationship with the legislature that the New
Jersey courts have. First, in states which have dram shop acts, the
courts may be precluded from further expansion of liability.63 Sec-
ond, in states with more active legislatures that have not actually
foreclosed judicial action, a court, nevertheless, may wish to avoid
the subsequent abrogation or restriction 64 of its holding. The Kelly
dissent noted that in California and Oregon this situation exists. 65
58 For a good discussion of this issue, see Cory v. Shierloh, 29 Cal. 3d 430, 629 P.2d 8, 174
Cal. Rptr. 500 (1981).
59 476 A.2d at 1226. See notes 19-21 supra and accompanying text.
60 140 NJ. Super. 212, 356 A.2d 15 (1976).
61 476 A.2d at 1226.
62 This is in regard to the histog of liability to third parties for the negligent provision of
alcohol in New Jersey. If the legislature abrogates the holding of Kell, see note 39 supra, this
would obviously signal a change from the past practices in New Jersey.
63 As the court in Kelly points out:
Whether mentioned or not in these opinions, the very existence of a Dram Shop
Act constitutes a substantial argument against expansion of the legislatively-man-
dated liability. Very simply, when the Legislature has spoken so specifically on the
subject and has chosen to make only licensees liable, arguably the Legislature did
not intend to impose the same liability on hosts. See, e.g., Edgar, 375 N.Y.S.2d at
551-52.
476 A.2d at 1227; see also Manning v. Andy, 454 Pa. 237, 310 A.2d 75 (1973).
64 See 476 A.2d at 1231 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting). But see id. at 1227 n.13, where the
majority stated:
The dissent's reference to Oregon statutes as abrogating or restricting a prior judi-
cial determination in favor of the cause of action, post at 1231 is incorrect. The
Oregon statute accepted the judicial determination similar to that made in this case;
its effect. . . was only to prevent further expansions of liability beyond that allowed
by this court today.
It seems that the majority's characterization is more accurate. See note 65 infra.
65 476 A.2d at 1231 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting). In California, the courts entered this area
in Vesley v. Sager, 5 Cal. 3d 153, 486 P.2d 151, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1971). In Vesley the
California Supreme Court abrogated the common law rule and held that the Jurnishing of
alcohol to an intoxicated person may be the proximate cause of injuries inflicted by the intox-
icated person upon a third person as a statute imposed a duty upon licensees. In Bernhard v.
Harrah's Club, 16 Cal. 3d 313, 546 P.2d 719, 128 Cal. Rptr. 215 (1976), the same court noted
that, "although Veslhy relied upon section 25602 of the Business and Professions Code to sup-
port its holding, nevertheless, 'the clear impact of our decision was there was no bar to civil
liability under modern negligence law.'" Cory v. Shierloh, 29 Cal. 3d 430, 434, 629 P.2d 8,
10, 174 Cal. Rptr. 500, 502 (1981) (citation omitted). In Coulter v. Superior Court, 21 Cal.
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Where dram shop acts are in force, the court's power to act is
called into question.66 Nevertheless, even where the legislature is ac-
tive in this area, an anticipated legislative reaction to a court's deci-
sion does not indicate that the holding exceeded the court's proper
function. As Professor Keeton states:
A court, then, should not refrain from correcting outmoded doc-
trine for fear of being chastised by the legislature's enactment of a
statute restoring the old doctrine. Even in the unlikely event that
a statute fully and unqualifiedly restores the overruled doctrine,
its enactment should not be seen as a slap on the court's wrist or
as an incident in a power struggle, but simply as a proper mani-
festation of the political will through the institution designed for
such expressions.6 7
3d 144, 577 P.2d 669, 145 Cal. Rptr. 534 (1978), the California court held that a social host
who provides alcohol to an obviously intoxicated person (including adults), where the risk of
harm to third persons is a reasonably foreseeable result of such provision, may be liable to
third parties who are injured when such harm, in fact occurs.
Shortly after the decision in Coulter, the California legislature amended section 25602 of
the Business and Professions Code to exempt both social hosts and commercial vendors from
civil liability. The new sections state:
(b) No person who sells, furnishes, gives, or causes to be sold, furnished, or given
away, any alcoholic beverage pursuant to subdivision (a) of this section shall be
civilly liable to any injured person or the estate of such person for injuries inflicted
on that person as a result of intoxication by the consumer of such alcoholic
beverage.
(c) The Legislature hereby declares that this section shall be interpreted so that the
holdings in cases such as Vesely v. Sager (5 Cal.3d 153), Bernhard v. Harrah's Club
(16 Cal.3d 313) and Coulter v. Superior Court (- Cal.3d -) be abrogated in favor
of prior judicial interpretation finding the consumption of alcoholic beverages
rather than the serving of alcoholic beverages as the proximate cause of injuries
inflicted upon another by an intoxicated person.
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25602 (West 1978).
In Weiner v. Gamma Phi Chapter of Alpha Tau Omega, 258 Or. 632, 485 P.2d 18
(1971), the Oregon Supreme Court held that the direct involvement of a host in serving alco-
hol to a minor may raise a duty "to refuse to serve alcohol to a guest when it would be
unreasonable under the circumstances to permit him to drink." Id. at 643, 485 P.2d at 23.
The court also stated that the guest's age and the host's knowledge that the guest would
be driving after the party were facts from which the jury might conclude that the host had
acted unreasonably.
In 1979, the Oregon legislature enacted OR. REV. STAT. § 30.955 which states: "No
private host is liable for damages incurred or caused by an intoxicated social guest unless the
private host has served or provided alcoholic beverages to a social guest when such guest was
visibly intoxicated."
66 If the legislature has specifically preempted the field, the court is without power to act
absent constitutional considerations. See W. KEETON, D. DOBBs, R. KEETON, & D. OWEN,
supra note 53, at 19; see also Cory v. Shierloh, 29 Cal. 3d 430, 629 P.2d 8, 174 Cal. Rptr. 500
(1981).
67 R. KEETON, supra note 53, at 19-20; see also Peck, The Role of the Courts and Legislatures in
the Refrm of Tort Law, 48 MINN. L. REV. 265, 285-93 (1963). The Kell court specifically
noted the legislature's power to abrogate its holding. 476 A.2d at 1227.
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The principal arguments against the judicial imposition of social
host liability rely on the strengths of the legislative process and the
weaknesses of the judicial process.68 These arguments do not focus
upon which body has the power to decide the question. 69 Instead,
the arguments first assume that both the legislature and the judiciary
have the power to address the question and then seek to determine
which body is better equipped to decide the question. 70
As the dissent and many of the cases cited in Kelly point out, the
legislature usually can investigate complex problems and balance
conflicting interests better than a court can. 7' Furthermore, the legis-
lature has broader and more flexible remedial powers than a court.
As one author remarked:
Their [the courts'] preeminent shortcoming is looking at one
small part of a total social problem - the aspect brought to them
by the litigants - and arriving at a solution for that piece of the
problem out of the context of the total social system in which the
problem exists. Unless all classes who could be adversely affected
have their advocates in court, there is a good chance that their
interests will not be brought to the court's attention. 72
The courts, it is argued, cannot adequately evaluate the broad impli-
cations of holding social hosts liable to third parties for the negligent
provision of alcohol to adults. 73
These characteristics of the judicial and legislative process sug-
gest that the courts should leave this question to the legislature. Yet,
these characteristics present only part of the total picture. When the
weaknesses of the legislature are also considered, the legislature's the-
oretical superiority in these areas disappears. 74
Although legislatures possess broader investigatory and remedial
powers, they are unlikely to use these powers, especially in an area
such as social host liability.7 5 Various factors which influence the
68 See 476 A.2d at 1231-32 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting) citing Cartwright v. Hyatt Corp.,
460 F. Supp. 80, 82 (D.D.C. 1978); Runge v. Watts, 180 Mont. 91, 94, 589 P.2d 145, 147
(1979); Olsen v. Copeland, 90 Wis.2d 483, 491, 280 N.W.2d 178, 181 (1979); Holmes v. Circo,
196 Neb. 496, 505, 244 N.W.3d 65, 70 (1976); Edgar v. Kajet, 84 Misc. 2d 100, 103, 375
N.Y.S.2d 548, 552 (Sup. Ct. 1975), aJ'd, 55 A.D.2d 597, 389 N.Y.S.2d 631 (1976); Manning v.
Andy, 454 Pa. 237, 239, 310 A.2d 75, 76 (1973).
69 See notes 40-41 supra and accompanying text.
70 Id.
71 See note 68 supra.
72 R. NEELY, How COURTS GOVERN AMERICA 207 (1981).
73 See 476 A.2d at 1230-36 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
74 See R. NEELY, supra note 72, at 46.
75 See Peck, supra note 67, at 296; see also Satter, Changing Roles of Courts and Legislatures, 85
CASE & COMMENT 18, 21 (July-Aug. 1980).
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legislative process contribute to this inactivity. 76 Regardless of the
usefulness of these influences in other areas, they nonetheless reduce
the legislature's effectiveness in addressing certain problems.7 7 Thus,
in practice, the courts are just as capable as the legislature to effec-
tively decide the questions that arise in the context of social host
liability.78
The area of social host liability is a proper area for the exercise
of judicial power, unless the legislature has preempted the field.79
Furthermore, political reality suggests the courts can deal with the
problem as effectively as the legislature can.80 Although implemen-
tation of judicially imposed liability in this area will obviously pose
some problems,8' the legal system has solved similar problems in the
past.82
Where the judiciary properly addresses the duty of a social host,
the courts should also set guidelines for trial courts to resolve the
significant evidentiary issues present in these cases. The Kelly court
failed to provide this guidance.8 3
III. Evidentiary Considerations
With the pronouncement of New Jersey's new social host duty,
the Kelly court established a dual-knowledge standard, requiring that
the plaintiff prove that the host knew both that the guest would drive
after drinking and that his guest was intoxicated when the host
served him the liquor.8 4 The first element presents relatively simple
76 See Peck, supra note 67, at 268-85. Professor Peck discusses five factors which influence
the legislative process: (1) legislative indifference; (2) the motivations, personalities, and work-
ing conditions of legislators; (3) legislative committees and committee hearings; (4) legislative
service agencies; and (5) lobbies and pressure groups.
77 Id. at 296.
78 Even where the courts are unable to provide an optimal remedy, they may push the
legislature into action. In this way, the strengths of these two branches of government may be
combined to solve a problem. See id. at 296-302.
79 See note 66 supra.
80 Courts do have limitations. But, if we assume that courts share the legitimate author-
ity to decide the issue with the legislature, the only reason a court should refrain from decid-
ing the issue is if the legislature is clearly able to make a better decision. Such is not the case
here.
81 See notes 83-135 infia and accompanying text.
82 See R. KEETON, supra note 53, at 18-24 (discussing the fashioning of a remedy through
interaction between courts and legislatures); see also Bischoff, supra note 40, at 84-85 (same).
83 See Drunk Driver 70 A.B.A. J. 31 (Sept. 1984): "The [Kelly] holding is unpopular with
trial judges. . . . 'Judges felt that it went too far but was not specific enough.' "
84 476 A.2d at 1224. The court stressed several times the dual-knowledge aspect of
Kelly's cause of action. See id. at 1224-25, 1228, and 1230. Thus, although the court gives
only a cursory treatment to these knowledge elements, they are prerequisites to imposing
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problems of proof.85 Generally, the fact that the host knew or should
have known that the guest would drive can be easily inferred from
the circumstances of the case.8 6 The second element, however, is
much more problematic. The court did not establish specific guide-
lines to determine the host's knowledge of his guest's intoxication.
Failure to provide such guidelines may have a serious impact on the
application and influence of the Kely decision.8 7 This section focuses
on the evidentiary problems involved in proving that the host knew
his guest was intoxicated and examines the two analyses generally
used: 1) the blood alcohol concentration ("BAC") test, and 2) the
"totality of the evidence" approach. 8
In imposing the new duty, the Kely majority "decide[d] only
that . . . the social host [who] directly serves the guest [liquor] . . .
even after the guest is visibly intoxicated" will incur liability.8 9 Except
liability upon the social host. Other courts require the same dual-knowledge standard in
dealing with tavern owner liability. See, e.g., Chartrand v. Coos Bay Tavern, Inc., 683 P.2d
139 (Or. App. 1984); Hutchins v. Hankins, 63 N.C. App. 1, 303 S.E.2d 584 (1983); Young v.
Caravan Corp., 99 Wash. 2d 655, 663 P.2d 834 (1983); see Appleman, Pleading, Evidence, and
Procedure Under the Dram Shop Act, 1958 U. ILL. L.F. 219 (1958).
85 Modem social hosts cannot expect their guests who arrive by automobile to return
home by another method of transportation. Thus, unless the host establishes that the guest
came with another driver or expressed a believable intent not to drive, any protestations by
the host that he did not know the guest would be driving should be unpersuasive.
86 See, e.g., Campbell v. Carpenter, 279 Or. 237, 566 P.2d 893 (1977) (current use of
automobiles is so common that it is reasonably foreseeable that tavern customers will leave in
automobiles).
87 The trial court will feel the first effect of the decision. In determining whether the
Zaks knew that Gwinnell was intoxicated, this court will have to apply either a subjective or
an objective test. The Supreme Court's standard appears to call for a subjective analysis in
that the Zaks are not liable unless they directly served Gwinnell beyond the point at which he
was "visibly intoxicated," 476 A.2d at 1220, 1221-22; 1227 n.13, and 1228, but the principal
evidence before the court was the objective evidence of Gwinnell's blood alcohol concentra-
tion and the expert's interpretation of this evidence. See 476 A.2d at 1220; see also 476 A.2d at
1233 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
88 These approaches are not explicitly referred to in the cases. Rather, they are ap-
proaches gleaned from a reading of the cases in the areas of dram shop and social host liabil-
ity wherein the plaintiff must establish that the provider of the liquor served the drinker with
knowledge of his intoxicated state.
89 476 A.2d at 1228 (emphasis added); see note 87 supra. The "visibly" or "obviously"
intoxicated standard has been widely applied in civil actions under dram shop acts, alcoholic
beverages control acts, or common law negligence theories. The cases usually, though not
always, involved commercial vendors of alcohol. See, e.g., Chartrand v. Coos Bay Tavern,
Inc., 683 P.2d 139 (Or. App. 1984); Halligan v. Pupo, 678 P.2d 1295 (Wash. App. 1984);
Johnson v. Mobey, 334 N.W.2d 411 (Minn. 1983); Hutchens v. Hankins, 63 N.C. App. 1, 303
S.E.2d 584 (1983); Young v. Caravan Corp., 99 Wash.2d 655, 663 P.2d 834 (1983); Couts v.
Ghion, 281 Pa. Super. 135, 421 A.2d 1184 (1980); Seeley v. Sobczak, 218 N.W.2d 368 (Minn.
1979); Cartwright v. Hyatt Corp., 460 F. Supp. 80 (D.D.C. 1978); Connelly v. Ziegler, 251 Pa.
Super. 521, 380 A.2d 902 (1977). Other courts have required that the vendor have "notice"
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for its initial discussion of the facts,90 where the court devoted a para-
graph to the objective evidence of Gwinnell's BAC, 9 1 the court did
not deal explicitly with the complex evidentiary problems involved
that the consumer is intoxicated. See, e.g., Elsperman v. Plump, 446 N.E.2d 1027 (Ind. App.
1983); McNally v. Addis, 65 Misc. 2d 204, 216, 317 N.Y.S.2d 157, 170 (1970) ("[T]he seller
must have notice of a consumer's near-intoxicated condition, by means of objective outward
appearances. . . .") (emphasis added). The "visibly" or "obviously" intoxicated standard
has been applied in jurisdictions which have held a social host liable for injuries caused by
adult guests. See Coulter v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 3d 144, 577 P.2d 669, 145 Cal. Rptr. 534
(1978) (subsequently abrogated, see note 65 supra); OR. REv. STAT. § 30.955 (1979), supra note
65 (limiting social host liability to cases wherein the host served or provided alcoholic bever-
ages to a social guest when such guest was "visibly intoxicated"). Additionally, this standard
has been applied in cases involving employer liability for serving alcohol to employees who
subsequently cause injury to third parties. See, e.g., Chastain v. Litton Systems, Inc., 694 F.2d
957 (4th Cir. 1983); Otis Eng'g Corp. v. Clark, 668 S.W.2d 307 (Tex. 1983); Dickson v. Ed-
wards, 682 P.2d 971 (Wash. App. 1984).
Although the issue of whether the same standards that apply to employers and tavern
keepers should be imposed on social hosts is, in general, beyond the scope of this comment, for
a discussion of this issue, see Stanner, Liability of Social Host for ojrPremises Negligence of Inebri-
ated Guest, 68 ILL. B.J. 396 (1980); Graham, Liabiliy of the Social Host for Injuries Caused by the
Negligent Acts of Intoxicated Guests, 16 WILLAMETrE L. REv. 561 (1980); Note, supra note 24; see
also note 23 supra.
90 486 A.2d at 1220.
91 As the court stated:
After the accident Gwinnell was subjected to a blood test, which indicated a blood
alcohol concentration of 0.286 percent. Kelly's expert concluded from that reading
that Gwinnell had consumed not two or three scotches [as the defendants claimed]
but the equivalent of thirteen drinks; that while at Zak's home Gwinnell must have
been showing unmistakable signs of intoxication. . . . (emphasis added; footnote omitted).
Id. at 1220. The court noted that under present New Jersey law, "a person who drives with a
blood alcohol concentration of 0.10 percent or more violates" the New Jersey "statute con-
cerning driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor." Id at 1220 n. 1. See note 8
supra. The Kelly court may have been impressed by the fact that Gwinnell's BAC was signifi-
cantly higher than the legal standard for drunken driving. But, the criminal standard is not
direct evidence of visible intoxication in civil actions; moreover, courts have indicated that
the civil and criminal standards are not to be confused. See, e.g., Chartrand v. Coos Bay
Tavern, Inc., 683 P.2d at 141-42, where the court stated:
[The Oregon] standard for civil liability to third parties [is] being "visibly intoxi-
cated," which is not necessarily the same as being "under the influence of intoxicat-
ing liquor." The officer's testimony concerning the blood alcohol standard for being
under the influence of intoxicating liquor was never tied to the principal element of
the alleged negligence in this case, i.e., serving alcohol to a "visibly" intoxicated
person. The testimony is not relevant. A similar difficulty is presented by the in-
struction. The instruction that plaintiff must prove that defendant served its cus-
tomer when she was "visibly intoxicated," followed by the instruction objected to
that "a person whose blood alcohol content is more than .10 percent is under the
influence of intoxicating liquor," confuses two unrelated standards, and the latter is
not the standard for civil liability in this action. Together the instructions are con-
fusing and misleading. It was error to admit the officer's testimony and to give the
instruction (footnotes omitted).
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in the "visibly intoxicated" standard.92 Because the court empha-
sized "the availability of clear objective evidence establishing intoxi-
cation"93 and the expert's analysis of Gwinnell's BAG, 94 the majority
implicitly supported the use of the BAG test in determining whether
the host knew his guest was intoxicated.95 The Kelly court's implicit
reliance on the BAG test raises the critical issue of whether this test
represents the best guideline for the "visibly intoxicated"
requirement.
The BAG test is based upon certain prevalent, although often
disputed, assumptions about the way the body reacts to alcohol.96
92 The majority addresses the question of proof only once. 476 A.2d at 1230. Here, the
court merely states that "[t]he availability of clear objective evidence establishing intoxication
will act to weed out baseless claims and to prevent this cause of action from being used as a
tool for harrassment." This does not provide an answer to the overriding question of what
evidence will establish that the host knew that his guest was intoxicated when he last served
him liquor.
93 See note 92 supra.
94 See note 91 supra.
95 There was other evidence from which the court could have reasoned that the Zaks
knew that Gwinnell was intoxicated (e.g. Mr. Zak's phone call to Mrs. Gwinnell, see note 9
supra and accompanying text), but the court only discussed Gwinnell's BAC; see notes 90-92
supra and accompanying text. The procedural stage of the case, however, may explain the
court's cursory treatment of the facts. The ely majority merely ruled that "[v]iewing the
facts most favorably to plaintiff (as we must, since the complaint was dismissed on a motion
for summary judgement), one could reasonably conclude that the Zaks must have known that
their provision of liquor was causing Gwinnell to become drunk. . . ." 476 A.2d at 1221. In
addition to the phone call, the court was aware that Gwinnell had not eaten since lunch, 190
NJ. Super. 320, 321, 463 A.2d 387, 388, and that he was not served any food by the Zaks.
Brief for Appellant at 4-5, Kelly v. Gwinnell, 476 A.2d 1219 (N.J. 1984). But the Kell court
did not draw any noticeable inference from the phone call and did not even mention the fact
that Gwinnell had not eaten.
96 See Radlow & Hurst, Delayed Blood Alcohol Determinations in Forensic Applications, 2 CRIM.
JUST. J. 281 (1979); Fitzgerald & Hume, The Single Chemical Test for Intoxication: A Challenge to
Admisiility, 66 MAss. L. REv. 23 (1981); Comment, Driving With 0. 10% Blood Alcohol: Can the
State Prove It?, 16 U.S.F.L. REv. 817 (1982).
Most of the available studies deal with BAC evidence in criminal cases. They usually
refer to BAC testing conducted near the levels upon which drunken driving is presumed by
state statutory law. See note 8 supra. There is a notable absence of BAC research in the area
of civil liability which is probably due to widespread acceptance of the evidentiary standards
established in the criminal arena. See, e.g., Behner, Some Practical Aspects of Dram Shop Litiga-
tion, 51 N.Y. ST. B.J. 286, 288 (1979) (experts are assumed competent to render accounts of
"the blood alcohol level of the intoxicated person at various stages of alcohol consumption
throughout the evening and to state what visible effect, if any, these levels of alcohol would
have on the intoxicated persons at specific times throughout the evening"). Since civil liabil-
ity often involves higher BAC levels than does criminal culpability, see Ewing v. Cloverleaf
Bowl, 20 Cal. 3d 389, 572 P.2d 1155, 143 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1978), (suggesting a BAC level of
.20% for civil liability based on "obvious intoxication"), there is a need for research on the
effects of alcohol on behavior at specific BAC levels if courts are going to rely on BAC
evidence.
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The first assumption is that the body absorbs all the alcohol into the
blood very quickly, within as little as fifteen minutes, after the indi-
vidual consumes the drink.97 Second, experts conclude that the indi-
vidual's peak or maximum BAC occurs soon after he stops
drinking.98 Based upon these two assumptions, the expert then cal-
culates the individual's BAC for a precise time prior to the time the
test was performed. 99 For example, the expert will say that an indi-
vidual with a BAC level of 0.14% at the time of the test had a BAC
level of 0.18% when he was involved in an accident two hours earlier.
This calculation, or extrapolation, of past BAC is based on a third
assumption that after alcohol is absorbed into the bloodstream and
the individual attains his peak BAC, the BAC level declines steadily
at a rate fairly uniform for all persons.' 00 Given this uniform rate of
alcohol elimination, it is theoretical possible to calculate the prior
BAC any time after the individual reached his peak BAC and his
BAG began to decline. The fourth assumption, and perhaps the
most significant one in the social host situation, is that every individ-
ual with an extrapolated BAC will exhibit characteristic and unmis-
97 See Fitzgerald & Hume, supra note 96, at 25; see also R. DONIGAN, CHEMICAL TESTS
AND THE LAW 44-50 (1966); AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, Alcohol and the ImpairedDriver
(1968); R. ERWIN, DEFENSE OF DRUNK DRIVING CASES § 15 (3d ed. 1981). This assumption
often arises in drunken driving cases. See, e.g., People v. Schriever, 45 Cal. App. 3d 917, 922,
119 Cal. Rptr. 812, 814 (1975) (court rejected the defendant's contention that his BAC rose
between the time of his driving and the time of the test; court inferred that BAC peak level is
reached within 15 to 20 minutes after consumption).
98 Fitzgerald & Hume, supra note 96, at 24-25:
Police chemists and technicians will often testify, for example, that the alcohol will
be absorbed within about twenty minutes after each drink and that, therefore, the
peak BAC will be reached within twenty minutes after the last drink is taken.
Sometimes that period is more generously stated to be fifteen to thirty minutes, and
we also frequently hear that the maximum period for absorption of all alcohol after
the last drink is forty-five minutes. In any event, it is generaly assumed that the peak
BAC ir reached quickly (footnotes omitted; emphasis added).
99 Id. at 28-3 1; see also Comment, supra note 96, at 821. Thus in Kelly the plaintiff's expert
used Gwinnell's BAC at the time of the test (after the accident) to calculate his BAC at the
time that the Zaks served him liquor. 476 A.2d at 1220-21. The expert could not focus
merely on Gwinnell's BAC at the time of the accident. Rather, the expert had to establish
Gwinnell's BAC at the time that the Zaks served him liquor in order to conclude that at this
level of BAC, Gwinnell must have shown unmistakeable signs of intoxication.
Extrapolation of such BAC levels, thus, involves one step more than the calculation of
BAC at the time of the accident. This step is crucial; if the guest's BAC level rose significantly
during the time after he consumed the liquor but before he was involved in the accident, then
the host may never have observed any signs of the guest's intoxication and would not, under
the Kelly holding, be liable to the plaintiff. See notes 83-86 supra and accompanying text.
100 Fitzgerald & Hume, supra note 96, at 28-31. The rate at which the alcohol is elimi-
nated is called the alcohol elimination or clearance rate. See, Radlow & Hurst, supra note 96,
at 282; Comment, supra note 96, at 820.
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takeable behavior, i.e., visible signs of intoxication. ,
Although many courts approve of testimony based on these as-
sumptions, 10 2 recent studies reveal that the basic assumptions under-
lying the inferred, or calculated, BAG estimates are not correct. 10 3
These studies indicate that serious problems arise from using the
BAC level at the time of the test as the basis for evaluating either
prior BAC levels or prior behavior. 10 4
101 See, e.g., Otis Eng'g Corp. v. Clark, 668 S.W.2d at 308 (medical examiner testified that
given a BAC of 0.268% as determined after an accident the drinker must have "ingested a
substantial quantity of alcohol.. .[such that] one hundredpercent ofpersons with that much alcohol
exhibit signs of intoxication observable to the average person." (emphasis added)).
Thus, in Kelly, the plaintiff's expert testified that given Gwinnell's BAC as determined
one hour and twenty-one minutes after the accident, Brief for Appellant at 5, Kelly v. Gwin-
nell, 476 A.2d 1219 (N.J. 1984), Gwinnell must have been showing "unmistakeable signs and
symptoms" of intoxication at the time the Zaks served him drinks, some two hours and fifteen
minutes earlier. Id.; see also 476 A.2d at 1221-22.
102 See, e.g., Chartrand v. Coos Bay Tavern, Inc., 683 P.2d at 140, where the court ob-
served: "An expert testified that subjects with blood alcohol levels of 0.13 to 0.14 show visible
signs of intoxication. Suffice it to say that there is ample evidence from which the jury could
find that defendant served beer to [the driver] after she was visibly intoxicated." See also
Ewing v. Cloverleaf Bowl, 20 Cal. 3d 389, 143 Cal. Rptr. 13, 572 P.2d 1155 (1978) (court
accepted expert testimony that "casual observer" will detect visible intoxication if a person's
BAC level exceeds .20%).
In Campbell v. Carpenter, 279 Or. 237, 566 P.2d 893 (1977), a professor of toxicology
testified that although a tavern patron with a BAC of .25% would be showing "outward
symptoms of intoxication" afiershe left the tavern, he "would not say" whether she was visibly
intoxicated before she left. Id. at 242, 566 P.2d at 895. Nevertheless, the court held that the
"trial court could have properly found . . . [that] defendant's bartenders had continued to
serve" the patron after she was "visibly" intoxicated. There was testimony that she had had
up to eight beers in a period of two hours and the expert was willing to say that she "would
probaby show 'outward symptoms' of intoxication" because after "even five and one-fourth
beers [she] would build up a blood alcohol level of .24 percent. . . ."(emphasis added). Id.
There was no mention of how long it would take for the BAC to rise to .24 percent. More-
over, there was some evidence that the patron had taken valium, a tranquilizer, as well. As to
the latter, the court said that "[t]he trial court was not required to believe that evidence." Id.
103 NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., U.S. DEPr. OF TRANSP., METHODS
FOR ESTIMATING BLOOD ALCOHOL CONCENTRATION (1980) (available through the National
Technical Information Service, Springfield, Va. 22161, Pub. No. DOT-HS-805-563) [herein-
after cited as ESTIMATING BAC]; Radlow & Hurst, supra note 96; Fitzgerald & Hume, supra
note 96; Radlow & Conway, Consisteny ofAlcohol Absorption in Human Subjects (presented at the
American Psychological Association Convention, 1978). The first three of these studies are
analyzed in the Comment, supra note 96, on BAC and the California drunken driving stat-
utes. The last source is referred to in Radlow & Hurst, supra note 96, at 282, wherein the
authors state that "[t]he highly oversimplified analysis typically employed in courtoom testi-
mony tends to provide misleading information which could materially affect the accuracy of
the inferred BAC estimate. Both constitutional (physical) and situational factors must be
considered."
104 See also Taylor, Blood-Alcohol Presumptions.- Guilty Until Proven Innocent, 53 CAL. ST. BJ.
170, 175 (1978) (The blood alcohol "test can only indicate a suspect's condition at the time of
testing, not at the time of arrest in the field. Considerable biological change can occur in the
interim period.").
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The following specific problems with the BAC test approach re-
veal its unreliability. First, alcohol absorption rates vary not only
from individual to individual, 10 5 but also for a given individual de-
pending on innumerable factors. 10 6 These factors include the indi-
vidual's sex, body type, diet, body weight, speed of drinking,
drinking history, body chemistry, anger, fear, stress, nausea, intesti-
nal condition, stomach wall condition, and the type of alcohol con-
sumed. 10 7 One critical factor is food.1°8 Not only is the amount of
food important but also how much time - if any - elapsed between
eating and drinking and what type of food (carbohydrate, protein, or
fat) was consumed. 10 9 Even the time of day when an individual
drinks noticeably affects blood alcohol absorption.110 All these fac-
tors combine to undermine the BAG test which rests on the assump-
tion that all individuals have a rapid and uniform alcohol absorption
rate.
Second, elimination rates, correlated to absorption rates, vary
from individual to individual, as well as from day to day for an indi-
105 Recent studies indicate that contrary to most expert testimony, different individuals
may have peak BACs anywhere from 15 minutes to two hours or more after the drinkers
consume their last drinks. ESTIMATING BAC, supra note 103, at 3, 41-44, 54-55 and 59-60;
Fitzgerald & Hume, supra note 96, at 28-3 1; see also Radlow & Hurst, supra note 96, at 282-84
where the authors reported:
[I]t is common to understate the time required to reach peak BAG after drinking.
According to most published reports, it takes approximately an hour and a half for
an individual to reach peak BAG after drinking on an empty stomach. Individuals
who eat while drinking take materially longer.
. . . [T]he variability in rate of absorption varies enormously from individual to
individual. Some people take half an hour or less to reach peak BAG after drinking
on an empty stomach, while others take two and a half hours or more under the
same conditions. Failure to take this inter-individual variability into account could
result in substantially inaccurate inferences about the defendant's BAC at the time
of the [driving] . . . . (footnotes omitted).
106 ESTIMATING BAG, supra note 103, at 14, 20, 41-44, 60-61. Two commentators noted:
The same amounts of alcohol if consumed as gin, vodka, whiskey, dessert wine, table
wine, or beer gave peak BAG values [for one and the same individual] that range
from 0.10% to less than 0.05%, and the time needed to reach peak is seen to vary
from about fifteen minutes to an hour and a half.
Fitzgerald & Hume, supra note 96, at 30.
107 Comment, supra note 96, at 824-25; see also ESTIMATING BAG, supra note 103, at 2;
Radlow & Hurst, supra note 96, at 282-83; Fitzgerald & Hume, supra note 96, at 28-31; NA-
TIONAL INST. ON ALCOHOL ABUSE & ALCOHOLISM, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVICES, FACTS ABOUT ALCOHOL & ALCOHOLISM 7-8 (1981) (Pub. No. (ADM) 80-31); see
also note 106 supra; Y. ISRAEL & J. MARDONES, BIOLOGICAL BASIS OF ALCOHOLISM (1971).
108 Id
109 ESTIMATING BAC, supra note 103, at 2 passim.
110 Radlow & Hurst, supra note 96, at 285 (citing Sturtevant, Chronopharmacokinetics of Etha-
nol, Z Review of the Literature and Theoretical Considerations, 3 CHRONONBIOLOGIA 237 (1976)).
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vidual, and cannot be accurately estimated."1 In a recent govern-
ment study," 2 the individuals tested had clearance rates which
varied from 0.40% to 0.000% (no noticeable change) per hour.113
Since experts usually apply a standard elimination rate set between
these values, 114 they will improperly evaluate any individual's BAC
elimination rate that deviates from that standard. Based upon the
guest's extrapolated BAG, the expert will argue that the social host
must have witnessed visible signs of the guest's intoxication. 15 This
testimony will prejudice the host's case because the focus rests on the
individual's BAG at the time of the accident. 116 Since the critical
time in the social host context is prior to the accident, the test's em-
phasis upon the time of the accident undermines the reliability of the
BAG test.
In discussing BAG extrapolation, commentators have offered
two possible solutions to the problems. The first suggestion is to con-
duct multiple tests on the driver after the accident, instead of only
one test. Multiple testing arguably would provide better results than
111 ESTIMATING BAC, supra note 103, at 54-55; Fitzgerald & Hume, supra note 96, at 30-
31.
112 Estimating BAC, supra note 103.
113 Id at 54. None of the tested individuals had the same rates from day to day nor did an
individual have a constant elimination rate on any day. Id at 54-56; see also Comment, supra
note 96, at 826, 837. Compare these findings with what experts typically testify to when
evaluating a tested BAC:
For normal, healthy adults, the average rate of conversion is a decrease of 0.0 15%
per hour. It is often assumed, and commonly testified to by law enforcement of-
ficers, that after absorption is complete, all persons will show a decrease in BAC
equal to 0.015% per hour. That figure is then sometimes used to estimate the BAC
at a prior time by adding 0.015% to the value found in the test for each hour elapsed
between the time of vehicle operation and the time of the sample. A number of
studies have shown that, in fact, the rates for individuals vary greatly: the normal
range is between 0.01% to 0.02% per hour and values ashigh as 0.04% and as low as
0.006% have been observed. The result is that even if we know in a given case that
the vehicle operation and test occurred after the peak BAC, the attempt to state
accurately the earlier BAC would be imprecise without specific knowledge of that
person's elimination rate.
Fitzgerald & Hume, supra note 96, at 31.
114 See note 113 supra.
115 See note 113 supra;, see also text accompanying notes 96-101 supra. Other findings fur-
ther manifest the unreliability of the BAC approach. Some BAC levels were found to rise
immediately after drinking but then to fall for a time before rising even further. See ESTIMAT-
ING BAC, supra note 103, at 60-61. Food appears to be the chief factor in causing these
changes. But elimination rates were not constant even with individuals who had not eaten.
Id. at 54. Moreover, some individuals had multiple peak values which give a ridge-like ap-
pearance to a curve of their blood alcohol absorption and elimination rates. Id None of this
conforms with current expert testimony.
116 Se Fitzgerald & Hume, supra note 96; Radlow & Hurst, supra note 96; Comment, supra
note 96; Taylor, supra note 104.
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the single test method.II7 Although this "multiple testing" approach
may provide a more accurate estimate of the driver's BAC at the
time of the accident and his actual rate of elimination (or increase, if
his BAC is still rising),"1 " this approach would not eliminate the
problems surrounding what the driver's BAC was at the time the host
servedhim liquor. Since an individual may have undergone more than
one peak prior to testing,' 19 establishing a steadily declining BAC at
the time of the accident does not indicate either when the individ-
ual's first peak occurred or what his level was when the host last
served him. Thus, even multiple testing would not eliminate the in-
herent unreliability of the BAC approach in the social host liability
context.
The second proposed solution requires laboratory analysis of the
driver himself to determine his specific absorption and elimination
rates. 20 This approach directly addresses the problems encountered
in the current extrapolation methods. Given an accurate determina-
tion of the driver's personal rates, an expert may calculate more ac-
curately the guest's actual BAC at the time he was drinking.
The application of this approach, however, may create insur-
mountable practical problems. Proponents of this "individual" solu-
tion agree that this approach would require a laboratory setting that
completely duplicates all the physical and psychological conditions
which existed at the time and place the driver was drinking. ' 2 1 Even
assuming that an individual has constant absorption and elimination
rates each day,122 it is unlikely that all of the necessary factors can be
reproduced. 2 3 Moreover, if the driver dies in the accident or is
otherwise unable or unwilling to undergo the analysis, this approach
becomes impossible to execute. Furthermore, considering the current
public "get tough" attitude toward the drinking driver, 24 any
method which furnishes alcohol to these drinkers will probably be
unpopular.
The third and final problem in evaluating expert testimony re-
garding BAC and behavior arises from the assumption that everyone
117 See Fitzgerald & Hume, supra note 96, at 31-35; Radlow & Hurst, supra note 96, at 285.
118 Id.
119 See note 115 supra.
120 Radlow & Hurst, supra note 96, at 285-86; see also Comment, supra note 96, at 826-27.
121 Radlow & Hurst, supra note 96, at 285.
122 This is probably not the case. See ESTIMATING BAC, supra note 103, at 56 n.1 ("Time
of occurrence of peak BAC varied between subjects and between sessions.") (emphasis added).
123 See text accompanying notes 107-10 supra.
124 Kraft, supra note 34, 391-92; see note 34 supra.
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with a certain BAC level will appear visibly intoxicated. 125 Visible
intoxication is the crux of the case against the social host. 126 Courts
disagree about whether BAC alone reliably indicates a person's ap-
pearance at a time prior to testing. 27 These courts apply either the
BAC test approach or the "totality of the evidence approach. '1 28
The main criticism of the assumption that all persons with a
certain BAG will appear intoxicated is that alcohol affects each per-
125 See notes 96-100 supra and accompanying text.
126 See notes 87-89 supra and accompanying text. If Gwinnell did not appear intoxicated,
then, regardless of how high Gwinnell's BAC level might have been, the Zaks cannot be held
liable. Id.
127 Compare Harden v. Seventh Rib, Inc., 247 N.W.2d 42 (Minn. 1976) (evidence of .18%
BAC was not sufficient in and of itself to establish obvious intoxication at the time driver was
served) andJaros v. Warroad Municipal Liquor Store, 227 N.W.2d 376 (Minn. 1975) (evi-
dence of .28% BAC although sufficient to establish a strong prima facie case of intoxication
was insufficient to establish intoxication as a matter of law) and Cartwright v. Hyatt Corp.,
460 F. Supp. 80 (D.D.C. 1978) (evidence of.29% BAC along with post-accident observations
as to driver's intoxicated state was not enough to overcome eyewitness testimony that the
driver did not appear visibly intoxicated when she was served liquor) with Ewing v. Clover-
leaf Bowl, 20 Cal. 3d 389, 143 Cal. Rptr. 13, 572 P.2d 1155 (1978) (court accepted expert's
opinion that even casual observers will observe signs of intoxication in persons with .20%
BAC) andChartrand v. Coos Bay Tavern, Inc., 683 P.2d 139 (Or. App. 1984) (court accepted
expert's opinion that persons with BAC of from. 13 to. 14% would show visible signs of intoxi-
cation) and Otis Eng'g Corp. v. Clark, 668 S.W.3d 307 (Tex. 1983) (court accepted expert's
opinion that 100% of persons with BAC of .268 would exhibit signs of intoxication).
128 See note 88 supra. The phrase "totality of the evidence" is taken from Elsperman v.
Plump, 446 N.E.2d 1027 (Ind. App. 1983). In Espennan, the parents of a child killed in an
accident, in which the mother and child were struck by a car driven by a drunken driver,
brought a wrongful death action against the bar (Moose Lodge) which served the driver
alcoholic beverages and against the driver (Ewers) and bartender (Plump). Ewers admitted
that he was liable and reached a settlement with the plaintiffs. But Moose Lodge and Plump
denied that they had been negligenit and the case proceeded to trial on the issue of their
liability only. After the jury returned a verdict for the parents, the trial court granted judg-
ment on the evidence in favor of the Moose Lodge and Plump. The Indiana Court of Ap-
peals reversed, ruling that the "totality of the evidence" constituted "sufficient evidence of
probative value from which the jury could have inferred that Ewers was intoxicated and that
Plump served him alcoholic beverages knowing of his intoxicated condition . (emphasis ad-
ded). 446 N.E.2d at 1032. What is notable about the case is that Ewershadrefisedto undergo a
BAC test after the accident. Thus the court was forced to determine the issue of whether the
bartender knew that Ewers was intoxicated without BAC evidence. The "totality" was as
follows:
Viewing the totality of the evidence in this case - the amount of alcoholic beverages
consumed, the loud and boisterous conduct, the coughing spell and staggering to the
bathroom, the offer of [a Moose Lodge employee] to drive Ewers home, the admis-
sion of Plump that Ewers was a "little intoxicated", the fact that Plump followed
Ewers out and observed him drive away, and Plump's admonition to [the Moose
Lodge employee] to keep his mouth shut-we believe that there is sufficient evi-
dence. . ..
Id. This "totality" approach does not exclude BAC evidence; rather, BAC, when present, is
one factor to be considered in evaluating whether the drinker was "visibly intoxicated."
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son differently.129 Although almost all individuals will have im-
paired driving skills when their BAC rises above 0.10%, such
individuals still may not appear "visibly intoxicated." 130 Indeed, "it
is possible for a person to appear more intoxicated with a rising blood
level of 0.14% than when his level has reached 0.19% an hour or two
later."13' The crucial determination for the host is whether his guest
appears intoxicated; but if the guest's BAC is steady or declining -
although objectively high - the host may not see signs of intoxica-
tion in his guest's behavior. Moreover, some drinkers, especially al-
coholics and habitual drunkards, do not appear intoxicated because
they have a high tolerance to alcohol. Thus, a "heavy drinker may
still not appear intoxicated even with a blood level of 0.20%,"
whereas "the occasional or moderate drinker most frequently will be
found under the table."' 132 If the host's guest is not found "under the
table," the host will be held liable under the BAC approach, even
though the guest was not "visibly" or "obviously" intoxicated.
Many courts' decisions reflect a dissatisfaction with the BAG ap-
proach. 133 These courts rely on the total evidentiary picture. Al-
129 476 A.2d at 1233 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting) citing Perr, Blood Alcohol Levels and "Dimin-
ished Capaci y," 3 J. LEGAL MED. 28 (April 1975); Comment, Social Host Liabiliyfor Furnishing
Alcohol." A Legal Hangover?, 10 PAC. L.J. 95 (1978).
130 Perr, supra note 129, at 29 (citing AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, Alcohol and the
Impaired Driver (1968)); see also Taylor, supra note 104, at 176-77 where he wrote:
No matter how much society tries to standardize and equalize, human beings will
continue to be unique individuals. Individual tolerance is a crucial factor in accu-
rately determining whether a given person is under the influence of alcohol, yet it is
totally ignored by the blood-alcohol readings. Does anyone seriously contend that
all human beings react the same way to the same intake of alcohol? That everyone
has the same tolerance for alcohol?
131 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW-MEDICINE INSTITUTE, THE LEGAL ISSUES IN ALCOHOL-
ISM AND ALCOHOL USAGE 76 (1965) (referring to the "Mellenby phenomenon"); see E. MEL-
LANBY, ALCOHOL: ITS ABSORPTION INTO AND THE DISSAPPEARANCE FROM THE BLOOD
UNDER DIFFERENT CONDITIONS (1919) (Gr. Brit. Med. Research Council, Special Rep. Ser.,
No. 31, H.M. Stat. Off., London).
132 Perr, supra note 129, at 29, quoting BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW-MEDICINE INSTITUTE,
supra note 131; see also Comment, supra note 129, at 103.
133 See note 127 supra; see also Wilson v. Steinbach, 98 Wash. 2d 434, 439, 656 P.2d 1030,
1033 (1982) ("[A] person's sobriety must be judged by the way she appeared to those around
her, not by what a blood alcohol test may subsequently reveal.") (emphasis added; BAC was
.19%) followed by Dickinson v. Edwards, 682 P.2d 971 (Wash. App. 1984) (BAC was .17%). In
Cartwright v. Hyatt Corp., 460 F. Supp. at 83-84 the court observed:
Outward manifestations of intoxication, other than perhaps breath, obviously vary
from individual to individual. Further, a person's physical reaction to alcohol may
be affected by such conditions as, for example, leaving a heated room for the outside, or
proceeding to drive an automobile. Even [the plaintiff's expert] went no further than to
speculate that [the defendant's] . . . symptoms "probably" existed in the lounge,
and he gave no opinion as to when they became manifest [even though the defend-
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though the courts do not exclude BAC evidence, they do not regard
this evidence as conclusive. Thus, even where the BAC evidence
shows that the drinker probably had a very high BAC level at the
time he imbibed the alcohol, if eyewitnesses testify that the drinker
was not visibly intoxicated, these courts will not overturn a verdict
for the alcohol provider. 3 4 The courts will not upset the verdict even
though they admit that a high BAC is prima facie evidence of
intoxication.135
This "totality" approach provides more flexibility than the BAC
emphasis because it does not rely solely on expert testimony, and
thus, avoids the scientific problems involved in extrapolation of prior
BAC. Nevertheless, the totality approach creates it own set of
problems. For example, if the only other available evidence is the
host's self-serving statement that his guest did not appear intoxi-
cated, 36 no matter which test is applied, evidentiary problems will
arise. The Kelly court aggravated this situation by failing to provide
any guidelines for its jurisdiction to follow in determining the host's
ant had a BAC of.29% as determined two and one-half hours after the accident]. In
the absence of specific evidence, it is simply not reasonable to deduce fom [the defend-
ant's] condition after the accident not merey that she was intoxicated earlier but ,Jrther.that her
intoxication must have been apparent to the host who ordered and the cocktail waitress who served
her the last dr'nk (emphasis added).
134 See, e.g., Seeley v. Sobczak, 281 N.W.2d 368 (Minn. 1970). Seely involved a BAC of
0.269% revealed from an autopsy on the drinker-driver. Douglas Seeley had been drinking at
a tavern over a period of six hours. On his way home, he lost control of his truck, crashed,
and was killed. His wife brought a wrongful death suit under the Minnesota Civil Damages
Act (MINN. STAT. § 340.14. subd. la (1974)). The trial court entered judgment for the de-
fendant-tavern owner after a jury returned a verdict in the defendant's favor. Mrs. Seeley
appealed and asked the Minnesota Supreme Court to hold that a BAC level of .269% was
proof of "obvious intoxication" asa matter oflaw. Seeley's wife and daughter had testified that
Seeley "sounded intoxicated" when he called them while at the tavern. The court refused to
hold that a BAC of .269% established that a person was "obviously intoxicated" as a matter of
law. In so doing they said that, although such a high BAC presents strong prima facie evi-
dence of intoxication, other evidence supported the jury's verdict. Viewing the totality of the
evidence, the jury could have properly relied upon the "five witnesses. . . [who] testified that
it was not apparent that Seely was intoxicated" at the time he was served by the tavern. 281
N.W.2d at 369-71.
135 Id. (citingJaros v. Warroad Municipal Liquor Store, 227 N.W.3d 376 (Minn. 1975)).
136 Not surpisingly, neither of the Zaks admitted to observing any signs of intoxication in
Gwinnell's behavior. 190 N.J. Super. 320, 321,463 A.2d 387, 388. In spite of this, they called
his home to see if he had arrived safely. 476 A.2d at 1220. Perhaps such an apparent conflict
of testimony is best left to thejury. One solution to the evidentiary problem might come from
a practical handling of this problem. The court could allow the jury to hear all of the evi-
dence but instruct them that an extrapolated BAC level is not enough in itself to establish
that the defendants observed the driver while he was "visibly intoxicated." Rather, the jury
can decide whether or not to believe the defendants when they say that although they did not
know that their guest was intoxicated, they still wanted to call to find out whether he arrived
home safely.
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knowledge. If the social host duty established in Kelly is adopted in
other jurisdictions, their courts must still adequately address the evi-
dentiary considerations.
IV. Conclusion
The most important factor in determining a social host's liabil-
ity for injuries caused by an intoxicated guest should be whether lia-
bility will deter drunken driving. The Kely ruling should deter
drunken driving at the source because the host will be less likely to
allow his guest to become intoxicated or to drive if intoxicated.
Thus, having two legally responsible parties should ameliorate the
drunken driving problem.
Moreover, courts are competent to make the determination to
impose liability in this area. Indeed, the Kelly court's imposition of
the social host's duty is comparable to judicial extension of liability
in many other areas of tort law. Unless the legislature has preempted
the field, courts should feel free to decide the issue, and avoid a mis-
placed deference to an inactive legislature which would only leave
the problem unresolved.
If courts do impose this new duty upon the social host, however,
they also should provide guidelines for analyzing the novel eviden-
tiary problems related to the elements of the duty. In particular, the
evidence which establishes that the host served his guest with knowl-
edge of the guest's intoxication must be reliable. A great degree of
unreliability pervades the current blood alcohol concentration extra-
polation methods. Thus, courts should carefully examine an expert's
conclusion that a host witnessed signs of visible intoxication in his
guest's behavior when the conclusion is based upon the results of a
blood alcohol concentration test taken after the accident. Usually
the court should require other evidence confirming that the host
knew his guest was intoxicated. If eyewitness evidence contradicts an
expert's conclusions, then the eyewitness testimony-if credible-
should control.
The Kelly decision reflects society's growing concern with those
who promote drinking and driving. If the social host duty effectively
deters drunken driving, this deterrence will outweigh slight increases
in homeowner's insurance rates. Other courts and legislatures facing
the issue should carefully consider the policy reasons favoring imposi-
tion of the duty and determine whether the costs to society outweigh
the benefits of following New Jersey's lead. As the injuries and
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deaths caused by drunken drivers increase, the Kel court's reasoning
becomes even more compelling.
James T Landenberger
Edward A. Murphy
Robert R. Orellana
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CRIMINAL LAW-C4LFORmA V CARNEY. FASHIONING A "MOTOR
HOME EXCEPTION" TO THE WARRANT RULE
The fourth amendment proscription against unreasonable
searches and seizures' has provoked heated debate among Supreme
Court Justices for almost a century.2  One school of thought ad-
dresses whether police searches or seizures are unreasonable in light
of the circumstances underlying the action. A second, and more re-
cently developed school of thought, views any warrantless search or
seizure as per se unreasonable unless specifically exempted by one of
several judicial doctrines.3 The disagreement centers primarily on
two competing concerns: the desire to foster fair and efficient law
enforcement procedures by flexibly addressing the case-by-case cir-
cumstances surrounding warrantless intrusions and the desire to pro-
tect individual privacy interests by establishing procedural rules
limiting such intrusions.4
In People v. Carney,5 the Supreme Court of California weighed
these two concerns in a case where government agents searched a
private motor home without a warrant. In Camey, the California
court equated the privacy expectations in a motor home with those
associated with a fixed home. 6 As a result, the court held that the
fourth amendment protects the motor home'just as it does a private
1 The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2 See, e.g., Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 641 (1886) (Waite, C.J., Miller, J.,
concurring).
3 See, e.g., Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983), in which Justice Rehnquist lists the
following judicial exceptions to the per se warrant rule: (i) hot pursuit; (ii) exigent circum-
stances; (iii) automobile search; (iv) search of person and surrounding area incident to an
arrest; (v) search at border or "functional equivalent." He also recognizes the following "less
severe" intrusions: (i) stop and frisk; (ii) seizure for questioning; (iii) roadblock. Id. at 735,
736; see also United States v. Mapp, 476 F.2d 67, 76 (2d Cir. 1973) which includes searches
made in "plain view." Justice Rehnquist, however, notes that "plain view" is merely an
extension of a prior legitimate warrantless intrusion. See Brown, 460 U.S. at 739 (citing Coo-
lidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971)).
4 See 1 W. RINGEL, SEARCHES AND SEIZURES, ARRESTS AND CONFESSIONS § 1.1 (1984).
5 34 Cal. 3d 597, 668 P.2d 807, 194 Cal. Rptr. 500 (1983), cert. granted sub nom. California
v. Carney, 104 S. Ct. 1589 (1984).
6 Id. at 607-10, 668 P.2d at 813-14, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 506-07.
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dwelling.7 Applying the per se warrant rule of the United States
Supreme Court,8 the California court rejected the government's reli-
ance on the "automobile exception" to the warrant requirement to
justify the warrantless intrusion.9 In the court's opinion, that excep-
tion rested primarily upon the diminished privacy expectation in
automobiles.10 Since no such diminution of privacy existed in motor
homes, the court found the automobile exception inapplicable.
First, this comment briefly reviews the Supreme Court's devel-
opment of the automobile exception to the fourth amendment war-
rant clause. This comment then examines the California Supreme
Court's decision in Carney and highlights the practical deficiencies
which the Carney decision failed to address. Finally, this comment
suggests an alternative to the Carny approach which is designed to
remedy these deficiencies and establish a rule consistent with the
Supreme Court's fourth amendment jurisprudence.
I. The Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment Analysis
The United States Supreme Court established the "automobile
exception" to the fourth amendment warrant clause almost sixty
years ago in Carroll v. United States.'1  There, federal prohibition
agents unexpectedly encountered a vehicle suspected of being used to
transport contraband. Rather than obtaining a search warrant, and
perhaps losing the opportunity to search, the agents immediately
searched the vehicle at the roadside and discovered concealed li-
quor.12 In light of these circumstances, the Court held that "if the
search and seizure without a warrant are made upon probable cause
• . .that an automobile or other vehicle contains that which by law
7 Id.
8 See note 3 supra and note 90 infra.
9 Carnry, 34 Cal. 3d at 610, 668 P.2d at 814, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 507.
10 Id. at 606, 668 P.2d at 811, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 504.
11 267 U.S. 132 (1925). The type of protection offered by the fourth amendment has
long been recognized at common law. Early cases such as Entick v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep.
807 (1765), stood in opposition to searches conducted pursuant to overbroad warrants. For
an interesting and concise account of these cases and the historical development of the fourth
amendment, see Yackle, The Burger Court and the Fourth Amendment, 26 U. KAN. L. Riv. 335,
337-54 (1978).
12 Under the National Prohibition Act, the defendants were subject to arrest only after
officers discovered the intoxicants. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 144. Carroll arose because of the
unique nature of the Prohibition Act. As Justice Marshall observed in his dissent in United
States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982), the situation is not often encountered today because,
where police have probable cause to believe a car contains contraband, the suspected offense
is now usually felonious and the police, therefore, may arrest the suspects without having
observed the commission of the offense. Id at 836 n.6 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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is subject to seizure and destruction, the search and seizure are
valid."' 3 In striking what it considered a proper balance between
public and private interests, 14 the Court recognized that mobility
creates certain exigencies which make it impracticable to obtain a
warrant.' 5
During the next several decades, however, the Court referred to
Carroll only occasionally.' 6  Generally, warrantless automobile
searches were upheld on the "search incident to arrest" theory.' 7 But
in 1967, Chimed v. California,"'8 limited the "search incident to arrest"
doctrine, and Carrollwas viewed with renewed interest as providing a
justification for automobile searches. 9
13 Carroll, 267 U.S. at 149.
14 In support of its holding, the Court observed that "the Fourth Amendment is to be
construed in the light of what was deemed an unreasonable search and siezure when it was
adopted. ... Id Accordingly, the Court focused on those congressional acts enacted soon
after the adoption of the fourth amendment which permitted warrantless searches of vehicles.
The Court then concluded:
We have made a somewhat extended reference to these statutes to show that
the guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures by the Fourth
Amendment has been construed, practically since the beginning of the Government,
as recognizing a necessary difference between a search of a store, dwelling house or
other structure in respect of which a proper official warrant readily may be ob-
tained, and a search of a ship, motor boat, wagon or automobile, for contraband
goods, where it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quic*1y
moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.
Id. at 153 (emphasis added).
The Court, however, did not distinguish between types of vehicles such as "ships" which
may have residential indicia lacking in smaller "boats". But compare United States v. Cadena,
588 F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1979), where the court determined that the increased privacy interest
in ships which serve as residences "mandates careful scrutiny both of probable cause for the
search and the exigency of the circumstances excusing the failure to secure a warrant." Id. at
102. Similarly, motor homes may have residential indicia otherwise absent in automobiles.
Read broadly then, Carroll could be construed to permit warrantless searches of motor homes.
See note 84 infa. But see notes 26-40 infia and accompanying text.
15 In Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970), the Court elaborated:
Only in exigent circumstances will the judgment of the police as to probable cause
serve as a sufficient authorization for a search. Carroll. . . holds a search warrant
unnecessary where there is probable cause to search an automobile stopped on the
highway; the car is movable, the occupants are alerted, and the car's contents may
never be found again if a warrant must be obtained.
Id. at 51. But see note 26 infia.
16 See, e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg.
Co., 391 U.S. 216 (1968); Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964); Henry v. United
States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949); Scher v. United
States, 305 U.S. 251 (1938); Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694 (1931).
17 See 2 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
§ 7.2, at 511-12 (1978).
18 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
19 See 2 W. LAFAVE, supra note 17, at 512; see general.4y Note, Chimel v. Califormia: A Poten-
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Thus, in cases such as Chambers v. Maroney,20 which involved the
warrantless search of an impounded vehicle, the Court decided, with-
out elaboration, that an immediate roadside search would have been
justified under Carroll.21 Yet, the Court in Chambers entertained a
question not addressed in Carroll. given the preference for a magis-
trate's judgment, should police who have seized a vehicle refrain
from searching it until securing a warrant?22 The Court felt that this
distinction was constitutionally meaningless. Since seizing and hold-
ing the vehicle could be just as intrusive as searching it immediately,
it made no difference which path police chose.23 Yet, in the former
instance, a vehicle, like the one in Chambers, is effectively immobi-
lized. Absent are the exigencies created by mobility which were
seemingly intrinsic to the Carroll decision.24 In their place, however,
the Court recognized the potential threat presented by a vehicle's
inherent mobility.25 In essence, Chambers authorized a warrantless
search even though the actual threat of mobility, which justified the
initial warrantless seizure, no longer existed.26
tial Roadblock to Vehicle Searches, 17 U.C.L.A. L. Rv. 626 (1970). But see New York v. Belton,
453 U.S. 454 (1981), where the Court upheld a search of an automobile's interior under
Chimel.
20 399 U.S. 42 (1970). In Chambers, police stopped the vehicle, arrested the occupants for
armed robbery, and then hauled the vehicle to the station. The Court noted that due to
unfavorable conditions at the roadside, "it was not unreasonable in this case to take the car to
the station house." Id. at 52 n.10. Conditions which prevented a safe search at the scene
were thought to be a precondition to a later search at the station. See note 12 supra. In Texas
v. White, 423 U.S. 67 (1975) (per curiam), however, the Court upheld a later search at the
station where the initial encounter was in midafternoon under apparently safe conditions.
21 399 U.S. at 52.
22 Id.
23 The Court reasoned that the nature of this distinction could vary depending on the
circumstances. Id at 52, 53. For example, the inconvenience caused by making someone wait
until police secured a warrant might be more intrusive than an immediate search. Justice
Harlan disagreed. He felt that seizing a vehicle was, almost always, a lesser intrusion than an
immediate search and, in his view, police should generally delay searching until securing a
warrant. Justice Harlan noted that when the occupants are taken into custody, which is often
the case, immobilization of the vehicle is not all that intrusive. He also recognized that the
occupants were always free to consent to an immediate search. Chambers, 399 U.S. at 63, 64.
Accord Katz, United States v. Ross: Evolving Standards for Warrantless Searches, 74 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 172, 183 n.80 (1983).
24 See general y Note, Misstating the Exigency Rule: The Supreme Court v. The Exigengy Require-
ment in Warrantless Automobile Searches, 28 SYRACUSE L. REV. 981 (1977); see also Note, Warrant-
less Vehicle Searches and the Fourth Amendment: The Burger Court Attacks the Eclusiona,7 Rule, 68
CORNELL L. R-v. 105 (1982).
25 399 U.S. at 52. The Court used the term "inherent mobility" in South Dakota v.
Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367 (1976).
26 The Court has since acknowledged this distinction even in the circumstances of Carroll.
As the Court pointed out in Ross-
Subsequent cases make clear that the decision in Carroll was not based on the fact
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In a later series of automobile search cases, beginning with Card-
well v. Lewis, 27 the Supreme Court developed an additional rationale
to support such warrantless intrusions: the diminished expectation of
privacy in automobiles. In Cardwel, which involved the warrantless
search of the defendant's impounded car,28 the Court stated that "in-
sofar as Fourth Amendent protection extends to a motor vehicle, it is
the right to privacy that is the touchstone of our inquiry. ' 29 In the
Court's opinion, the privacy expectation in automobiles is not as
great as that existing in a dwelling or an office. Since a diminished
expectation of privacy is associated with automobiles, the added pro-
tection provided by a warrant was unnecessary.30 The opinion in
that the only course available to the police was an immediate search. As Justice
Harlan later recognized, although a failure to seize a moving automobile believed to
contain contraband might deprive officers of the illicit goods, once a vehicle itself
has been stopped the exigency does not necessarily justify a warrantless search.
456 U.S. at 807 n.9 (emphasis in original) (citing Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 62-64
(1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)). Recently, the Court has reaffirmed
this viewpoint. In Michigan v. Thomas, 458 U.S. 259 (1982) (per curiam), the Court stated:
It is. . .clear that the justification [for] a warrantless search does not vanish once
the car has been immobilized; nor does it depend upon a reviewing court's assess-
ment of the likelihood in each particular case that the car would have been driven
away, or that its contents would have been tampered with, during the period re-
quired for the police to obtain a warrant.
Id. at 261.
Hence, although actual mobility justifies a warrantless seizure, the Court acknowledges
that it is not necessarily a justification for a warrantless search. In addition to reasoning that
an immediate search could be less intrusive than waiting for a warrant, the Court has also
relied upon justifications other than mobility to support a probable cause warrantless search.
See text accompanying notes 27-40 infa.
27 417 U.S. 583 (1974). Police seized the automobile from a commercial parking lot
where the defendant had parked it on his way to report for questioning at the police station.
28 417 U.S. at 588. The "search" in Cardwelconsisted of a technician taking paint sam-
ples and tire casts from the defendant's impounded car.
29 417 U.S. at 591. This is not to say that the Court abandoned the mobility rationale in
Cardwell it asserted: "An underlying factor in the Carroll-Chambers line of decisions has been
the exigent circumstances that exist in connection with movable vehicles .... " Id. at 590.
In fact, the seizure in Cardwell was justified on this ground even though the Court dealt with
the search in terms of privacy expectations. As stated by the Court: "Here, as in Chambers v.
Marony, the automobile was seized from a public place where access was not meaningfully
restricted. This is, in fact, the ground upon which the Coolidge plurality opinion distinguished
Chambers." Cardwell, 417 U.S. at 593. (citations omitted). The Court went on to say: "The
fact that the car in Chambers was seized after being stopped on a highway, whereas Lewis' car
was seized from a parking lot, has little, if any, legal significance. The same arguments and
considerations of exigency, immobilization on the spot, and posting a guard obtain." Id at
594, 595. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971), involved the seizure of the de-
fendant's car from his private driveway. The warrantless search of the car's interior at the
station was held unconstitutional; the Court determined that a search at the point of seizure
would not have been justified under Carroll. Id at 463, 464.
30 417 U.S. at 590. The Court generalized that all individuals have lesser expectations of
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Cardwell, along with those in Cady v. DombrowskPt and South Dakota v.
Opperman,32 set forth various factors which subsequently have been
recognized as reducing privacy expectations. These factors were fi-
nally addressed collectively in United States v. Chadwick.33
In Chadwick, the Court rejected the government's contention
that a warrantless luggage search paralleled the automobile excep-
tion, noting that the factors which led to diminished privacy in
automobiles simply did not apply to luggage.34 Specifically, the
Court stated: "[an automobile's] functon is transportion and it sel-
dom serves as one's residence or as the repository of personal ef-
fects. . . . It travels public thoroughfares where both its occupants
privacy in their automobiles. In essence, the Court, in assessing society's viewpoint, is reason-
ing that the expectations are not reasonable enough to deserve the protection of a warrant.
This parallels Justice Harlan's approach in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), where
he stated: "My understanding of the rule that has emerged from prior decisions is that there
is a two fold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expection
of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as
'reasonable.'" Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). For a criticism of the reduced privacy
determination in Cardwell see Yackle, supra note 11, at 410-11.
31 413 U.S. 433 (1973); see note 36 infra.
32 428 U.S. 364 (1976). In Opperman, the Court considered the constitutionality of a war-
rantless "inventory" search of a vehicle impounded because of multiple parking violations.
Ultimately, the Court upheld the search even though no probable cause existed. The Court
observed that the impoundment was justified as part of the policemen's "community caretak-
ing function." Id. at 368, 374. Once impounded, the car could be routinely inspected in
accordance with a prescribed procedure. Given the "benign" nature of the intrusion, the
standard police warrantless inventory search was deemed reasonable under the circum-
stances. Id at 370-71, 376.
In both Opperman and Cardwell, the Court discussed the diminished privacy interest ra-
tionale in connection with impounded vehicles, situations in which the mobility rationale was
inapposite. Justice Marshall highlighted the importance of this distinction in Ross, 456 U.S.
798 (1982):
In many cases . .. the police will, prior to searching the car, have cause to
arrest the occupants and bring them to the station for booking. In this situation, the
police can ordinarily seize the automobile and bring it to the station. Because the
vehicle is now in the exclusive control of the authorities, any subsequent search
cannot be justified by the mobility of the car. Rather, an immediate warrantless
search of the vehicle is permitted because of the second major justification for the
automobile exception: the diminished expectation of privacy in an automobile.
Id. at 830 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
33 433 U.S. 1 (1977). In Chadwick, the defendant matched a profile used to alert police of
possible drug dealers and users. Police had made this determination when the defendant
boarded a train in San Diego. After the defendant arrived in a Boston train station, a police
dog detected marijuana in the defendant's footlocker. Although they had probable cause to
arrest the defendant at that time, the police waited until Chadwick and a companion placed
the footlocker in the trunk of Chadwick's car. The police arrested the defendant and seized
the footlocker, taking them both to the Federal Building where police later searched the foot-
locker without securing a warrant.
34 Id at 13.
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and its contents are in plain view." 35 Moreover, automobiles are sub-
ject to government regulations regarding their condition and use;36
they are subject to official inspections and "are often taken into po-
lice custody in the interests of public safety."' 37 Since a greater expec-
tation of privacy is associated with luggage, the Court required that a
warrant be obtained prior to a search. Finally, the Court in Chadwick
observed that, unlike luggage, safely securing automobiles may pres-
ent practical administrative problems. 38
The Court reiterated these practical concerns several years later
in United States v. Ross.3 9 In addition, the Court implied that it had
35 Id. at 12 (quoting Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974) (plurality opinion)).
36 Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 13 (citing Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973)). In
Cady, Wisconsin police took the defendant's wrecked car into custody. In its discussion, the
Court recognized that motor vehicles were subject to extensive regulation which, along with
vehicle mishaps, resulted in frequent police contact. This frequent contact apparantly dimin-
ishes privacy expectations.
37 Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 13 (quoting South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368, 369
(1976)). In the Court's opinion, these regulation and use factors significantly reduced privacy
expectations. Furthermore, language in the Court's recent Ross opinion might be construed
to find another factor diminishing privacy. After addressing the legal history concerning war-
rantless searches of automobiles, the Court in Ross noted: "In light of this established history,
individuals always had been on notice that movable vessels may be stopped and searched on facts
giving rise to probable cause that the vehicle contains contraband, without the protection
afforded by a magistrate's prior evaluation of those facts." 456 U.S. at 806 n.8 (emphasis
added). Should this creation of precedent ultimately reduce privacy expectations? Cases
such as Entick v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (1765), and the actions of the constitutional
Framers, demonstrate that it was not enough that the King just speak the word-no matter
how often he asserted it. See note I 1 supra.
38 Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 13 n.7. Problems of safely securing vehicles after seizure stem in
part from the size of the vehicles and their inherent mobility. In Arkansas v. Sanders, 442
U.S. 753 (1979), a case similar to Chadwick, the Court pointed out that requiring police to
seize and hold vehicles pending issuance of a warrant would impose extreme burdens on
many police departments due to inadequate storage facilities. As a result, automobiles are
treated differently from items such as luggage. Id. at 763 n. 10, 765 n. 14. Yet, this rationale
has been criticized. Consider, for example, the comments of Judge Wilkey in United States v.
Ross, 655 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1981), rev'd, 456 U.S. 798 (1982):
With all due respect, this explanation of the impracticality is itself most im-
practical and theoretical. For surely we can assume that any police department, no
matter how small or rural, can transport and impound vehicles illegally parked or
abandoned in hazardous locations. Tow trucks are available everywhere and it is
common experience that police are prepared to resort to them. A "boot" on one
wheel and one officer to watch over the car would be entirely sufficient to preserve
immobile the auto and its contents.
Id at 1200 (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
Additionally, the Court has pointed out that even if police are faced with greater admin-
istrative difficulties, this is not necessarily dispositive. In Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385
(1978) the Court asserted that greater police efficiency alone cannot justify a sacrifice of
fourth amendment warrant protection. Id. at 393; accord, Ross, 456 U.S. at 842 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
39 456 U.S. 798 (1982); see note 38 supra and note 64 infra.
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not abandoned mobility under Carroll and Chambers as a rationale
supporting the automobile exception. This exception, the Court con-
cluded, expressed the "reasoned application of the more general rule
that if an individual gives the police probable cause to believe a vehi-
cle is transporting contraband, he loses the right to proceed on his
way without official interference. '40
In People v. Carny,4' the Supreme Court of California addressed
whether the "automobile exception" applied to motor homes. In so
doing, it examined privacy interests associated with a quasi-resi-
dence, an issue which the United States Supreme Court has not yet
addressed. The Carney court, however, misconstrues the Supreme
Court's formulation of the automobile exception. While strongly
protecting individual privacy interests, the California court neglects
the practical law enforcement concerns which the Supreme Court
found persuasive in formulating that exception.42
II. The California Rule: People v. Carney
Acting on information provided by a private citizens' group
called WeTIP,43 Robert Williams of the Drug Enforcement Adminis-
tration (DEA) observed Charles Carney approach a Mexican boy in
downtown San Diego.44 Consistent with this information, Williams
observed Carney and the boy go into a motor home matching We-
TIP's description.45 After about seventy-five minutes the boy left the
vehicle and Agent Williams, along with San Diego narcotics officer
James Clem, approached him. The youth confirmed WeTIP's infor-
mation, telling the officers that the "older man" in the motor home
gave him marijuana in exchange for sexual favors.
40 Id. at 807 n.9. The scope of this interference is where the controversy lies.
41 34 Cal. 3d 597, 668 P.2d 807, 194 Cal. Rptr. 500 (1983), cert. grantedsub noma. California
v. Carney, 104 S. Ct. 1589 (1984).
42 See notes 15-38 supra and accompanying text.
43 WeTIP is the acronym for a private organization called "We Turn in Pushers." Car-
n,
, 
at 602, 668 P.2d at 809, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 502. That organization receives anonymous
phone calls regarding information about drug dealers and then relays this information to
nearby law enforcement personnel. WeTIP is known to the DEA, but its informants are not.
SeePeople v. Carney, 117 Cal. App.3d 36-51 n.2, 172 Cal. Rptr. 430,432 n.2 (1981) (hereinaf-
ter only the unofficial reporter will be cited; the official reporter has not published the appel-
late opinion but has alloted space for the decision).
44 Camr,, Cal. 3d at 602, 668 P.2d at 809, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 501-02. Agent Williams
actually intended to observe a suspected drug dealer named Lee Bowman. Subsequent obser-
vations, however, led Williams to believe that Bowman had either been replaced by Carney
or that Bowman and Carney were collaborating. See Came,, 34 Cal. 3d at 602, 603, 668 P.2d
at 808, 809, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 502.
45 34 Cal. 3d at 602, 668 P.2d at 809, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 502.
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The youth then accompanied the agents back to the vehicle and
asked Carney to step outside. When Carney stepped out, Agent
Clem stepped into the vehicle to see whether anyone else was in-
side.46 He observed in plain view a scale, two bags of marijuana, and
other drug paraphernalia.47 The agents arrested Carney and im-
pounded his motor home. Subsequently, narcotics agents conducted
a warrantless inventory search of the vehicle and discovered more
marijuana in the cupboards and refrigerator. 48
The trial court denied Carney's motions to suppress the evidence
gathered from the warrantless searches and to dismiss the case. 49
The California court of appeals affirmed, 50 determining that, under
the circumstances known to the officers at the time of Carney's arrest,
Clem's initial intrusion into the vehicle was justified as a protective
sweep search.51 This legitimate intrusion, according to the court, val-
46 The trial transcript suggests that Agent Clem stood in the motor home doorway and
peered inside the vehicle, while the opinion of the Supreme Court of California suggests a
somewhat greater physical intrusion. Compare Joint Appendix at 15-16, People v. Carney, 34
Cal. 3d 597, 668 P.2d 807, 194 Cal. Rptr. 500 (1983), cert. grantedsub noa. California v. Carney,
104 S.Ct. 1589 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Joint Appendix) with People v. Carney, 34 Cal. 3d
597, 602, 668 P.2d 807, 809, 194 Cal. Rptr. 500, 502 (1983).
The trial record contains the following cross examination of Agent Williams:
Q: Did you then ask [Mr. Carney] to face you?
A: I believe as Mr. Carney stepped out, Agent Clem stepped up on the steps,
looked in, stepped back out and told me what was observed, to the best of my
knowledge.
Q: And the first step is inside the van, is it not?
A: Yes, sir. Well
Q In other words, there is an exterior door on the van, is there not?
A: Yes, it is probably an exterior step that would be outside the van. Whether it
was down or not, I don't know. From what I remember, Agent Clem stepped in
where the door would have locked, stepped on that step and looked in.
Q: So he had his body and feet inside the van at that time when he looked, did he
not?
A: I believe so. You would have to ask agent Clem.
Joint Appendix, supra, at 20-21.
47 Camen,, 34 Cal. 3d at 602, 668 P.2d at 809, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 502.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 603, 668 P.2d at 809, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 502.
50 Canz,, 172 Cal. Rptr. 430 (1981).
51 Id at 434. The court of appeals determined that Agent Clem reasonably inferred from
the Mexican boy's statement that "the older man" inside the vehicle offered him drugs, that
more than one man was inside the motor home. Id. Moreover, it is significant to recall that
Agent Williams initially had been looking for Lee Bowman. See note 44 supra. Thus, the
boy's statement arguably took on even greater significance moments before Agent Clem's
"sweep search." According to the court of appeals, the police intrusion, therefore, was justi-
fied for safety reasons. Came,, 172 Cal. Rptr. 434.
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idated Clem's subsequent "plain view" 52 seizure of the marijuana. 53
The Supreme Court of California reversed,5 4 rejecting both the
government's protective sweep theory and the automobile exception
theory. The court rejected the first theory because, in its view, the
police had no "reasonable belief" that Carney had confederates in-
side the vehicle.55 The court rejected the second theory because it
felt that the automobile exception was inapplicable to the motor
home.56
52 The "plain view" doctrine creates a secondary exception to the fourth amendment
warrant clause. The doctrine rests on the policy that once police have lawfully intruded into
an otherwise constitutionally protected area, they may seize obvious evidence of criminal
activity as long as they do not have prior knowledge of its presence. See, e.g., Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 464-72 (1971). See also note 3 supra.
The Supreme Court has succinctly stated these elements as follows: "First, the police
officer must lawfully make an 'initial intrusion,' .... Second, the officer must discover in-
criminating evidence 'inadvertently,'. . . . Finally, it must be 'immediately apparent' to the
police that the items they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise
subject to seizure." Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 737 (1983) (interpreting Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971)).
53 The court of appeals recognized that some courts accorded people's privacy interest in
motor homes greater protection than automobiles. In particular, the court referred to United
States v. Williams, 630 F.2d 1322, 1326 (9th Cir. 1980), for the general proposition that pri-
vacy expectations are greater in motor homes than ordinary automobiles. Carny, 172 Cal.
Rptr. at 434. The court of appeals observed that the Ninth Circuit's analysis was based on a
general reasonableness inquiry rather than a per se rule. In William, exigencies other than
those associated with the automobile search validated a warrantless intrusion into the motor
home. Using a similar analytical approach, the court of appeals found that the privacy pro-
tections associated with the motor home merely altered judicial inquiry into what constituted
a "reasonable" search under the circumstances. The presence of Carney's motor home in a
downtown San Diego parking lot, within three blocks of that city's commercial center, sug-
gested the strong likelihood of the exigency of mobility under Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 132 (1925). The court held that under the circumstances, this exigency was sufficient to
permit the warrantless search. Camey, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 435.
Finally, the California appellate court found that the "plain view" discovery of the con-
traband and drug paraphernalia gave the police sufficient probable cause to search the motor
home after impoundment. Id at 436. Since the custodial intrusion was no greater than if the
police had made the further search in the parking lot, it too was reasonable under the fourth
amendment. Id.; cf. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51-52 (1970).
54 People v. Carney, 34 Cal. 3d 597, 668 P.2d 807, 194 Cal. Rptr. 500 (1983).
55 Id. at 613, 668 P.2d at 817, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 510. The Supreme Court of California
determined that the State had the burden of showing that the officers "were aware of specific,
articulable facts from which they could reasonably infer other suspects were in the motor
home." Id. at 612, 668 P.2d at 816, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 509. In the court's view, the officers'
reliance on the Mexican boy's implied reference to "another man" inside Carney's motor
home was unpersuasive. "Had the officers been truly concerned for their safety, it would
have been elementary for them to have asked the [boy] ...how many people were inside
[the motor home]." Id.
56 The Supreme Court of California stated ultimately that "a motor home is fully pro-
tected by the Fourth Amendment and is not subject to the 'automobile exception."' Id. at
610, 668 P.2d at 814, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 507. In its view, the exigencies associated with that
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Specifically, the court reasoned that the exception rested on two
bases: vehicular mobility and a diminished expectation of privacy.57
Although the Supreme Court has relied upon both rationales, the
Carney court rejected the mobility rationale by reasoning that the ex-
ception's "prime" justification rested upon the "diminished expecta-
tion of privacy. . . surround[ing] the automobile. ' 58 The California
court next concluded that the diminution of privacy in automobiles
flowed from that vehicle's primary use as transportation. Since mo-
tor homes commonly serve as temporary residences, and are thus
more like "homes" than "motor vehicles," no primary transportation
function exists to diminish the occupants' privacy expectations. In
the court's view, such occupants are protected at least to the same
extent as travelers temporarily renting motel rooms. 59 Finally, un-
like a car, a motor home's interior rarely is exposed to the public's
plain view. Thus, in Carney, no diminution of privacy existed suffi-
cient to apply the automobile exception to the motor home.
The Camey court redefined the automobile exception as resting
primarily on a diminished privacy expectation in automobiles.60
And, by equating motor homes with fixed private residences for
fourth amendment purposes,6 1 the Carney court found the automobile
exception were insufficient to overcome the strong presumption of privacy in motor homes-a
presumption which did not exist in automobiles. Although other exigencies might arise to
permit warrantless searches, those associated with the automobile exception are inapposite in
cases involving motor homes. Id. n.8.
57 Id. at 605-06, 668 P.2d at 811, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 504.
58 Id
59 The California Supreme Court noted expressly that "[miotor homes are generally
designed and used as residences; their essential purpose is to provide the occupant with living
quarters .... Id at 606, 668 P.2d at 812, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 505. The motor home creates a
setting "that could accommodate most private activities normally conducted in a fixed
home." Id This configuration, combined with the vehicle's use for personal purposes, con-
vinced the California Supreme Court to treat motor homes as "structures" worthy of greater
fourth amendment protection.
In arriving at its conclusion, the court curiously labeled the motor home a "structure"
under the California Code definition which states explicitly that a mobilehome is "a structure
transportable in one or more sections ... to be used with or without a foundation system."
CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 18008 (West 1984) (emphasis added). But that section
also states that a mobilehome "does not include a recreational vehicle." Yet, the Code classi-
fies a single chassis, self-propelled motor home as a recreational vehicle with residential indicia.
See id. at § 18010. In defining the "motor home," then, the California Code leaves out any
"structure" terminology. Thus, as the California Supreme Court employed the state code in
Camey, the court's reliance is misplaced.
60 See notes 33-38 supra and accompanying text.
61 According to the court in Came,, "in the case of a motor home as with a fixed house
the issue is whether the occupant manifests an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy
in the interior." 34 Cal. 3d at 608, 668 P.2d at 813, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 506. Thus, insofar as
Carney's motor home "would have alerted a reasonable person to believe it was likely to be
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exception inapplicable to motor homes. 62 Although Camey follows
the Supreme Court's recent trend of formulating "bright line" rules
for police officials in fourth amendment cases,63 by redefining the au-
tomobile exception the Carney court apparently ignores the Supreme
serving as at least a temporary residence, it was entitled to the protections traditionally given
to a home." Id. at 609, 668 P.2d at 814, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 507. Moreover, in the court's view,
even where the occupant's residential use of the motor home is not apparent, the motor
home's furnishings or "other residential accoutrements" are sufficient to indicate residential
status for fourth amendment purposes. Id. at 609 n.7, 668 P.2d at 814 n.7, 194 Cal. Rptr. at
507 n.7.
62 Carne, 34 Cal. 3d at 608, 668 P.2d at 813, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 506 (relying on United
States v. Williams, 630 F.2d 1322, 1326 (9th Cir. 1980)).
63 Perhaps Justice Blackmun has been the most vociferous Supreme Court Justice to
stress the necessity of formulating clear law enforcement guidelines in fourth amendment
cases. In Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979), Justice Blackmun suggested that, rather
than protecting luggage as a special container sometimes found in automobiles, "it would be
better to adopt a clear-cut rule to the effect that a warrant should not be required to seize and
search any personal property found in an automobile that may in turn be seized and searched
without a warrant pursuant to Carroll and Chambers." Id. at 772 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); cf.
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 21-22 & n.3 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). In Justice
Blackmun's view, Carroll permits all containers within an automobile to be searched for con-
traband without a warrant. Sanders, 442 U.S. at 769 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Justice Powell has also stressed the need for "bright line" rules in this area of fourth
amendment cases. In Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420 (1981) (plurality opinion), he
stressed the need to balance "marginal" privacy interests in automobiles with the need to
protect both police officers and destructible evidence. Id. at 430-31 (Powell, J., concurring).
Recently, the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982)
established the most dramatic bright line rule to date in these fourth amendment cases.
Under Ross, where police have probable cause to believe generally that a motor vehicle con-
tains contraband, any container which is capable of concealing that contraband may be
searched pursuant to the Carroll doctrine. Id at 820-24. The Court finally established a work-
able "bright line" rule to provide both courts and constables "specific guidance" in automo-
bile search cases. See id. at 825 (Blackmun, J., concurring); id. at 826 (Powell, J., concurring).
In the opinion of one commentator, the appropriate judicial approach to fourth amend-
ment cases should follow a simple "bright line" approach applying the warrant requirement
exclusively. This would eliminate the "incomprehensible categories" of privacy expectations
created by the Court in its fourth amendment cases replacing them with a standard warrant
rule, the exceptions to which would be established through a "common sense analysis of exi-
gent circumstances." See Bloom, Warrant Requirement-The Burger Court Approach, 53 U. COLO.
L. REV. 691, 740-43 (1982). Professor Bloom suggests that "[i]t makes more sense to review
the facts of an individual case to determine whether or not it was practical to secure a warrant
...than to review the abstract distinctions necessitated by the Court's attempt to apply a
diminished expectation of privacy rationale." Id. at 742. The practical consequence of
adopting this view would be for the Court to reject the unnecessary rules fostered by its
Chambers decision and return instead to the standard Carroll mobility analysis, predicated on
exigent circumstances.
The Supreme Court of California in Carny apparently has opted for an approach similar
to that suggested by Professor Bloom. Seee.g., 34 Cal. 3d at 610 & n.8, 668 P.2d at 814 & n.8,
194 Cal. Rptr. at 507 & n.8. In Carne, the court eschewed the abstract privacy analysis
regarding motor homes and adopted a "bright line" warrant requirement to protect all motor
home occupants.
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Court's recent discussion in Ross, which emphasized that practical
considerations of mobility are still important in analyzing warrant-
less search cases.64 But Carney should not be read as totally ignoring
"mobility." Rather, in light of Ross, the decision should be read to
mean that mobility permits police to seize but not search motor
homes.
In Ross, the Supreme Court did more than reaffirm its prior reli-
ance on actual mobility to justify the automobile exception. In a
footnote, the Court distinguished warrantless seizures from warrant-
less searches. 65 The Court admitted that its decision in Carroll was
not based solely on the necessity for an immediate search. 66 Rather,
the Court acknowledged that Carroll was justified for two reasons.
First, a warrantless seizure was necessary to curtail the exigencies pres-
ent there. Second, the search was permitted since, as the Court ex-
plained in Chambers, no meaningful distinction in the level of
intrusiveness exists between warrantless seizures and warrantless
searches of automobiles. 67
64 The Supreme Court of California stated that "courts have recognized that mobility is
no longer the prime justification for the automobile exception; rather, 'the answer lies in the
diminished expectation of privacy which surrounds the automobile.'" 34 Cal. 3d at 605, 668
P.2d at 811, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 504 (quoting United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12 (1977)).
In a footnote, the California Supreme Court noted that its reasoning was not undermined by
the Supreme Court's decision in Ross. In its view, Ross dealt only with the scope of the auto-
mobile exception once that exception applied, not whether it applied. Therefore, the Califor-
nia court found that the only part of Ross relevant to its inquiry in Carney was that which
reaffirmed the importance of privacy expectations. The court in Carrey, however, seemingly
ignored the fact that the Ross opinion emphasized the importance of mobility and its refer-
ence to the practical problems presented after seizure. See Ross, 456 U.S. at 805, 806. See also
id. at 807 n.9, 812 n.16, 813 n.18, 816 n.21,820, 821 n.28; id. at 830 n.2, 832, 838 (MarshallJ.,
dissenting). Contrary to the Carne court's understanding of Ross, then, the Supreme Court's
opinion in Ross reaffirms the need to address practical law enforcement problems, as well as
individual privacy expectations, in balancing fourth amendment interests.
65 456 U.S. at 807 n.9. The fourth amendment addresses both warrantless searches and
warrantless seizures. In cases involving motor vehicle stops, the police must stop and "seize"
the vehicle before they "search" it. In Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970), the Court
recognized that police could prevent the removal of evidence transported in cars by seizing
the car temporarily in order to secure a warrant. Id. at 51-52. And in United States v. Ross,
456 U.S. 798 (1982), the Court observed that a seizure was really sufficient to curtail the
exigencies presented in Carroll. id. at 807 n.9. Arguably, only the warrantless seizure should
be permitted under Carroll and the search be allowed only by consent of a vehicle's occupants
or where circumstances make it impracticable to immobilize the car in order to obtain a
warrant. See Chambers, 399 U.S. at 64 & n.9 (Harlan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part).
66 See Ross, 456 U.S. at 807 n.9.
67 Id. (citing Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52 (1970)). In Ross, the Supreme Court
made clear that a warrantless "seizure" in Carroll would have been sufficient to curtail the
exigencies caused by vehicular mobility. See note 26 supra. Analytically, a warrantless
"search" in Carroll was unnecessary. Ross, 456 U.S. at 807 n.9. The Court was able to justify
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In roadway stops involving motor homes, however, a different
approach is required. Motor home occupants do not expose them-
selves freely to the public view.68 Moreover, as the Ninth Circuit
noted in United States v. Williams,69 the residential indicia attaching to
motor homes suggests that those occupants have a "significantly
greater" expectation of privacy than in a car. In that court's view,
although actual mobility, under some circumstances, may still be a
factor sufficient to overcome an occupant's privacy interests in a mo-
tor home, 70 where that vehicle is rendered immobile because its occu-
pants are under arrest, no actual emergency exists permitting a
warrantless search. 7' This analysis suggests that the Ninth Circuit in
Williams rejected the Supreme Court's Chambers rationale regarding
impoundment searches, 72 for once the threat of actual mobility
ceases, the fourth amendment prohibits custodial searches of motor
homes.
Similar to the approach in Ross, Carne seems to draw a distinc-
tion between warrantless seizures and warrantless searches. 73 And,
the Carroll "search," however, under its rationale in Chambers. There, the Court refused to
distinguish between warrantless searches and warrantless seizures where automobiles were
involved. The diminished privacy expectations surrounding automobiles were insufficient to
support a different result.
When Camre erected a privacy distinction between automobiles and motor homes, how-
ever, the Chambers justification fell. Thus, the only legitimate warrantless intrusions into mo-
tor homes seemingly would be the warrantless "seizure" discussed in Ross. Under this
analysis, the Camqy decision accommodated the Carroll scenario insofar as it allowed agents
Williams and Clem to seize Carney's motor home without a warrant.
68 See, e.g., United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1977); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417
U.S. 583, 590-91 (1974).
69 630 F.2d 1322 (9th Cir. 1980).
70 The Ninth Circuit in Williams impliedly acknowledged the legitimacy of the govern-
ment's argument that the motor home's inherent mobility placed that vehicle within the
scope of the automobile exception. Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit rejected this argument as
employed in that case, however, because the facts in William suggested that "there was no
chance that the motor home would disappear in the short amount of time it would have
taken the agents to obtain a warrant." Id. at 1326.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 The Ninth Circuit in Williams distinguished between automobiles and motor homes.
"Whatever expectations of privacy those travelling in an ordinary car have, those travelling
in a motor home have expectations that are significantly greater." Id. In light of the residen-
tial indicia in motor homes, the Ninth Circuit found the differences between automobiles and
motor homes too great to let the automobile exception support the warrantless police search
once the vehicle was immobilized. The meaning of the Ninth Circuit's language at this point
in its opinion is somewhat unclear. The court suggests that privacy interests in motor homes
are "significantly greater" than those in automobiles even when actual mobility attaches.
The Carngy court took this language to mean that personal privacy interests in motor homes
outweighed any warrantless search justifications created by actual mobility. But the Ninth
Circuit's language in Willidms could be read to the contrary. Indeed, Williams seems to view
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like the Ninth Circuit in Williams, Carney impliedly rejected the
Chambers rationale that a warrantless search could be a lesser intru-
sion than a warrantless impoundment. 74 Because of the greater ex-
pectation of privacy associated with a motor home, an immediate
warrantless search is decidedly more intrusive than holding the vehi-
cle until a warrant is obtained. To decide otherwise would render
the Supreme Court's emphasis on privacy expectations meaningless.
Thus, the Carney court properly rejected the Supreme Court's "lesser
intrusion" rationale. 75 Viewed in this manner, Carney does not reject
warrantless seizures under Carroll.76 Rather, Carney holds only that
circumstances justifying legitimate warrantless seziures will not al-
ways justify immediate searches in cases involving motor homes.
But while Carney may be reconciled with part of the Supreme
Court's recent analysis in Ross, 77 it still ignores the practical law en-
forcement problems uniquely associated with motor homes .7  For ex-
ample, in United States v. W4za 79 the Ninth Circuit recognized that:
While a motor home may afford its occupants a higher ex-
pectation of privacy than does an ordinary passenger automobile,
it also raises the possibility of certain exigencies which are not
present in the case of the ordinary automobile stop. A motor
home may shield from the view of officers unknown occupants
who could either present a threat to the officers' safety or destroy
or secrete contraband while the driver is being interrogated. 80
In Wzga, the Ninth Circuit went on to suggest that in some cir-
both this intrinsically greater privacy interest and the actual use (i.e., the absence of actual
mobility) as elements critical to its decision not to apply the automobile exception to motor
homes. But see United States v. Wiga, 662 F.2d 1325, 1329 (9th Cir. 1981) (interpreting Wil-
liams to hold categorically that the automobile exception is inapplicable to the motor home).
74 This reasoning assumes, of course, that privacy expectations in motor homes are not
sufficiently diminished by government regulation and use in public thoroughfares so as to
preclude protections against warrantless intrusions. This assumption follows directly from the
Court's opinion in Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979). There, the Court stated: "An
individual operating or traveling in an automobile does not lose all reasonable expectations of
privacy simply because the automobile and its use are subject to government regulation." Id.
at 662. Since the Court in Prouse stated that regulation alone could not justify a warrantless
seizure, this Comment presumes that neither should such regulations justify the "more intru-
sive" warrantless search.
75 See, e.g., Chambers, 399 U.S. 42 at 51-52.
76 See notes 64, 67 supra.
77 Carney holds that warrantless seizures are permitted in cases involving motor homes.
This is consistent with the Supreme Court's analysis of Carrollin the Ross case. Set notes 64, 67
supra.
78 See note 64 supra.
79 662 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir. 1981).
80 Id at 1329.
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cumstances exigencies associated with fixed structures might also at-
tach to motor homes.8 ' Moreover, the motor home's inherent
mobility may provide unseen occupants with an avenue of escape.8 2
Taken together, these examples evidence dangers to police safety and
restrictions on effective law enforcement practices in motor home
cases.
8 3
III. Recommendations
In order to deal with these and other exigencies which may arise
when police stop a motor home, the cases present several avenues for
analysis. At one extreme, courts might apply warrant standards ac-
cording to a vehicle's use just before the search. At the other ex-
treme, courts might apply the automobile exception to any vehicle,
regardless of its character or actual use. Also, courts might balance
actual vehicle use with the presumed privacy interests in motor
homes.
The Ross opinion seems to endorse the first approach, focusing
on the vehicle's use which is apparent to police at the time of the
stop.8 4 Thus, where a motor home is used for transportation pur-
81 Id
82 This "inherent exigency" rationale prompted the California court of appeals in Carnq
to note that "the [motor home] possibly contained other suspects and, unless the fact of their
absence was immediately established, the safety of the officers could be endangered, the vehi-
cle driven away and the evidence lost or destroyed." Carney, 172 Cal. Rptr. 430, 434 (1981).
Moreover, the possibility of threats from a party within the motor home but unknown to
the police officers has also prompted other courts to recognize the need for flexible judicial
analysis in protective sweep search cases. See, e.g., State v. Francoeur, 387 So. 2d 1063 (Fla.
App. 1980) (where the police searched a vehicle referred to as a "mobile home," "camper
home," and "van," they were justified in conducting a warrantless search for other occupants
after discovering weapons and narcotics on the driver); State v. Mower, 407 A.2d 729 (Me.
1979) (where the court upheld a protective sweep search when a lone police officer stopped a
converted bus/camper suspected of being used in a theft).
83 Permitting law enforcement officers to conduct a warrantless intrusion sufficient to
protect their safety or destructible evidence is not new. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
And, although the Ninth Circuit in Wiga refused to apply the automobile exception to motor
homes because of its prior decision in Williams, see note 73 supra, it found that several circuits
upheld warrantless "protective sweep searches" where police had some reasonable suspicion
that unforseen agents were within a premises. Wiga, 662 F.2d at 1330-3 1. For a discussion of
differing standards of "cause to search" applied throughout the circuits, see Note, Criminal
Law in the Ninth Circuit: Recent Developments, 16 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 707, 784-85 nn.607, 610
(1983).
84 According to the Supreme Court in Ross, "if an individual gives the police probable
cause to believe a vehicle is transporting contraband, he loses the right to proceed on his way
without official interference." Ross, 456 U.S. at 807 n.9 (emphasis added). Thus, assuming a
motor home is classified as a "vehicle," Ross could endorse the exception's application to
motor homes where motor homes were used to "transport" contraband. Cf United States v.
Holland, 740 F.2d 878 (1 th Cir. 1984); see also note 14 supra.
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poses, the automobile exception under Carroll would apply.8 5 The
problem with this approach, however, is that police have little gui-
dance in determining "apparent" use. Rarely will the clear Carroll-
Chambers scenarios present themselves. More likely, a motor home's
"use" will combine both residential and transportation purposes. 86
Then, the question arises how police officers, "engaged in the often
competitive enterprise of ferretting out crime,"87 are to balance their
own law enforcement needs against the privacy expectations of
individuals.
To avoid this characterization problem, a second approach may
85 See United States v. Holland, 740 F.2d 878 (1 lth Cir. 1984), where the court refused to
follow the view established in Carne. Instead of announcing categorically any rule placing
mobile homes within or without the automobile exception, the court held that a vehicle's
"use," rather than its configuration, controlled the exception's application. ld. at 880.
In Holland, the defendants rented two Winnebago motor homes specifically to transport a
large cache of marijuana. Since the defendants used the motor homes as they might use
trucks, the "residential appurtenances" which the Camfy court relied on became mere inci-
dentals to the overall use. The Holland court thus rejected the Carney holding which barred
the automobile exception from cases involving motor homes. The Holland court found, in-
stead, that the applicable fourth amendment standard of reasonableness was that attaching to
ordinary trucks.
86 The following hypothetical situation illustrates this problem. Dan is driving his motor
home coast-to-coast along an interstate highway. His wife, Lisa, sleeps periodically on the
bed of their motor home. Unknown to Lisa, Dan has agreed with a friend to transport con-
trolled substances inside the bed's matress. During the trip, Lisa and Dan stop periodically to
rest and cook within their motor home. Because the matress is "lumpy," Dan and Lisa decide
to spend several nights in motels along the way. If police stop Dan and Lisa several days later
at a rest stop, how should they decide whether transportational or residential uses attach?
Since Dan and Lisa are traveling coast-to-coast, they certainly are using their vehicle for
transportation. But since they are also using their vehicle as a place in which to stop, cook,
and rest, they are using it equally as a residence. Moreover, at the beginning of the trip they
slept overnight in the motor home. Assuming the arresting officers are aware of all these facts
through a special law enforcement information "network," should they consider this detail?
On the other hand, does stopping at the motels strip away the residential protection from the
motor home because Dan and Lisa's "residential intent" was somehow incomplete? If Dan
and Lisa fall asleep together at a rest stop and police arrive, is the motor home a "residence"
then? Does it lose any residential character if Dan awakens before Lisa and quietly resumes
their journey?
87 The classic statement of the policy underlying the warrant requirement of the fourth
amendment is that of Justice Jackson in Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948):
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous
officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences
which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that
those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being
judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out
crime. Any assumption that evidence sufficient to support a magistrate's disinter-
ested determination to issue a search warrant will justify the officers in making a
search without a warrant would reduce the Amendment to a nullity and leave the
people's homes secure only in the discretion of police officers.
Id at 13-14 (footnotes omitted).
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be adopted, applying the automobile exception regardless of the ve-
hicle's actual use or configuration. But while Carney would protect
personal privacy at a cost to efficient law enforcement, this second
approach would promote an entirely opposite result. It would treat
the motor home just like an automobile under the Carroll-Chambers
cases, eschewing any separate privacy analysis. Thus, any privacy
expectation arising from the residential use of motor homes would be
left "secure only in the discretion of police officers." 88
Both of these approaches are unsatisfactory in a society which
prides itself on protecting liberty interests.8 9 The Supreme Court has
announced repeatedly that warrantless searches are per se unreasona-
ble unless they fall within certain narrow and jealously guarded ex-
ceptions.90 Expanding the automobile exception this radically would
give the Court's pronouncements a hollow ring.
Yet, as Ross illustrates, courts should not foresake practical law
enforcement concerns. In light of these concerns, courts might adopt
a third approach, permitting police to conduct a limited automatic
sweep search where they have probable cause to believe a motor
home contains contraband or other destructible evidence, or where
they otherwise act pursuant to a legitimate highway arrest.91 This
approach would accommodate the Carroll-Chambers scenarios without
88 Id. at 14.
89 In Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), the Supreme Court acknowledged that
the principles behind the fourth amendment "affect the very essence of constitutional liberty
and security." Id at 630 (commenting on Lord Camden's judgment in Entick v. Carrington,
95 Eng. Rep. 807 (1765)). "It is not the breaking of [a man's] doors, and the rummaging of
his drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offense; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible
right of personal security, personal liberty and private property. . . ." Id.
90 A recent statement regarding this per se rule was announced in Ross. There, the Court
stated:
The Fourth Amendment proscribes all unreasonable searches and seizures, and it is
a cardinal principle that "searches conducted outside the judicial process, without
prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment-subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated ex-
ceptions. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
Ross, 456 U.S. at 825 (quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978)); see also note 3
.pra.
91 One commentator recently has reviewed the protective sweep doctrine. Ste Joseph,
The Protective Sweep Doctrine: Protecting Arresting Offters from Attack by Persons Other tian Ar'estees,
33 CATH. U.L. REv. 95 (1983). In Professor Joseph's view, the courts should not address
whether police have "reasonable cause" or "probable cause" to believe a suspect is within a
premises before they search. Id. at 129. Rather, he proposes a narrowly-drawn per se rule
allowing protective sweep searches pursuant to valid arrests. Id. at 140-43.
Professor Joseph would dispense with the need for prior probable cause and permit an
automatic sweep search whenever a suspect is arrested in a motor home, apartment, or other
premises. The scope of such searches, however, would be confined to briefly entering a room
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totally foresaking increased personal privacy interests in motor
homes. it would also modify the Carney holding to accommodate the
minimum practical needs of law enforcement officials.
This sweep search should be permitted, however, only to fore-
close dangers associated with motor homes. For example, since a mo-
tor home provides opportunities for persons to hide from police in a
manner unlike an automobile, there always exists a threat to police
safety. The sweep search, then, would be limited to those reasonable
actions necessary to protect police officers and secure the vehicle. 92
Thus, in the case of a motor home, a warrantless impoundment
search would be foreclosed as a "greater intrusion" than in the case
of an automobile. 93 Once the police secure the motor home through
and scanning for "other persons who could pose a threat to the officers during the course of the
arrest." Id. at 141 (emphasis in original).
Professor Joseph's analysis is confined to dwellings and other fixed structures. Moreover,
he would not advocate intrusions into closets-even "walk in" closets-absent "reasonable
suspicion" to believe a dangerous party is within. Id. at 144. Nor would he advocate such
intrusions when the arrest occurs outside the premises. Such intrusions are, in his view, only
justified where "probable cause" and exigent circumstances validate the action. Id. at 145.
The view advanced in this Comment rejects Professor Joseph's limitations in the case of
motor homes. As a practical matter, people are not arrested inside their motor homes. They
are arrested outside their vehicles. Nonetheless, the risks to officer safety in the context of
valid highway stops are indistinguishable from those in the context of valid arrests inside a
fixed home.
92 See Chambers, 399 U.S. at 61-64 (Harlan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
93 This result is consistent with this Comment's interpretation of the Camey decision. See
notes 74-76 supra and accompanying text. In Professor LaFave's opinion, courts should avoid
flexible fourth amendment analysis as much as possible. In his view, the courts can only
uphold the policies behind the fourth amendment by "articulating reasonable and under-
standable limits upon police authority .... " See LaFave, The Fourth Amendment in an Imperfect
World On Drawing "Br'ght Lines" and "Good Faith", 43 U. PITT. L. REv. 307, 361 (1982). In
this fashion, courts must adopt and apply carefully conceived "bright lines" whenever feasi-
ble. Id
But such "bright lines" should not be drawn haphazardly. In particular, Professor
LaFave cautions courts to resist the temptation to draw "[n]ew, supposedly 'bright' lines"
when existing doctrine is, in fact, sufficient to handle problems encountered through day-to-
day practice. Quoting Karl Llewellyn, he suggests that courts should take a less myopic view
of problems associated with individual cases; instead, "they need 'to see in the round rather
than the flat, and to gain some understanding of the whole in action.'" Id. at 333 (quoting K.
LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION-DECIDING APPEALs 263 (1960)).
In order to achieve these results, Professor LaFave suggests four inquiries essential to
rationally determining a bright line's efficacy:
(1) Does [the rule] have clear and certain boundaries, so that it in fact makes case-
by-case evaluation and adjudication unnecessary? (2) Does it produce results ap-
proximating those which would be obtained ifaccurate case-by-case application of
the underlying principle were practicable? (3) Is it responsive to a genuine need to
forego case-by-case application of a principle because that approach has proved un-
workable? (4) Is it not readily subject to manipulation and abuse?
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a limited roadway sweep search, further intrusions should be con-
ducted pursuant to a warrant.
Applying this rule to Carny, the initial sweep search in the park-
ing lot would be justified even if the agents lacked a reasonable belief
that Carney had confederates within the motor home. Once the mo-
tor home was secured, however, the police should have obtained a
search warrant before invading the vehicle's cupboards and
refrigerator.
IV. Conclusion
The United States Supreme Court granted the California Attor-
ney General's petition for certiorari in Carny on March 19, 1984.94
Because of the need to balance public interests in law enforcement
and personal interests in privacy within the motor home, Carney may
now force the Court to delineate some uniform rationale underlying
the automobile exception. The Court might address whether the ex-
ception is based on mobility, diminished privacy expectations, practi-
cal law enforcement considerations, or other factors.
Significantly, the Supreme Court in Ross suggested that the "au-
tomobile exception" is actually a general "vehicle exception. '95 In-
deed, this is the thrust of the State's argument to the Court on
certiorari review.96 But, if the Court adopts such a broad generaliza-
tion, it will impliedly reject personal privacy expectations as the
"touchstone" of its inquiry, in favor of law enforcement concerns.
Such an extreme rationale justifying the automobile exception will
fail to properly accommodate the numerous scenarios and competing
interests with which the law must deal. Allowing an automatic
sweep search to the extent necessary to protect the police and secure
the vehicle balances these competing interests. Such a limited search
would provide clear guidance to police in conducting "reasonable"
warrantless intrusions into motor homes. It would also accommodate
legitimate practical law enforcement concerns by promoting police
safety. Finally, it would protect the personal privacy interests of in-
Id. at 325-26 (emphasis in original). The rule which this Comment suggests parallels Profes-
sor LaFave's suggested analysis.
94 California v. Carney, 104 S. Ct. 1589, 1590 (1984).
95 See note 84 and accompanying text.
96 See Brief for Petitioner at 15-17 n.4, 18-21, California v. Carney, 104 S. Ct. 1589
(1984).
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dividuals-interests which are paramount to the "ordered liberty" of
a free society.97
Arthur H Abel
Donald E. Moore
97 See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949). See also Gouled v. United States, 255
U.S. 298, 303-04 (1921).
